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Abstract 
 
Soil erosion is considered a major constraint for agriculture and thus rural development in 
developing countries. Therefore, many efforts are made to promote soil and water conservation 
(SWC) among farm households. However, adoption of SWC practices is often disappointing. This 
thesis analyses the adoption behaviour of farm households. Two sub-watersheds (Pacucha and 
Piuray-Ccorimarca) in the Andes region of Peru were chosen as research area because of the 
importance of SWC in these zones, and the broad experience with SWC interventions. 
 
The main beneficial effect of terraces is the increased water availability in the soils, allowing higher 
crop densities and subsequently higher yields. However, the area lost due to terracing nullifies this 
positive effect on yield. Without changes in crop management terraces will not increase crop yields. 
Therefore, terracing should be combined with intensification of agriculture or with the introduction 
of crops with high market value. Whether terraces are financially attractive for farmers depends on 
their personal opportunity cost of labour. The direct incentives that farm households receive from 
programmes for the implementation of SWC change only slightly the profitability of the terraces.  
 
The decision to participate in a SWC-oriented programme appeared to play a key role in the 
adoption process, as programme participation is by far the most significant factor determining the 
adoption decision. The period of presence and the targeting criteria of programmes define which 
farm households decide to participate. Programmes with a top-down approach have a strong 
influence on the adoption decision. Participants of a programme with participatory approaches have 
more individual control on the adoption decision. In the latter case, terraces are installed on the less 
degraded fields, to intensify agricultural production for home consumption. Participants of top-
down programmes installed SWC practices on the rainfed and degraded fields with steep slopes that 
are used for extensive agriculture or pasture. Direct incentives do not result in a change in adoption 
effort, except for the participatory approach with farmer competitions. These competitions result in 
a larger share of land with terraces. 
 
Production functions revealed that terraces do not result in a significant increase of agricultural 
output at household level, but they do reduce the negative effect of slope on production. In Pacucha, 
the marginal product of land is lower on farms with terraces while the marginal product of labour is 
higher. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, it is exactly the opposite. These opposite effects are explained by the 
performance of the factor markets. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, land is scarcer but more capital is 
available, resulting in a more intensive farming system. In Pacucha, the labour market and output 
market are imperfect, because of the remoteness of the area. Terraces have the potential to increase 
agricultural production and factor productivity, but whether this is of interest of a farm household, 
depends on the existing markets.  
 
External intervention is indispensable for the implementation of SWC practices by farm 
households. However, whether farm households continue with these practices depends on the 
effects on agricultural production, factor productivity and existing markets. Therefore, programmes 
have to take into account the scarcity of production factors and the opportunities at local markets to 
convert increased output or increased factor productivity into cash income. As conditions differ per 
region, SWC interventions should be decentralised. 
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Prologue 
 
October 2001 
This is my second day in Pacucha. I’m still impressed by the beautiful surroundings: the impressive 
mountains, the splendid lake, a refreshing silence and clear air. The night was cold, but the early sun 
beams warm my stiff body. At this moment I realise that my PhD research is now really to start… I 
have an appointment with Saqueo, a farmer who lives near the place where I am staying. I asked him to 
be my guide for the morning, which he accepted. 
 
Being born in the Dutch lowlands, I’m exhausted after climbing a few hundred meters at this altitude 
of 3000 meter above sea level. I ask Saqueo whether we can sit down for a while. He looks at me a bit 
ironically. “Foreigners are always very fast exhausted”. We take a short break, watching silently the 
spectacular view. While I’m catching my breath, Saqueo starts to talk about his life: “I went to Lima”, 
he says, “in the hope to find fortune there. I worked there for several years. But everything you gain, 
you have to spend on food and housing. Lima is too crowded, life is unhealthy there. I returned to my 
village, and now I’m happy. I produce my own food. When I work, I can keep the money to buy clothes 
or a radio. I’m healthy and relaxed. I never go back to Lima again.” 
 
While resting, we talk about life in Pacucha. When I ask him why some farmers do not participate in 
programmes, he answers: “these people are lazy, they do not want to work. They only want to receive 
things for nothing. In the meanwhile, they are jealous of those who work hard for their living and who 
achieve their goals.” 
 
We continue, and I try to be strong and act as if the walk is not exhausting me. As we climb the 
mountain, maize and potato fields make space for fallow land and pastures with natural vegetation. In 
some fields I can see abandoned terraces or infiltration ditches. “These practices were installed by 
PRONAMACHCS, but we have abandoned them as we don’t cultivate here anymore”, Saqueo explains. “As 
there is less rain nowadays, water is lacking here, and we decided to cultivate the fields down slope 
where we have access to irrigation”. 
 
We reach the top of the mountain, and the view is beautiful. I’m proud I made it, but then I see women 
and barefooted children walking around with their livestock; this is their daily routine. Suddenly I feel 
a bit silly, the stupid foreigner with her mountaineering boots, who thinks she knows everything, but 
actually is uninformed and disabled in this environment. We walk back silently. Saqueo only spoke a few 
words, but he gave me an enormous amount of valuable information. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Setting and problem description 
 
Soil erosion induced by inappropriate land management practices is considered to be a major 
constraint to agricultural development in developing countries (LDCs) and thus also a constraint to 
rural development and poverty reduction (Ellis-Jones, 1999). Since the 1960s, soil and water 
conservation (SWC) has been of interestest to policy makers and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The policy makers have reasons to be concerned, as the reduction in farm productivity 
associated with degradation can affect the aggregate supply or price of agricultural output, the 
agricultural income, the economic growth, the consumption by poor farm households, and the 
national wealth (Winters et al., 2004). However, even though the importance of conserving soil and 
water in order to guarantee sustainable agriculture has been recognized, and despite many efforts, 
the results of SWC interventions are often discouraging (Rist and Martin, 1991; Lutz et al., 1994a; 
Erenstein, 1999; Sanders and Cahill, 1999; Vogel, 1999).  
 
A complicating factor of SWC is the uncertainty about the physical dimension of soil erosion and 
its effects, as these are difficult to measure (Warren et al., 2001) because data are not very reliable 
and erosion processes are complex (Blaikie, 1985; Stocking, 1987). This uncertainty about the 
actual extent and impact of soil erosion in physical terms, and the difficulty of evaluating it due to 
socio-economic differences over space and time, make it difficult to determine the economic effect 
of soil erosion and thus of SWC (Erenstein, 1999). Uncertainty about the profitability might be one 
of the reasons of limited adoption of SWC practices. 
 
Many economists (for example: Graaff, 1996; Enters, 1998; Bunch, 1999; Giger, 1999) argue that a 
major reason of the non-adoption of SWC practices is that they are not cost-effective for the farmers 
who should apply them: the investment costs are too high, and the benefits are too low, uncertain 
and achieved on long-term. To counteract these disadvantages, governments and NGOs are 
intervening to encourage farmers to adopt SWC practices, among others by providing incentives – 
but with mixed results, ranging from highly effective to counterproductive (Sanders and Cahill, 
1999). There have been cases where farmers have abandoned the SWC practices once the 
programme has withdrawn its assistance and incentives (Bunch, 1999; Giger, 1999; Sanders and 
Cahill, 1999). To prevent this happening, incentives must be clearly targeted and embedded into the 
social and economic context and the overall policy framework (Kuyvenhoven et al., 1995). 
 
This thesis will explore the adoption process of SWC practices in order to identify the causes of 
failing SWC interventions. Are the technologies inappropriate? Are the incentives inappropriate? 
Should the farmers be compensated permanently for installing and maintaining SWC practices? 
This thesis will handle these questions within the specific context of the Andes region of Peru. The 
Peruvian Andes was chosen as the basis research area because of its variety of agro-ecological 
conditions, in most of which SWC is important, and because in this region there is much experience 
with SWC practices and various types of incentives.  
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1.2 Key concepts and definitions 
 
The research done for this thesis focuses on the on-site physical and economic effects of SWC 
practices, and on the role of programmes on the adoption process. In this thesis the term soil and 
water conservation is used instead of soil conservation. The practices for soil conservation and for 
conserving rainwater are closely linked. Reducing soil erosion usually entails preventing splash 
erosion or the breakdown of soil structure, in order to increase the infiltration of rainwater and so 
help water conservation. Similarly, the reduction of surface runoff by structures or changes in land 
management will also help to reduce soil erosion (Hudson, 1987).  
 
The SWC practices considered are mainly mechanical. Mechanical SWC practices are used to 
control the movement of water – and wind – over the soil surface (Morgan, 1995). Bench terraces 
and slow-forming terraces receive particular attention, as these are heavily promoted in Peru. Bench 
terraces consist of a series of alternating platforms and risers. The platforms have a slight inward 
inclination, in order to retain water. Bench terraces modify the slope to enable maximum infiltration 
of rainwater and as a consequence they reduce runoff and erosion. Slow-forming terraces form over 
time. These terraces consist of ditches along the contour, with an embankment upslope which is 
stabilised with vegetation or trees in some cases. Eroded soil settles behind (i.e. upslope) the 
embankment, and as this process continues, the slope gradually changes and a terrace is created 
(Callañaupa and Egas, 2000).  
 
The physical effect of SWC practices is defined as the on-site effect of these practices on soil 
productivity and the consequent potential change in crop production. The economic effect is 
measured in terms of on-site profitability, as well as the change in the farm household’s production 
system, i.e. a possible change in the allocation of production factors and/or factor productivity. 
Adoption is defined as the implementation of a new SWC practice by a farm household on its own 
farm, after hearing about or seeing it. Incentives are defined as stimulus from external institutions 
(e.g. market, programmes, or government) that influence the behaviour and decision-making of 
farm households. These key concepts are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.3 Research questions and objectives 
 
This research has a closer look at the effects of SWC practices and the influence of incentives on 
the adoption of these SWC practices. It improves the insight into the complexity of SWC 
interventions by governments or NGOs, and the reactions of farmers with regard to conservation 
strategies and the use of incentives. The research aims to identify key factors for the success or 
failure of SWC programmes. In order to determine the adoption behaviour and effectiveness of 
incentives for SWC, the research focuses on the following research questions:  
1. What are the physical and subsequent socio-economic effects brought about by on-farm SWC 
activities and how do the farmers perceive these effects? 
2. Which factors are important in the adoption process and what is the influence of the SWC 
programme incentives? 
3. Which socio-economic constraints restrain the adoption of SWC practices? 
4. What are the implications of these research findings for the use of incentives in SWC 
interventions?  
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1.4 Thesis outline  
 
In this thesis the results of four years of research are presented. It starts with a conceptual 
framework and problem analysis based on theory, and then continues with the empirical research 
findings. Chapter 2 begins by discussing the theoretical framework of the research. The physical 
aspects of soil erosion are explored, as well as the economic interpretation of soil erosion and SWC. 
Furthermore, an overview is given of the different paradigms and research approaches in adoption 
literature, and the use of incentives for SWC interventions is discussed. Chapter 3 describes the 
historical, physical and economic context of the Peruvian Andes, as this is important for the 
interpretation of the results. Chapter 4 describes the two research areas, the characteristics of the 
farm households in the research areas, and the programmes that promoted SWC practices in these 
areas. Chapter 5 presents the case study on the physical effects of bench terraces on soil 
productivity, based on yield measurements. Chapter 6 transforms these findings into a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to determine the profitability of these practices at field level. Chapter 7 
disentangles the adoption behaviour of farm households, and the influence of programmes on this 
behaviour. Three different stages are distinguished to explain this process: the decision of a farm 
household to participate in an SWC-oriented programme, the decision to implement SWC practices, 
and finally the decision on how much effort (investment) is applied if there has been adoption. 
Chapter 8 analyses the effect of SWC practices on farm output and factor productivity at farm 
household level by estimating production functions. The results are discussed in the final chapter 
‘conclusions and outlook’ (Chapter 9).  
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2  Soil and water conservation: adoption and incentives 
 
Soil erosion can seriously affect agricultural production, and as a consequence the well-being of 
small-scale farmers in developing countries (LDCs), as well as the economic growth and welfare at 
national level (Barbier, 1995; Scherr, 1999). Much research has been done on soil degradation and 
its prevention, as well as on the economic behaviour of farm households. Several researchers try to 
combine both approaches in order to come to more appropriate and sustainable solutions for the 
problem of stagnating or even decreasing agricultural production of small-scale farmers due to soil 
degradation (e.g.: Blaikie, 1985; Barbier, 1995; Eaton, 1996; Graaff, 1996; Enters, 1998; Erenstein, 
1999; Pagiola, 1999).  
 
This chapter describes the conceptual framework that is used for a case study in the Peruvian 
Andes, as described in this thesis. In section 2.1 the interactions between soil erosion, soil and water 
conservation (SWC), soil productivity and agricultural production are explained, as well as 
approaches in economic valuation of soil erosion and SWC. This section 2.1 provides the 
theoretical framework for chapters 5, 6 and 8. Section 2.2 gives an overview of adoption theories 
and empirical research. This section will be used as starting point for the analysis of adoption 
behaviour in chapter 7. Though no special chapter is dedicated to incentives, this topic will be 
treated throughout the thesis. Therefore, the conceptual framework of incentives within the context 
of natural resource management is given in section 2.3. 
 
2.1 Effect of soil erosion and conservation on crop production 
 
Soil is an essential input to farming (Barbier, 1995). Processes leading to soil degradation include: 
chemical, physical and biological degradation, and soil erosion. Soil degradation is believed to 
reduce the agricultural potential of the soil (Grohs, 1994; Eswaran et al., 2001) and to threaten 
sustainable crop production (Enters, 1998), especially in the tropical regions. The degradation of the 
soil is thus believed to be a major problem for small-scale farmers in the tropics who often depend 
on agricultural production for their living. The quantitative assessment of soil degradation has 
mainly concentrated on soil erosion, as the effect of erosion on the soil capacity and thus food 
production is the most serious type of degradation in tropical environments (Grohs, 1994; Stocking 
and Murnaghan, 2001). The costs of soil erosion, and thus the benefits of conservation, may be 
substantial in developing countries, despite relatively low returns to agriculture (Barbier and 
Bishop, 1995).  
 
2.1.1 Soil erosion 
 
The physical effects of soil erosion are felt at two spatial levels: on-site and off-site. On-site is the 
field or area where soil detachment takes place. Off-site effects occur when soil erosion in upstream 
parts has (physical) consequences in downstream areas. The on-site effects mainly include soil loss 
and productivity loss, whereas off-site effects are predominantly flooding and sedimentation. In 
general, farmers are only concerned with the on-site effects of soil erosion, as they often face 
problems when their agricultural production is threatened by soil erosion, whereas society is also 
concerned about the off-site effects. Since this thesis focuses on farm household behaviour, on-site 
effects of soil erosion will be considered, as these are the household’s main concern.  
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On-site effects of soil erosion 
There is often a lot of confusion in the literature on economics of soil erosion about the different 
aspects of soil erosion caused by water (i.e. rainfall and/or irrigation). When the rainfall intensity or 
irrigation rate exceeds the infiltration capacity of the soil, ponding occurs. When this takes place on 
sloping land, the excess water will run off due to gravity forces. In an agricultural field, three 
processes start that can affect the agricultural production: water is lost (the runoff water); in some 
cases seeds and fertilisers are lost, as they are carried away with the runoff water; and soil erosion 
starts, as soil particles are detached and transported with the runoff water as well. The first two 
processes have a demonstrable direct effect on the crop production, as less inputs (water, and in 
some cases fertilisers and seeds) will be available for plant growth. The latter process has a less 
visible effect on crop production. Lal (2001) categorises the loss of water and inputs as short-term 
productivity effects, and soil erosion and its consequences as long-term productivity effects. 
 
Soil erosion changes the soil productivity, as soil characteristics are affected. Soil productivity is 
reduced by soil erosion due to: reduction in rooting depth, reduction in plant-available water 
reserves, degradation of soil structure, and loss of nutrients. The degradation of soil aggregates, 
which is the basic unit of soil structure, is both a cause and a consequence of soil erosion. It is a 
vicious circle: degradation of soil structure is one of the causes of accelerated erosion, causing a 
deterioration of structural properties (Flörchinger, 1998). 
 
A simplification of these processes is depicted in Figure 2.1. Often farmers are most concerned 
about the short-term visible effects: the loss of water and inputs. Water loss is a problem in 
particular for rainfed farming, especially in semi-arid regions, as water is often the major limiting 
factor for crop production (Pimentel, 1993). Loss of inputs is seen as an extra production cost. 
Farmers notice also a decrease in soil productivity, but it is not always directly linked to the soil 
erosion processes that take place in their fields. Soil productivity determines the potential crop 
production and thus the value of the soil for farmers, especially for farmers in LDC’s, who often do 
not have the means to increase the soil productivity through artificial inputs (Grohs, 1994; 
Erenstein, 1999; Scherr, 1999).  
 
The concern of scientists, however, is rather the soil erosion process and its consequences for the 
rooting depth, water storage, soil structure and soil nutrients, and how this influences the soil 
productivity. Especially the loss of nutrients receives attention from scientists, but distinction is not 
always made between nutrient losses caused by soil erosion or caused by depletion (soil mining) 
while these are two different processes. After soil particles are detached by the impact of raindrops, 
the runoff water washes away the finest and most fertile soil particles, leaving the coarse sand 
particles behind. This results in impoverishment of the soil and affects the soil structure. Depletion 
or nutrient mining occurs when the extraction of nutrients through removal of harvest products and 
crop residues is at a higher rate than the nutrient supply through mineralization and fertilisers 
(Stocking and Murnaghan, 2001). In general, the soil depletion process is less drastic than often 
suggested, and can be easily remedied through cultural practices and by adding fertilisers (Lal, 
1990). However, this is not the case with soil erosion, as soil particles are removed selectively and 
permanently. The erosion effects can be masked by ‘exogenous’ technological change like 
improved crop varieties (Barbier and Bishop, 1995), or its effects are modified by the use of inputs, 
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like nutrients in the form of fertilisers, by tillage, or by supplemental water supply through 
irrigation. However, adding nutrients is not a replacement for the natural productivity of the soil, as 
this consists of soil structure and soil depth besides the nutrients. Problems with rooting depth, 
which is more pronounced in eroded soils, reduce the efficiency of water and nutrient use by the 
crop (Hatfield, 2002). 
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Figure 2.1 Farmers’ and scientists’ concerns about soil erosion and crop production 
 
Inappropriate agricultural practices can accelerate soil erosion, and erosion-induced productivity 
loss is highly probable in most soils. However, any relationship between soil productivity and soil 
erosion depends on the quality of the soil that remains in the field rather than the quantity of soil 
lost (Hellin and Haigh, 2002). Erenstein (1999) also argues that erosion-induced productivity loss is 
more important than the amount of soil actually lost. The value of the soil for farmers is the 
possibility to produce crops and soil erosion results in foregone future productivity. However, 
quantification of this process and thus defining the effect of erosion on production is extremely 
difficult, as several functions of the soil are affected (see Figure 2.1). The processes are site- and 
time-specific. Soils differ much in their characteristics and heterogeneity is high, especially in 
mountainous regions. In some soils, nutrients are concentrated in the upper layers, which may lead 
to drastic yield losses in a few years when the topsoil is eroded. Other soils have a more even 
distribution of nutrients throughout the layers so that yield reductions are less pronounced and 
follow a more linear trend (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Grohs, 1994). Furthermore, the effects 
vary among crops, as demands for soil structure, rooting depth and water retention differ per crop 
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(Grohs, 1994). The degree of soil productivity loss thus depends upon the soil profile 
characteristics, the crop grown, soil management, and the microclimate (Lal, 1985).  
 
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) enlist the following problems that are encountered during attempts to 
quantify the effect of erosion on productivity: 
− Productivity and erosion are not independent. As one changes, so does the other, and because of 
the multivariate characteristics of each, so do many other factors change. 
− There are other factors responsible for yield decline and productivity losses, and, although these 
factors may themselves be related to erosion, they are distinctly separate processes. 
− Erosion rates by themselves are poor indicators of productivity loss. Some soils may suffer 
much erosion but are relatively unaffected, while others need only a very small quantity of soil 
loss to decline dramatically in yield levels. 
− Changing climate, technology and inputs tend to mask the decline in land productivity. 
 
But common sense suggests that production must be lower when soil erosion occurs, even if there is 
a lack of scientific data substantiating the relationship quantitatively (Erenstein, 1999). This 
explains the persistent assumption of erosion-induced productivity loss. Many expect the 
relationship to be cumulative non-linear, either convex or concave (Erenstein, 1999) or S-shaped 
(Pagiola, 1992). Often the regression equation that Lal found is used (Lal, 1981; cited in: Eaton, 
1996): 
xAeY β−=  [2.1] 
where Y is the yield in t ha-1, A is a constant (equal to yield on un-eroded land), e is the natural log, 
x is cumulative soil loss (t ha-1) and β is a constant that varies according to crop and slope. Other 
attempts have been made to estimate empirically the relation between soil erosion and yield loss 
with empirical data (see Table 2.1). Most researchers found annual yield declines in the range of 1 
to 4%. 
 
Table 2.1 Estimates of yield losses due to soil erosion 
Author Country  Yield loss (%) per 
1 cm soil loss 
Crop and cultivation method 
Lyles, 1975 USA 2.0 – 3.4 
0.8 – 3.7 
1.6 – 2.2 
Maize 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Biot, 1989 Sierra 
Leone 
2.7 – 4.2 
3.3 – 4.1 
Maize 
Cowpea 
Vittal, 1990 India 8.0 Sorghum 
Grohs, 1994 Zimbabwe 2.0 – 4.2 
0.5 – 3.7 
1.6 – 8.0 
3.3 – 4.1 
Maize 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Cowpea 
Flörchinger, 1999 Colombia 3.6 – 3.7 
3.0 – 3.5 
3.5 
3.0 – 3.5 
Clean tilled fallow 
Cassava without ridges 
Cassava on ridges in slope direction 
Cassava on contour ridges 
(Sources: Grohs, 1994; Flörchinger, 1998)  
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In order to evaluate the effect of soil erosion on soil productivity, the following approaches can be 
distinguished: 
 
Statistical methods: 
− Topsoil removal is applied to create various topsoil thicknesses. This method uses a proven 
statistical design with replication. However, natural soil erosion is a selective process, and the 
gross one-time, mechanical removal of topsoil does not simulate natural conditions (Olson et al., 
1994). 
− Paired comparisons between selected fields with different eroded phases, is often used. This 
approach works best in relatively young landscapes with documented cropping history where it 
is possible to determine estimates of past erosion. However, the data interpretation in such 
studies may be confounded by other factors (Olson et al., 1994). 
− Regression analysis can be used to analyse time series of yield trends across regions in a 
country to identify statistically significant effect of erosion rates on yields (Grohs, 1994). 
− Geo-statistics analyses the spatial variability of given soil and crop parameters within a specific 
area. When spatial variance structure occurs between samples taken from known locations in a 
field, it can be presented in a semi-variogram and missing values and values of correlated 
variables can be programmeed. The geo-statistical approach allows to express soil property 
changes in mathematical terms (Olson et al., 1994). 
− Production functions can be used to estimate relationships between the soil at a given location 
and the accompanying crop yields. These relationships can be used to express the soil 
productivity at different locations with a given level of technology (Grohs, 1994). 
Nutrient and water balances. The in- and outflows of nutrients and water in the soil are calculated, 
in order to see whether these flows are in balance, and to quantify the contribution of erosion. In 
case of a negative balance (more out- than inflow), the soil degrades. However, it is difficult to 
separate and quantify the leaching, erosion and depletion processes. 
Soil-plant simulation models. These models simulate plant growth on the basis of daily climatic 
information for a specific location and specific crops, and allow the simulation of erosion 
(Grohs, 1994). EPIC (Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator) is such a simulation model. The 
EPIC is a process based model that operates on a daily time step and consists of components 
that simulate erosion, plant growth and related processes and economic components to estimate 
the effects and costs of erosion and to determine optimal management strategies (Flörchinger, 
1998). However, these models are very data demanding and have to be validated with 
experiments (Olson et al., 1994; Erenstein, 1999). 
 
Some scientists state that soil erosion is not a major threat to production (Hellin and Haigh, 2002) or 
that the extent of land degradation is overestimated (Mazzucato and Niemeijer, 2001). According to 
Erenstein (1999), this belief is based on simple before-after comparisons where achieved yield 
increases took place due to yield-enhancing technical progress despite of soil erosion. However, 
yield-enhancing technical progress cannot be seen as a simple substitute for erosion control. On the 
other hand, there exists a risk of overestimating erosion-induced productivity loss. Nevertheless, 
soil productivity often increases due to SWC practices, whether soil erosion is a serious threat to 
agricultural production or not. 
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Off-site effects of soil erosion 
Water-induced soil erosion can be seen as a redistribution of soil: soil is removed from the upstream 
source and ‘re-appears’ further downstream. There are many possible downstream or off-site effects 
(sedimentation problems in fishery, irrigation systems, and drinking water reservoirs) of soil erosion 
that result from surface runoff and sedimentation. This can either have negative effects, like 
pollution or silting up of water reservoirs, or in some cases positive effects, like enriching of the 
soils in alluvial plains (Sfeir-Younis and Dragun, 1993; Erenstein, 1999). Off-site costs vary in 
measurability and relevance. Some are a direct financial burden, like the costs of sediment removal 
from water reservoirs and from rivers to maintain navigation, or removal of eroded soil from roads 
after floods (Hatfield, 2002). Other off-site costs are less tangible and do not lend themselves for 
quantification.  
 
Economic costs can be measured in terms of the present value of foregone net economic benefits 
from any loss of downstream economic activity, or from any direct welfare effects (Barbier, 1995). 
Environmental effects from erosion may take more time to be noticeable. Sediment deposition into 
streams, rivers, and lakes affects the biological health of the ecosystem. Sediment that is moved off-
site may contain nutrients (in particular phosphorus), agricultural chemicals, or pathogens. Each of 
these components has an impact on the ecosystem (Hatfield, 2002). However, the contribution of 
erosion on agricultural land to downstream problems is often overstated, as other causes of erosion 
are neglected, like natural processes and non-agricultural activities like road construction and 
deforestation. Finally, high off-site costs do not necessarily coincide with high on-site soil erosion 
rates (Erenstein, 1999). 
 
2.1.2 Soil and water conservation 
 
The aim of soil and water conservation (SWC) is preventing or at least reducing the effects of soil 
erosion and maintain the soil quality (Graaff, 1993). SWC consists of any set of measures and 
practices in order to ensure the soil functions for long-term use by humans and nature (Grohs, 1994) 
and obtain a sustainable agricultural production. SWC practices can be divided into mechanical and 
biological practices (Hudson, 1981). Mechanical practices control soil erosion, after the soil starts 
moving. Biological practices, however, prevent erosion by intercepting raindrops and thus not 
allowing the erosion process to start (Sfeir-Younis and Dragun, 1993). However, this distinction is 
not as strict, as hedgerows are biological methods, but control erosion instead of preventing it. SWC 
practices can be subdivided into annual practices and one-time investments. Annual SWC practices 
form part of ploughing and cultivation practices, and require an effort within each cropping season. 
Annual SWC practices are: mulching, contour ploughing, organic fertilisers, cover crops, crop 
rotation, et cetera. One-time investments are mainly mechanical practices. They require a one-time 
investment of labour and capital, and afterwards recurrent maintenance activities. It often involves 
modification of the slope, like terracing, and preventing runoff water through infiltration ditches, 
benches, hedgerows, et cetera.  
 
When replacing soil erosion by soil and water conservation in Figure 2.1, a similar picture is 
obtained (see Figure 2.2). The major benefits of erosion control are conserving water and retaining 
soil nutrients and organic matter, as well as maintaining soil depth (Pimentel, 1993) and soil 
structure. SWC practices decrease the risk of soil erosion and/or increase crop production. Due to 
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SWC practices, runoff water is retained as well as the seeds and fertilisers, and thus production 
costs are reduced. More fertilisers will be available to the crop increasing crop production. When 
the soil is conserved, there is no decrease in the rooting depth and the water storage capacity is 
maintained. Also, nutrients are conserved on the field. Due to the prevention of water loss, i.e. water 
conservation, water can infiltrate and is stored in the soil profile. In case a dry spell occurs during 
the rainy season, the crop benefits from the increased water storage, reducing the risk of crop failure 
due to drought. Water conservation is an important adjunct to soil conservation, in particular in 
semi-arid zones (Graaff, 1993) with rainfed agriculture. All these effects of SWC increase the soil 
productivity and thus the crop production. However, these SWC-induced processes can be masked 
by climatic changes, pests and diseases, technology changes, et cetera. There are more factors that 
influence crop production besides the few related to SWC that are mentioned here. 
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Figure 2.2 Farmers’ and scientists’ concerns about SWC and crop production 
 
In this thesis SWC practices will be evaluated by their effect on soil productivity in terms of crop 
production. The effects of erosion and SWC on soil characteristics, as depicted in the Figures 2.1 
and 2.2, are not analysed, as it is assumed that these characteristics converge in the term soil 
productivity.  
 
2.1.3 Economic assessment of soil and water conservation 
 
The assessment of soil and water conservation poses a considerable analytical challenge that can be 
tackled in varying ways. Erenstein (1999) distinguishes two different schools of economic analysis 
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of soil and water conservation with their own analytical approach: (1) the evaluation school, and (2) 
the adoption school. The first tries to quantify the economic effect of different SWC scenarios. The 
latter tries to explain and predict the divergences in SWC behaviour between economic agents. The 
evaluation school is discussed in this section. The adoption school will be discussed in section 2.2. 
 
Dimensions of the economic assessment of soil and water conservation 
Any economic analysis of soil erosion usually begins with the assessment and quantification of the 
physical effects, followed by the evaluation of soil productivity decline which is commonly 
represented by crop yields (Sfeir-Younis and Dragun, 1993; Grohs, 1994). SWC practices change 
the distribution of soil and water resources in space and time. When evaluating the benefits and 
costs of SWC, four basic factors should be considered. The first two refer to the spatial 
characteristics of costs and benefits, that is, the on-site and off-site or downstream effects. The other 
two refer to the temporal characteristics, that is, the present value of programmes in which benefits 
and costs extend into a reasonably well-known future, and the optional value of actions that extend 
into an essentially unknown future (Seckler, 1987). 
 
Considering the temporal aspect, SWC implies saving soil for future use: the resource use rates are 
distributed into the future. Degradation implies a redistribution of resource use rates towards the 
present (Barbier, 1995). The question is to which extent this ‘redistribution in time’ is desirable. 
SWC can be implemented at different intensities. Erenstein (1999) distinguishes the following three 
different connotations:  
− Absolute conservation: assuring that the soil does not erode at all. 
− Standards-based conservation: on-site standards take the soil formation rate into account, 
technology based standards take the best available control technology. 
− Efficient or optimal conservation: soil erosion is prevented only if benefits are larger than the 
costs. 
The optimal level of SWC in economic terms is the level at which the marginal benefits of 
additional conservation just equal its costs. It is clearly not optimal to reduce erosion to zero. Soil 
conservation represents a capital investment that does not necessarily generate a new income flow, 
but rather reduces the rate of decay of an existing income flow. Especially physical structures like 
terraces imply a long payback period. While the investment costs of SWC are readily determined, 
measuring the benefits is more problematic (Erenstein, 1999). 
 
As for the spatial aspects, farmers are often concerned with the on-site costs and benefits of soil 
erosion only, whereas society is also concerned with any off-site costs (Barbier, 1995). When soil 
erosion and conservation is examined from the society’s perspective, these external effects should 
be included. As a result, more costs and benefits are included for the society than for an individual 
farmer. The value of the resources should be adjusted for any distortions resulting from policy 
interventions or market failures in order to measure their true opportunity cost from a society’s 
perspective. From a farmer’s perspective, only the costs and benefits that actually accrue to the land 
user, who makes the decision about resource use, are considered (Lutz et al., 1994a). 
 
On-site costs of soil erosion 
From farmers’ perspective, the costs of erosion control consist of two components (Barbier, 1995): 
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− Direct costs: the costs to the farmer of the effort that is required to undertake SWC practices for 
soil erosion prevention. 
− Foregone output: any loss of current output that results from using less land, as SWC practices 
often take space. 
For the on-site cost of soil erosion to be a financial cost it must be an opportunity cost, which is 
defined as the value of a foregone alternative. In the case of soil erosion, the alternative for the 
farmer is to invest in SWC. Thus, the on-site cost of soil erosion is the difference between the 
(present value of) net returns of the farming system with SWC and the (present value of) net returns 
with soil erosion (Barbier, 1995).  
 
The valuation of erosion in monetary terms is even more complicated than the quantification of its 
effect on crop production. Whereas the biophysical environment determines the magnitude of soil 
erosion and its on-site effect, the socio-economic environment determines its value and thus its 
seriousness in monetary terms. An erosion-induced yield decrease is not the same in economic 
sense for all locations, as the value of agricultural production is influenced by factors like market 
access and land use (high value vs. low value crop). In developing countries most farm households 
are only partially integrated in markets, and particularly the staple food production is relatively 
inelastic. Market integration, even if partially, helps to mask the effect of soil erosion as external 
input use is stimulated, and market fluctuations hide trends. Market prices may, or may not, reflect 
the opportunity costs, and these influence farmers’ behaviour (Erenstein, 1999). Under perfect 
circumstances, market prices represent equilibrium between supply and demand. However, in case 
of imperfect markets – due to lack of information, limited access, subsidies or taxes – market prices 
might be inadequate to reflect the economic value of goods and services. Adjusted prices are then 
used to express the value of these goods and services. Shadow prices are adjusted market prices, to 
reflect true scarcity in the economy. Surrogate market prices are often used as shadow prices. If 
costs and benefits are not valued in the market, but clear substitutes exist, one can use appropriately 
adjusted market prices for the substitutes to develop surrogate or proxy values. Another possibility 
is to use hypothetical values through contingent valuation (Gregersen et al., 1987).  
 
Valuation techniques for soil and water conservation 
The following valuation techniques are commonly used to assess the costs of soil erosion as well as 
the cost and benefits of soil conservation. Different prices are used for these valuation techniques 
(Gregersen et al., 1987): 
Using market prices: 
− The change in productivity approach calculates the difference in crop yields with and without 
erosion, multiplied by the monetary value of the crop, minus the production costs (Barbier, 
1995). This approach is frequently used in environmental economics. There are two possible 
ways to apply the change of productivity approach for the assessment of soil erosion costs. The 
potential yield loss due to soil erosion can be estimated first and then evaluated by comparing 
the actual yield on an eroded soil with the yield on a conserved soil. Another possibility is to 
compare the increased production from actually conserved land with the production on non-
conserved land to identify the actual yield loss attributed to soil erosion (Grohs, 1994). 
Following this approach, erosion damage equals the market value of the lost crop production. 
However, contributing the observed yield declines only to soil erosion results in cost 
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overestimates (Enters, 1998), as other factors that might contribute to yield decline are 
overlooked. 
− The replacement cost approach uses the value of the compensation costs when land substituting 
inputs like fertilisers are used to compensate for the soil degradation (Erenstein, 1999). The 
‘replacement cost approach’ calculates the costs that one has to make when the damaged asset 
has to be replaced (Grohs, 1994), which is usually the annual marginal costs of fertiliser in order 
to compensate the loss of soil nutrients due to erosion. The replacement cost approach is 
appealing but can be misleading, as the interactions between soil erosion, nutrient loss and 
productivity loss are simplified. Most studies rely on the cost of inorganic fertiliser, not on the 
actual cost of nutrient replacement, which would also include the cost of transporting the 
fertiliser to the field as well as its application. 
 
Using surrogate market prices 
− Hedonic pricing and property valuation use land prices to estimate the economic value of soil 
erosion. Sale prices and/or rental charges of land experiencing different levels of erosion are 
assessed with regression analysis. The basic assumption is that investments in SWC will 
translate into higher land values, i.e. a future benefit to a farm household (Enters, 1998). Since 
land markets are poorly developed in most developing countries and institutional arrangements 
are often not sufficient to ensure property rights, hedonic pricing is in these circumstance of 
limited practical value (Grohs, 1994). 
 
Hypothetical values 
− Contingent valuation is often used for the valuation of environment and nature conservation. 
Hypothetical values are obtained through surveys by asking people how much they are willing 
to pay to conserve a nature reserve or to prevent air pollution. However, within SWC this 
method is rarely used. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis of soil and water conservation 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the most common approach to valuate the returns (or profitability) of 
SWC practices, and is based on the ‘change in productivity approach’. In practice CBA consists of 
impact analysis, followed by the valuation of the various effects. This enables the comparison of the 
present value of the benefits to the present value of all investment and recurrent costs (Graaff, 
1993). In the context of SWC, CBA generally distinguishes between a ‘without-case’ where soil 
erosion takes place, and a ‘with-case’ where some kind of SWC practices are implemented 
(Erenstein, 1999). Often a constant estimate of the yield decline induced by soil erosion over the 
period of analysis is assumed for the without-case. According to Pagiola (1992) this leads to biased 
results, as a fixed-yield decline leads to a ‘front-loading’ of the losses caused by erosion, causing 
them to be weighted more heavily in the analysis. The likely returns of conservation would then be 
overestimated. CBA is further discussed and applied in Chapter 6. 
 
However, profitability does not imply that adoption of SWC will be certain. Only in case farm 
households operate under perfect markets and with the sole objective of profit maximisation, a CBA 
would be sufficient to predict adoption (Erenstein, 1999). But most farm households in LDCs 
maximise their utility, not profit. Utility contains the various objectives of a farm household: 
besides profit that can be leisure, risk reduction, social reward, et cetera. The change in utility 
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caused by SWC practices is thus also determining the decision of a farm household to apply SWC 
practices or not. The composition of utility is unique for each farm household, depending on the 
farm household’s assets, characteristics, attitude and beliefs. Adoption studies try to explain the 
pattern of adoption behaviour among different agents by analysing these factors. The adoption 
school is further explained in section 2.2. 
 
2.2 Adoption behaviour in soil and water conservation  
 
Since the 1950’s, researchers try to understand which factors determine farmers’ decision to 
innovate or not (Ervin and Ervin, 1982), and what determines the pattern of diffusion of the 
innovation through the population of potential adopters (Abadi-Ghadim and Pannell, 1999). 
According to many authors, results of adoption studies have been disappointing (Nowak, 1987; 
Abadi-Ghadim and Pannell, 1999; Boahene et al., 1999; Jones, 2002). Studies were disciplinary, 
lacking the expertise of different disciplines to solve the complex, multi-dimensional issue of 
adoption behaviour. Statistical models that were developed lack explanatory power, despite their 
long lists of explanatory variables (Abadi-Ghadim and Pannell, 1999). Yet much theoretical and 
empirical research is done to understand decision-making and adoption behaviour of farm 
households. This section 2.2 will be used as theoretical framework for the adoption study as 
discussed in Chapter 7 in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Decision-making on soil and water conservation adoption 
 
Decision-making is a complex process. Farmers’ livelihood strategies are influenced or dictated by 
the biophysical, socio-economic and policy environments in which they operate (Blaikie, 1985; 
Enters, 1998). Farmers often face numerous constraints, such as land tenure problems, liquidity 
constraints, and the need to meet consumption requirements and to compensate for missing or 
incomplete markets (Lutz et al., 1994a). Within these constraints, a “room of manoeuvre” is left, in 
which each person can make different decisions. Final decisions are made based on own 
experiences and preferences, opinions of family and relatives, and other incentives. But even the 
decision maker himself can often not define exactly which signals influenced to what extent this 
decision, as some signals are received unconsciously. Each case of adoption behaviour is thus 
unique. The decision to adopt a new technology is a dynamic process that is determined by the 
characteristics of the new technology and by the characteristics of the decision maker as well. 
Farmers’ perceptions of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the innovation, and the efforts 
made by extension services to disseminate these technologies also influence the adoption process 
(Batz et al., 2003). 
 
In this thesis, adoption is defined as the implementation of a new or exogenous technology by a 
farm household on its farm. The adoption of a technology for natural resource conservation, like 
SWC, is different from adoption of agricultural inputs like fertilisers. The decision to adopt a new 
conservation technology can be seen as an investment decision on long-term, whereas the decision 
to apply agricultural inputs is made on a seasonal basis or short-term (Caswell et al., 2001). 
 
Graaff (1996) and Ellis-Jones and Mason (1999) summarised a number of preconditions needed 
before a household considers adoption of conservation technologies (see Figure 2.3). It is assumed 
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that farmers experience the following stages during the decision-making process: perception, need, 
knowledge, competence, and willingness. However, many constraints are likely to constrain the 
adoption behaviour of farm households. 
 
Figure 2.3 Decision-making process on adoption of SWC practices (adapted from: Graaff, 
1996; Ellis-Jones and Mason, 1999)  
 
 
2.2.2 The adoption process according to theory 
 
Several paradigms can be distinguished in adoption theory. Adesina and Zinnah (1993) define three 
main paradigms: the economic constraint paradigm, the innovation-diffusion-adoption paradigm 
and the adopter perception paradigm. Upadhuay et al. (2003) make a subdivision of the economic 
constraint paradigm into the income paradigm and the utility maximisation paradigm.  
 
Economic constraints paradigm 
Some economists assume that producers strive for profit maximisation. This implies that when an 
innovation or new technology results in higher profits, farm households ‘automatically’ adopt this 
technology. The strength of this paradigm lies in understanding the role of changes in income that 
Preconditions necessary for household adoption of conservation practices 
 
Preconditions       Possible reasons for no adoption 
Are erosion symptoms recognized? →  No Very slow process 
       More land readily available 
  ↓ Yes     Tillage by labourers 
Are erosion effects recognized?  →  No Climatic fluctuations 
       Infrequent use or visits of land 
       Lack of knowledge 
 ↓ Yes     Other disturbing factors 
Is erosion taken seriously?  →  No Not the farmer’s land 
       Deep soils, high fertility 
 ↓ Yes     Considered as a downstream problem 
Is farmer aware of SWC technologies?  → No Lack of knowledge 
       Inadequate extension 
 ↓ Yes     Poor information flow within community 
Is farmer able to undertake   → No Limited labour and capital 
SWC technologies?     Not land owner 
       Socio-economic constraints 
 Need to secure food production on short-term 
 ↓ Yes     Incompatibility with present farming system 
Is farmer willing to undertake  → No Insecure land tenure 
SWC technologies?     Poor financial return 
       Benefits are too long-term 
       Other priorities 
 ↓ Yes     Downsteam problem 
Is farmer ready to undertake  → No No adequate extension / training 
SWC technologies?     Too high initial investment required 
       Too much risk 
       Lack of credit 
 ↓ Yes     Limited market access  
 
 Possible adoption    
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motivates innovation. However, it fails to recognize heterogeneity among farmers’ preferences 
(Upadhyay et al., 2003). Farm households in LDCs often opt for tolerable profits (also called 
satisfying behaviour), not for maximal profit. Farm households have other objectives besides profit 
maximisation. According to Lipton (1982), non-economic variables are more important in the 
decision-making of a farmer in peasant economies than economic considerations, since poverty, 
diseases, illiteracy, culture, and limited access to institutions change the priorities and limit the 
opportunities of the farmer. Objectives like risk spreading, leisure, consumption, profit, 
environmental protection, et cetera, congregate in the term utility. Most economic studies on 
adoption use therefore utility maximisation to explain farm households’ behaviour. Social reward is 
not always considered, but this should also be included in the utility term (Boahene et al., 1999). 
Social status (in this case defined by non-economic variables like royalty, leadership and 
membership in an organization) is expected to play an important role in the adoption decision. 
Social networks are especially important for small-scale farmers who have less access to official 
institutions, as these networks enable farmers to overcome economic constraints and thus facilitate 
adoption.  
 
The economic constraints paradigm assumes that resource endowments are asymmetrically 
distributed and this determines the observed pattern of adoption of technological innovation 
(Adesina and Zinnah, 1993; Negatu and Parikh, 1999).  Possible economic constraints (or 
incentives) can be (Foltz, 2003):  
− Natural resource endowments: increasing scarcity of natural resources (e.g. land) leads to higher 
shadow prices for the resource, motivating farm households to adopt a resource conserving 
technology.  
− Capital scarcity: lack of capital or no access to credit implies that it is difficult for farm 
households to make long-term investments and thus impedes adoption.  
− Learning costs: technologies will diffuse fastest in areas where the learning costs are low; i.e. 
information about technology is readily available and easily evaluated by potential adopters.  
− Risk attitude: risk aversion implies that farmers will not invest in unknown new technologies or 
technologies that potentially create a greater variance in output.  
 
The innovation-diffusion-adoption model 
The diffusion paradigm is based on the innovation-diffusion theory of Rogers (1962). Rogers 
described the adoption process as ‘the mental process an individual passes from first hearing about 
an innovation to final adoption’ (cited in: Feder et al., 1982). Access to information about an 
innovation is the key factor determining adoption decisions according to this paradigm. The 
innovation is assumed to be appropriate, and the problem of technology adoption is reduced to 
communicating information on the technology to the potential adopters (Adesina and Zinnah, 
1993). As the knowledge is spread over time, the new technology is adopted on a larger scale. 
 
The diffusion theory made an important contribution to the adoption studies. The innovation- 
diffusion-adoption paradigm conceptualises adoption as a multi-stage decision process. Adoption is 
seen as a process of collecting information, revising opinions/attitudes and reassessing decisions – 
in other words, a dynamic learning process (Feder et al., 1982; Marsh, 1998). The current 
theoretical and empirical literature recognizes that adoption behaviour is complex and requires a 
blend of the income, utility and diffusion paradigms (Nowak, 1987; Upadhyay et al., 2003). Any 
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adoption decision is preceded by an information acquisition period which is also called an 
awareness or learning period (Dimara and Skuras, 2003). Generation and distribution of knowledge 
(i.e. extension and training) is an important factor in the adoption process, especially in case of 
complex innovations (Nowak, 1987), as the decision whether to adopt or not can be seen as a ‘risky 
choice’ problem. The farmer is unsure whether he will be better or worse off by adopting (Marsh, 
1998; Marra et al., 2003). One of the factors of uncertainty is on how the new technology or 
innovation will affect the production and/or profit. The likelihood of making a correct decision 
clearly depends on the decision maker’s knowledge of the relevant parameters. In time, when actual 
yields and profit are realised with the innovation, more knowledge is gained on the new technology 
(Feder et al., 1982), and the innovation is perceived as less risky (Marra et al., 2003).  
 
Adopter perception paradigm 
In case of natural resource management, or more specific soil and water conservation, innovations 
are often more environmental (i.e. conservation) than profit (i.e. production increase or 
intensification) oriented. Attitude and perception play an important role in the decision-making to 
adopt environmental technologies besides economic considerations. To fully explain adoption 
behaviour, any model of the adoption process must include attitudes, motivations and perception. 
Before taking any action, a farmer makes an internal trade-off analysis, weighing the personal 
advantages and disadvantages related to the conservation decision. This internal analysis is 
determined by human values, which can differ per person. Farmers that are ‘environmental’ 
oriented sooner adopt a SWC technology than their ‘profit’ oriented colleagues. Stronger attitudes 
favouring soil conservation raise the levels of effort of implementation (Lynne et al., 1988). 
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Figure 2.4 The Ervin and Ervin (1982) conceptual model of the adoption process  
 
Ervin and Ervin (1982) tried to conceptualise the decision-making process towards SWC (see 
Figure 2.4). This process starts by the recognition that there is an erosion problem. This perception 
is influenced by personal factors (human capital) as well as physical factors of the land (physical 
capital) and institutional factors (awareness raising). The second stage is the decision itself whether 
to implement SWC practices. Besides the factors influencing the perception, also economic 
considerations start to play a role. In the final stage the SWC effort (a function of the extent of 
individual practices on the farmer’s land) is determined. The same factors influence effort, but in a 
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different way than they influence the decision to use a SWC technology (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; 
Semgalawe, 1998). This analytical framework links socio-psychological innovation adoption 
behaviour to economic decisions on SWC (Semgalawe, 1998). The conceptual model is a 
simplification of the adoption process, as in real life the decision process is continuous and dynamic 
(Sinden and King, 1990). Sinden and King (1990) included an extra step between perception and 
decision: recognition. A farmer might perceive soil erosion, but that does not mean that he thinks 
the problem is worthwhile to solve by adopting a conservation technology. Whether or not these 
stages should be resolved simultaneously depends on the situation. If the final stage occurs one or 
two years after the recognition, or if the separate effects of the factors are of interest at each stage, 
the models can be estimated separately (Sinden and King, 1990). 
 
2.2.3 Modelling adoption behaviour 
 
Uniform adoption is quite rare, as both the utility of each farm household and the constraining 
factors differ across socio-economic groups and over time (Feder et al., 1982). Adoption research 
therefore tries to determine the impact of various factors on the adoption decision by estimating 
empirical models on adoption behaviour. Modelling the adoption process is complicated, and the 
researcher often faces mathematical and also physical constraints. The theoretical or empirical 
model for explaining adoption behaviour also depends on the choice of the dependent variable and 
the available data. 
 
Choice of dependent variable 
The adoption of SWC measures has been estimated in various ways in different theoretical models. 
The dependent variable reflects adoption of SWC measures and ranges from a binary (or 
dichotomous) variable to a continuous variable like effort  or intensity of use (Lynne et al., 1988). A 
dichotomous variable is relevant in case of non-divisible innovations (like buying a tractor or not), 
as non-divisible technologies are scale dependent and fixed (Semgalawe, 1998). However, 
important information on adoption behaviour might get lost (Lynne et al., 1988), as the dependent 
variable might take a value in between 0 and 1, which cannot be observed. This makes prediction 
impossible. In case of divisible technologies that are scale neutral and for which the level of use can 
be adjusted (Semgalawe, 1998), it is better to use a continuous variable.  
 
Often, adoption is defined as a qualitative variable. It is analysed in term of whether or not the 
innovation is used by the farmers (Semgalawe, 1998), using probit or logit models, in which either 
utility functions or production functions are included. Most studies derive farmers’ adoption 
behaviour from the maximisation of expected utility, subject to constraints like human capital and 
availability of land, labour, credit, et cetera (Feder et al., 1982). It is assumed that the farmer 
compares the new technology with the traditional technology during the decision process. If the 
farmers expects that the utility level of the new technology will surpass the utility of the traditional 
technology, he will adopt the new one (Adesina and Baidu-Forson, 1999; Batz et al., 2003). This 
process can be described as follows (based on the publications of: Adesina and Baidu-Forson, 1999; 
Batz et al., 2003): 
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Let EUT represent the expected utility from adoption of improved technology T, and EU0 the 
expected utility of the existing technology. The probability that a farmer adopts a new technology is 
a function of its relative utility: 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛==
O
T
T EU
EUfAP 1  [2.2] 
where P is the probability of the adoption and AT (=1) the adoption of the new technology. When 
EUT > EU0 the farmer adopts the new technology. Otherwise, no adoption is observed. The 
expected utility is determined by a vector X, representing the beliefs of the farm household 
regarding the characteristics of the technology (XT), the characteristics of the farm household (XH), 
the farming system (XF) and the farming environment (XE): ( )EFHT XXXXfEU ,,,=  [2.3] 
Then, the probability of adoption is given by: 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== EFH
O
T
T XXXX
XfAP ,,,1  [2.4] 
 
Time-series versus cross-section data 
The approach used to study the adoption problem, depends on the type of data available. In time-
series studies the shape of the diffusion process (or aggregate adoption behaviour) can be 
determined. The pattern of the aggregate adoption model is in general assumed to be a logistic-
shaped (S-curve) over time. Though the decision-making of farmers to adopt a new technology is a 
process over time, empirical research often applies a static analysis with cross-sectional data. In 
these cross-sectional studies a snapshot is taken of farm households’ technology use at a given 
moment. Using a binary choice model, the effect of farm, technology and environment 
characteristics on adoption decisions are estimated. However, static adoption studies often ignore 
the fact that most decision-making processes concerning innovation involve a multistage procedure 
of organisational change (Dimara and Skuras, 2003). A static model is thus problematic if the 
adoption decision has a dynamic structure over time. At the moment of study the technology may 
not yet be completely diffused throughout the population. Panel data, however, allow to combine 
both data and study both household effects and adoption over time (Besley and Case, 1993). 
 
Household modelling 
In some studies a household model is used to simulate the decision-making of a farm household. In 
order to reflect decision-making correctly, the model must be able to consider specific production 
constraints of a farmer while correctly weighing his main objectives (Bernet et al., 1999). In their 
model, Bernet et al. (1999) maximise the annual farm-household profit as a result of the optimal 
solution, referring to the maximum expected profitability to be reached within a specified context, 
as determined by a set of potential production activities and production constraints.  
 
Disciplinarity 
Several disciplines study adoption behaviour. Though adoption behaviour is subject to a 
combination of social, economic as well as cultural factors, most of the theoretical models have 
tended to present single-discipline explanations. Adoption has been explained in terms of the 
profitability of the investment (economics), the social rewards associated with adoption and the 
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nature of communication channels (sociology), spatial differences in resource endowment 
(geography) and the compatibility of the innovation with the norms of the society (anthropology). 
These different approaches are complementary, and not necessarily contradictory (Boahene et al., 
1999). 
 
Many attempts are thus made to estimate adoption behaviour, using different modelling techniques. 
The following section discusses the results of these attempts, and the factors found empirically that 
determine adoption behaviour. 
 
2.2.4 Determining factors of adoption according to empirical research 
 
It is increasingly recognized that the technical solutions offered by external agencies are not always 
sustained by farmers in the long-term. It is widely accepted that, besides the bio-physical context 
and technical factors, the socio-economic and cultural context have to be taken into account as well 
(McDonald and Brown, 2000). In general, it is assumed that the adoption process is influenced by 
factors as technology characteristics (performance, risk, complexity, investment, appropriateness), 
farmers’ attitude towards risk, adoption costs (investment), availability of capital (cash resources 
and access to credit; natural, social and human resources), labour availability and land tenure (Feder 
et al., 1982; Carter, 1995; Ellis-Jones and Mason, 1999; Batz et al., 2003). The following factors 
were found empirically to affect adoption of SWC practices significantly: 
 
Physical factors: 
− In some cases it was found that the rate of land degradation positively influences the adoption 
of SWC technologies (Sinden and King, 1990; Marsh, 1998; Baidu-Forson, 1999). 
 
Technical factors: 
− The new technologies proposed should be appropriate within the given farming system and not 
too complex (Marsh, 1998; Bunch, 1999). 
− Because of lack of creativity in developing new technologies, often a limited number of 
technologies is introduced which might be appropriate at one place, but inappropriate at another 
(Bunch, 1999).  
− The focus of soil conservation technologies is often on structures and retention rather than 
vegetation and cover, whereas the latter are more effective in preventing soil erosion, are less 
expensive and can provide lateral benefits (Bunch, 1999). It is better to have a broader focus 
like land husbandry or sustainable rural livelihoods approaches (McDonald and Brown, 2000). 
 
Personal factors: 
− Perception: recognition of soil erosion and positive attitude towards soil conservation influences 
the farmer’s attitude and increases his effort in soil conservation (Lynne et al., 1988; Shiferaw 
and Holden, 1998).  
− Subjective preferences for characteristics of new agricultural technologies are important 
determinants of adoption behaviour (Adesina and Baidu-Forson, 1995). 
− Human capital (e.g. education, experience) influences positively the attitude and perception of 
the farmer, and his adoption behaviour (Feder et al., 1982; Marsh, 1998; Illukpitiya and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2004; Lapar and Ehui, 2004). Especially education is found to stimulate 
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significantly adoption of innovations in many studies (Asfaw and Admassie, 2004). Age is 
found to influence the adoption decision negatively in some cases (Shiferaw and Holden, 1998). 
 
Economic factors: 
− Profitability is a prerequisite. The new technology itself should be appropriate and provide 
economic advantage to farmers (Cary and Wilkinson, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Bunch, 1999), or 
result in a higher utility level than the traditional technology (Batz et al., 1999). The benefits 
(production, risk reduction, income) should be immediate and tangible (McDonald and Brown, 
2000). 
− Often a new technology implies an initial investment for its implementation. Access to capital 
and/or credit influences the adoption rate, especially in the case of indivisible technologies 
(Feder et al., 1982; Nowak, 1987; Sinden and King, 1990; Barbier and Bishop, 1995; Illukpitiya 
and Gopalakrishnan, 2004; Lapar and Ehui, 2004). 
− Perception of risk and uncertainty are important, as innovations entail a (subjective) risk. Risk-
averse farmers are expected to prefer technologies with short-term benefits (Feder et al., 1982; 
Marsh, 1998). Those farmers that are willing to take risk and make investments, will adopt a 
new technology more easily (Sinden and King, 1990; Marra et al., 2003). 
− Labour availability may influence adoption in either way, as some new technologies are labour 
saving and others labour demanding (Feder et al., 1982; Nowak, 1987; Barbier and Bishop, 
1995). 
 
Institutional factors: 
− Integration into institutional, local information, and assistance networks can facilitate the 
adoption process (Nowak, 1987; Sinden and King, 1990; Marsh, 1998; Baidu-Forson, 1999). 
− Institutional inefficiencies in the development and delivery of relevant knowledge and 
assistance are asserted to be a major reason why conservation technologies are not adopted 
(Nowak, 1987). 
− When attitudes are strengthened through extension and training, there may be less need for 
dependence on technical assistance and other net income-enhancing programmes such as cost 
sharing and tax incentives (Lynne et al., 1988). 
− Programmes and institutes should be flexible in their approach. SWC programmes should focus 
more on processes (communication, participation, learning, adaptation and empowerment) 
rather than being output driven (McDonald and Brown, 2000). 
− Empirical studies do not always find a clear relationship between land tenure and adoption, but 
in some cases tenants are less likely to adopt a certain new technology than owners. If tenure is 
insecure, farmers are unlikely to invest in long-term activities (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 
2003; Illukpitiya and Gopalakrishnan, 2004). Some suggest that any observed effect of tenancy 
may be indirectly caused by the implied relation between tenure and access to credit, markets 
and technical information (Feder et al., 1982; Nowak, 1987; Lynne et al., 1988). 
− Farm size can have either a positive or negative effect on adoption, depending on the 
characteristics of the technology (economies of scale) and the institutional setting (Feder et al., 
1982; Nowak, 1987). 
− When complementary inputs (e.g. fertilisers or water) are not available, supply constraints 
hinder adoption (Feder et al., 1982). 
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− The behaviour of leading farmers is found to affect farmers’ awareness and perceptions (Marsh, 
1998). 
− Due to imperfect rural land markets, the user’s costs of soil erosion may not be reflected 
adequately in, or even bear any relation to, land values. The lack of effective rural credit 
markets may distort the farming household’s decision whether it is worthwhile investing in soil 
maintenance and its future productivity or exploiting it for immediate gain today. In other 
words, the opportunity cost of conserving the soil may be extremely high. If the farm household 
has to borrow in the short-term to invest in conservation, then distorted or non-existent local 
capital markets may make the direct costs of conservation too high (Barbier, 1995). 
 
It is clear that there exist many constraints that influence adoption behaviour or even impede 
adoption. Incentives are often used to alleviate these constraints. Section 2.3 will further discuss 
incentives and how these can influence adoption behaviour. 
 
2.3 The use of incentives for soil and water conservation 
 
There is a clear consensus that SWC practices help to reduce or prevent soil erosion and induce a 
more sustainable agriculture. However, as discussed in the previous section 2.2, there are many 
constraints that limit the adoption of these practices. Nowadays governmental programmes and 
NGO activities are developed in order to raise awareness and to promote SWC in many LDCs. 
Incentives are used to attract farmers and to overcome the adoption constraints. There is still a 
discussion going on whether incentives should be used or not to promote soil and water 
conservation among small-scale farmers in LDCs. There is no special chapter in this thesis 
dedicated to the analysis of incentives, however, programme incentives will be discussed 
throughout the thesis and therefore a conceptual framework will be given here. 
 
An incentive is a stimulant that influences the behaviour of an agent. Within natural resource 
management, an incentive is any inducement on the part of an external agency, meant to allow or 
motivate the local population, be it collectively or on an individual basis, to adopt new techniques 
and methods aimed at improving natural resource management (Laman et al., 1996; cited in: 
Sanders and Cahill, 1999). The aim of natural resource management is to use natural resources in 
such a way that production is adequate for present needs and that the productive capacity is 
maintained beyond the present use. Thus, there are two goals: meeting present needs through 
agricultural production – a short-term and private objective, and conservation of resources – a long-
term and social objective. Incentives play a role in ‘making private and social objectives meet’. 
Graaff (1999) calls the private benefits, financial benefits – ‘profitability’ according to Pagiola 
(1999) – and the social benefits, economic benefits. When both individual and social objectives are 
met and a measure is both economic and financial attractive, there is a so-called win-win situation, 
and no compensation for bearing costs by incentives are needed. However, if measures are 
economically attractive, but not financially (because of high investment costs or productivity loss), 
use of incentives for compensation of the costs is justified. These incentives should be the most 
cost-effective way to bridge the gap between the national economic and private financial 
profitability. If the individual gains (financial benefits) at the cost of society (economic costs), 
disincentives like taxes or legislation are more appropriate (Zaal et al., 1998). Figure 2.5 depicts this 
interaction of financial and economic benefits.  
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The discussion on the use of incentives in SWC programmes is between those who say that only the 
win-win situation (both objectives are met) should be aimed at, and those who justify the use of 
incentives if there are no financial benefits, but the economic benefits for society are sufficiently 
large. 
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Figure 2.5 Use of incentives in natural resource management 
 
 
2.3.1 The discussion on the use of incentives for soil and water conservation 
 
Agencies promoting SWC practices often make use of incentives in order to stimulate adoption by 
farm households. Here, the opinions of proponents and opponents of incentives are briefly 
discussed.  
 
The justification of incentives 
SWC incentives of any kind are intended to bring about a measure of equity between the public and 
private partners who strive to achieve both public and private conservation goals. They are meant to 
alleviate discrepancies in costs between public objectives and the personal or business objectives of 
landowners and land managers (Sanders and Cahill, 1999). In some cases, SWC results in benefits 
not (only) for the land user, but also for society in general. From society’s perspective, intervention 
might be justified when there is considerable off-site damage, or when land productivity is 
maintained for future generations. However, most SWC practices have to be installed on farmers’ 
fields and the accompanying decisions are taken by the farmers themselves. They are the final 
decision makers to manage their land in accordance with their objectives, their possibilities and 
constraints (Lutz et al., 1994a). Furthermore, the farmers are generally those who bear the costs of 
the implementation of SWC practices. In absence of private benefits for the farmer, there is no 
incentive or rational for him to invest in SWC, even though there are substantial social benefits 
(Shiferaw et al., 2003). Therefore, providing incentives to alleviate or compensate additional costs 
in order to stimulate farmers to adopt SWC practices is justified in terms of the benefits they 
produce for society and even for future generations. By providing financial incentives these 
‘externalities are internalised’ (Richards, 1999). Moreover, such incentives, either in the form of 
subsidies or other measures increasing the profitability of SWC, are likely to be continued in order 
to sustain conservation measures at the socially optimal level (Huszar, 1999). If the farmer is the 
only beneficiary, use of incentives is often justified by the argument that farmers are too poor to 
take any risks, while the measures involve heavy investment of labour and money. Therefore, the 
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farmers’ income may be reduced in the initial stage of soil conservation (Giger, 1999). Incentives 
help to compensate this temporary income reduction. 
 
Another justification of the use of incentives is that, since land degradation is often driven by 
economic incentives, it is necessary to alter these incentives in order to promote conservation goals 
(Enters, 1999). Resource degradation is encouraged by poor farmers’ high discount rates, lack of 
capital markets, high transport costs, adverse government policies and insecure property rights, in 
other words, land degradation is (partly) caused by market failures (Antle and Diagana, 2003). In 
case of imperfect credit markets and insecure property rights, the inter-temporal flow of net benefits 
from SWC is important for investment decisions. Short-term benefits become more important, but 
are often negligible. As poor credit-constrained farmers heavily discount long-term benefits in order 
to meet short-term needs, these negligible short-term benefits work as a disincentive for private 
investments (Shiferaw et al., 2003). Incentives or programme assistance may then be used to reduce 
the risk of implementing a new technology, if the innovation is fairly simple but involves a 
significant initial investment (Nowak, 1987). Another effect of market failures is that prices of 
agricultural inputs and outputs diverge from their efficient levels, affecting the market incentive for 
SWC (Eaton, 1996). 
 
Nowak (1987) already warned that SWC programmes will be ineffective if policy makers continue 
to assume that the adoption of SWC practices is guided solely by economic rationality. Even if 
SWC practices are profitable for farmers, they might still be reluctant to adopt these because of 
other constraints. Many authors mentioned the importance of institutional factors within soil 
conservation which can hamper SWC, like insecure land tenure (e.g.: Lutz et al., 1994a). Also, 
awareness and knowledge might be lacking. Educational or persuasive programmes can increase the 
efficiency of existing economic and technical assistance programmes. 
 
The rejection of incentives 
Many authors have argued against incentives, as many examples are known where incentives 
induced changes in land use on the short-term, but farm households returned to their old land use 
practices as soon as these incentives were withdrawn. They were only interested in the incentive 
itself (e.g. food, cash, agricultural equipment), and not in the accompanying technology (Bunch, 
1999; Sanders and Cahill, 1999). Bunch (1999) gives more reasons why direct incentives do not 
work: payment for the construction of SWC practices make farmers think that, as the programme or 
government had such an interest in these practices, they should also pay for the maintenance. 
Besides that, a paternalistic dependency is created: the farmer thinks he is unable to implement 
these practices without external help. Also, he is not motivated to experiment with and adapt the 
practice to his own circumstances, as he will not get the payment then. Programmes also use 
incentives to achieve quick results, without paying much time- and energy-consuming attention to 
sustainable effect of the programme. It is even argued that weak SWC programmes are more likely 
to use incentives to achieve its unsustainable goals. Often the root causes of the problem of land 
degradation are not addressed  in a SWC programme (Giger, 1999). Furthermore, the incentives 
influence the strategic behaviour and attitude of the beneficiaries. 
 
In an ideal situation the SWC practice should be an incentive in itself. SWC practices should 
conserve soil and provide productive benefits to the farmer, like biological (or vegetative) 
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conservation techniques (Stocking and Tengberg, 1999). SWC practices should no longer be seen as 
goals on its own, but incorporated in the overall farming system and farmers’ economic strategies. 
Instead of discussing the effectiveness of direct incentives for soil conservation, the issues should 
be put in a broader environment and socio-economic context. There must be a clear understanding 
of the rural economy, changing livelihood strategies and the evolving farmers’ perspectives (Malla, 
1999). According to Bunch (1999) the incentives needed for a successful SWC programme are 
motivating the farmers to innovate and create opportunities for these innovation processes. 
 
2.3.2 Types of incentives 
 
A part of the discussion is caused by the fact that different definitions of incentives are used. Table 
2.2 gives a brief overview of different types of incentives as they are used within conservation 
programmes. Note that those arguing against incentives are mainly arguing against direct incentives 
used by programmes. Indeed, direct incentives are often misused, as well by the transmitter (the 
programme), as by the receiver (the beneficiary, often the farmer). Direct incentives are designed to 
have an immediate impact on individual and community behaviour and can be either in the form of 
cash or kind (Zaal et al., 1998). Direct incentives have a discriminating effect: only adopters benefit 
from these incentives, whereas indirect incentives affect the whole community or population 
whether they adopt the new technology or not. Most agencies use direct incentives to motivate farm 
households to change their land use. These incentives will be called programme incentives 
throughout this thesis. 
 
Table 2.2 Classification of incentives used in conservation programmes 
Incentives 
Indirect incentives 
Variable incentives 
Direct incentives 
Regulating 
incentives   
Enabling incentives 
(or social instruments) Sectoral 
incentives 
Macro-economic 
incentives 
Cash payment 
Subsidies 
Agricultural 
implements 
Food aid 
Rewards and prizes 
Subsidised credit 
Fines 
Taxes 
Law 
Land security 
Market development 
Decentralisation of 
decision-making 
Credit facilities 
National security 
Input and 
output prices 
Subsidies 
Tariffs 
Exchange rate 
Interest rates 
Fiscal and 
monetary 
measures 
Adapted from Sanders and Cahill (1999) and Enters (1999) 
 
Regulating incentives can be regulatory measures like legal and institutional arrangements (Graaff, 
1999) or legislative and administrative instruments like restrictions and regulations (Enters, 1999). 
Laws are sometimes constructed to prevent natural resource degradation and violation of these laws 
is punished with fines. These incentives are especially used for nature reserves and protection of 
forests. Often farm households are restrained because of market failures and insecurity. Incentives 
like land security, credit facilities and market development can nullify or diminish these constraints 
and enable technology adoption. Furthermore, enabling incentives mediate the farm household’s 
potential response to the variable incentives (Enters, 1999). Another type of enabling incentives are 
social instruments that are used to raise awareness or moral persuasion through extension efforts 
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(Graaff, 1999). Variable incentives alter the net returns that farm households receive from their 
SWC activities, and can be applied directly through subsidies or cheap credit, or indirectly through 
fiscal market-based instruments. Market-based instruments use the ‘beneficiary pays’ approach in 
case of SWC, and are based on the concept that ‘external’ beneficiaries (the society, future 
generations or downstream residents) should compensate the land users for the benefits provided. 
The main principal is that these market-based instruments internalise social costs and benefits into 
private returns. This fiscal mechanism can be either executed through taxes or through subsidies 
(Richards, 1999). Temporary or permanent price policies are also financial incentives which can 
increase or decrease returns of investments (Enters, 1999).  
 
Incentives are often used to achieve a wide-scale implementation of conservation practices, but in 
order to be effective they should be oriented towards the land users’ problems (Sanders and Cahill, 
1999). If a misconceived incentive is used that does not correspond with the existing problem, the 
intended objective will not be reached. Therefore, it is important to know why a deteriorating 
situation persists. Instead of trying to find the most appropriate incentive to stimulate change it may 
be far more effective to find the disincentives that bring about a disabling environment (Enters, 
1999). To be economically viable and socially acceptable, incentive systems should be effective 
(results in line with their purposes), efficient (costs not exceeding social gains) and also equitable 
(all participants agreeing on fair compensation) (Graaff, 1999). Incentives should be related to 
‘farmer pull’ instead of ‘technology push’ (Graaff, 1993). The government’s role should change to a 
facilitator with the main objectives of setting the right conditions or creating an enabling 
environment for technological change. These new policy instruments should be market-based and at 
the forefront of any programme incentives.  
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
As soil erosion consists of several processes affecting the soil (section 2.1), physical and economic 
assessment of soil erosion and SWC is complicated. However, by focussing on soil productivity and 
crop production, a simpler approach is proposed ignoring the complexity of soil erosion processes. 
In this thesis only the effect on soil productivity and crop production will be considered, as this is 
the main concern of most farm households. Since this thesis focuses on the behaviour of farm 
households, on-site effects of SWC are considered, ignoring possible off-site effects. It is assumed 
that these possible off-site effects do not affect farmers’ decision-making and behaviour. The 
analyses described in this thesis are based on the ‘change in productivity approach’ (Chapter 5). 
 
The evaluation school and the adoption school are the two main schools of economic analysis of 
SWC. In this thesis, approaches of both schools are applied. The most common approach within the 
evaluation school to determine the profitability of SWC practices is cost-benefit analysis (Chapter 
6). As profitability does not automatically result in adoption, analysis of adoption behaviour of farm 
households is important to determine other constraints to adoption. The analysis in this thesis 
(Chapter 7) is based on the adopter perception paradigm. 
 
Despite extensive research on technology adoption among small-scale farmers, and despite the 
discussion on the use of incentives, little empirical research is done to analyse the effect of 
incentives on the adoption process. Most knowledge is based on evaluation reports of programmes 
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that used these incentives to induce adoption. To avoid confusion about incentives, several types of 
incentives were defined in section 2.3. Most programmes promoting SWC practices make use of 
direct incentives to stimulate adoption, but these can be accompanied with enabling incentives. The 
discussion on the use of incentives is partly caused by different definitions and understanding of 
incentives. 
 30 
 31
Chapter 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Setting the stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
3 Setting the stage 
 
The research described in this thesis took place in the Peruvian Andes. The environment, history 
and socio-economic development of Peru are quite different from other regions in the world. 
Therefore, in this chapter a description is given of the bio-physical, historical, socio-economic and 
institutional context in order to be able to put the research results in the right perspective. 
 
3.1 The bio-physical context of the Peruvian Andes 
 
Few countries have such a high variety in geography, ecology, climate and biodiversity as Peru 
(Heredia, 1997). In a thousand metre of mountainside of the Andes, more biological and 
topographical diversity can be found than in a thousand kilometres of flatland, resulting in many 
neighbouring micro-niches (Rhoades, 1986). This heterogeneity creates both opportunities and 
limitations to development (Crissman and Espinosa, 1996).  
 
3.1.1 The Andes 
 
The Andes is the longest mountain chain in the world with a length of 7.200 km (Tapia, 1996). The 
Andes emerged by subduction of the South American plate and the Nazca plate beneath the Pacific 
Ocean. The final uplifting occurred in the tertiary period, thus the mountains are relatively young 
and have still immature soils (Becker, 1988). The Peruvian Andes is referred to as the central Andes 
and is located at 12 to 18 degrees south latitude (Winterhalder, 1993). The Andes mountain range 
covers 24% of the Peruvian territory (Gonzales de Olarte, 1986). 
 
The Peruvian Andes have four characteristics that affect the development (Tapia, 1996): 
− Inaccessibility: Due to the location, altitude, slope and physical conditions, the access to and 
within the Andean region is difficult. Isolation, lack of communication, and limited mobility are 
all results of the inaccessibility. 
− Fragility: Areas with the steep slopes and light soil formations are susceptible to degradation. 
Inadequate use, overexploitation and sudden changes make the natural resources even more 
vulnerable. Also the economic structures (e.g. markets, access to credit) can be considered 
fragile. Fragility is related to marginality. 
− Marginality: The region does not benefit of investments in productive activities because of its 
isolation and remoteness. The population receives no priority in national development plans. 
− Diversity: The heterogeneity caused by altitude, pedological and geological conditions, and the 
location between the tropics result in many diverse ecological zones and a huge biodiversity of 
plants and animals. This diversity can be an advantage if good use is made of the 
complementary properties of the different zones.  
 
Climate 
In the Andes the weather is as important for agricultural production as the soil and inputs (seeds and 
labour). The central Andes form a massive barrier for the humid air coming from the Atlantic 
Ocean and Amazon Basin, that form into rain clouds when it ascends the eastern escarpments of the 
Andes (Winterhalder, 1993). Annual rainfall diminishes from north to south and from east to west 
in the Andes, but increases with altitude (Tapia, 1996). The rainy season endures from October till 
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March, when the air humidity and wind increase (Winterhalder, 1993). There exists an inter-annual 
climate variability causing dry or wet periods every few years due to temperature differences of the 
ocean along the Peruvian coast. This phenomenon is known as El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO), or more popular ‘El Niño’. This event occurs once every three to six years. During an El 
Niño episode, rainfall dramatically increases in some areas, whereas droughts occur in other 
regions. The next phase, known as ‘La Niña’, produces roughly the opposite climate patterns 
(Holmgren et al., 2001). The amount of annual rainfall is thus highly variable, in time and space. 
This erratic rainfall pattern makes the weather conditions in the Andes unpredictable and as a 
consequence the farmers vulnerable. Even if it is known that there will be an El Niño year, it is still 
not possible to predict the severity of the event and its influence on the agricultural production. 
 
Temperature hardly varies among seasons, but more so between day and night, especially at higher 
altitudes. During the dry season diurnal temperature fluctuations are high, as the temperature 
depends more on the (lack of) cloud cover than on changes in solar radiation due to the tropical 
latitude of the central Andes (Winterhalder, 1993). Temperature also varies by altitude with an 
average decrease of 5.5°C per 1000 meters increasing altitude (Johnson, 1976; Winterhalder, 1993).  
 
Agro-ecological zones 
Due to its diverse topographic and climatic conditions, the Andes contain a large variety of 
ecological conditions: from tropical to temperate, from humid to arid, from glaciers to hot valleys. 
This ecological heterogeneity determined the development of different agricultural systems, ranging 
from fallow systems to permanent cropping systems and from intensive to very extensive livestock 
production systems (Bernet, 1995). Taking advantage of this diversity along altitude, agriculture in 
the Andes has been dominated by the strategy of maximum diversification along altitude, which is 
also called the ‘vertical control’ of the mountain slopes (Murra, 1975; Morlon et al., 1982; 
Chonchol, 1995). The interaction among the different agro-ecological zones is necessary, because 
none is self-sufficient. The variety of agro-ecological zones along the slope creates opportunities 
but also limitations for agriculture. It might be desirable to cultivate a cover crop on a certain 
location in order to reduce soil erosion, but this might be impossible due to frost or drought. The 
other way around, crops suitable for a given climate might not be suitable for the given soil 
(Crissman and Espinosa, 1996). 
 
In Peru, eight different major natural regions can be distinguished, of which five are located in the 
Andes (see Table 3.1). The main agro-ecological zones in the Andes are Quechua, Suni and Puna. 
Below, descriptions are given of these three zones (Morlon, 1996; Pulgar-Vidal, 1996): 
− Quechua: due to its pleasant temperate climate and the suitability of the soils for agriculture, 
this zone has been intensely occupied and densely inhabited since ages. The annual maximum 
temperature varies between 22 and 29°C; and the minimum between 4 and 7°C. Annual rainfall 
ranges from 400 to 1000 mm y-1, depending on the longitude and latitude. The seasonal rains are 
of regular intensity, but sometimes destructive rainstorms occur. The frost line is found in the 
higher parts of this region at about 3000 m.a.s.l.1 during winter (May to August). As the frost 
affects the crops, this period is dedicated to harvest and fallow activities. Only on protected 
places with access to irrigation, crops are sown during this period, taking advantage of the fact 
                                                 
1 m.a.s.l. = meters above sea level 
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that the frost mainly affects plain land and less the sloping land. Maize (Zea mays) is the basic 
food crop and different varieties are grown. In order to increase the maize production, irrigation 
structures and terraces have been developed in this zone long time ago. Other important crops 
are bean (Vicia fava), potato (Solanum tuberosum), vegetables and fruit trees. Reforestation 
with eucalyptuses (Eucalyptus globulus) is taking place since last century. 
− Suni: this zone (also called Jalca) is characterised by steep slopes, deep gorges and rock 
formations. The climate is cold and dry due to the elevation and the local winds. The annual 
mean temperature fluctuates between 7 and 10°C, with a maximum at 20°C and a minimum 
between -1 and -16°C. The soil is hot as it receives the direct rays of the sun but it cools down 
quickly once the sun sets. Average rainfall is about 800 mm y-1. The main crops cultivated in 
this zone are typical Andean crops like: mashua (Tropaeolum tuberosum), quinoa 
(Chenopodium quinoa), tarhui (Lupinus mutabilis), bean (Vicia fava), potato (Solanum 
tuberosum), oca (Oxalis tuberosa) and olluco (Ullucus tuberosus). Because of the remoteness, 
the unfavourable conditions for agriculture and the degraded pastures, many inhabitants of the 
Suni emigrate nowadays towards lower regions with off-farm employment opportunities and 
education possibilities for the children. 
− Puna: the vegetation of the Puna is scarce but nutritious. This zone is the natural habitat of the 
Peruvian camels: llama (Lama glama), alpaca (Lama glama pacos), vicuña (Vicugna vicugna) 
and guanaco (Lama guanicoe). Potato (Solanum tuberosum) is cultivated as food crop. Annual 
rainfall ranges from 150 (dry Puna) to more than 1000 mm y-1 (humid Puna). At night, 
temperatures drop below zero.  
 
Table 3.1 Agro-ecological zones in Peru (after: Pulgar-Vidal, 1996) 
Agro-ecological 
zones 
Altitude 
(m.a.s.l.) 
Climate Main activities Agricultural 
products 
Coast 0-500 
Temperate to warm,  
0-50 mm y-1,  
high humidity 
Industry, fishery, high-
input commercial 
agriculture, urban areas 
Coconut, palm tree, 
olives, grapevine 
Yunga (Andes) 500-2300 Sub-tropical,  400-1000 mm y-1 Fruit trees 
Avocado,  citrus, 
sugarcane 
Quechua (Andes) 2300-3500 Temperate, spatial variability rainfall 
Small-scale agriculture, 
horticulture, livestock 
Maize, wheat, beans, 
fruit trees  
Suni (Andes) 3500-4000 Cold, spatial variability rainfall 
Small-scale agriculture, 
livestock 
Potato, mashua, 
quinua, oca, olluco
Puna (Andes) 4000-4800 Very cold,  200-1000 mm y-1  
Livestock breeding: 
llamas, alpacas Potato, barley 
Cordillera  
(Andes) 
4800-6768 Glacial Mining  
Higher jungle  
(Amazon) 
400-1000 Very warm and humid, >3000 mm y-1 
Rain forest, agriculture, 
coca Rubber, oil palm,  
Lower jungle 
(Amazon) 
80-400 Hot and humid,  2000-3000 mm y-1 
Rain forest, fishery, 
shifting cultivation 
Chestnut, natural 
vegetation  
 
3.1.2 History of agriculture in the Andes 
 
Ancient times 
It is assumed that around 40,000 BC the first people, hunters, came from Asia towards the Americas 
(Chonchol, 1995). Prehistoric hunters and gatherers preferred mountains because of the great plant 
 35
and animal diversity within short distances, a year-round supply of water, wood, and shelter, and 
favourable conditions for self-defence (Rhoades, 1986). Tuber crops, like potato, were important in 
the Andes. Maize was more important in the warmer zones at lower elevations (Burga and 
Manrique, 1990). Around 1000 BC the first permanent settlements arose in the Peruvian Andes, 
with their accompanying social structure and rules (Chonchol, 1995). 
 
Agricultural terraces are among the most distinctive features of the Andean landscape. In the pre-
Hispanic era, terraces built by indigenous societies supported large populations. It is estimated that 
nowadays the ancient terraces total up to 500,000 ha, and that up to 75% of these terraces are now 
abandoned and crumbling (Treacy, 1998). Terrace-building developed gradually. With an 
increasing agricultural population in steep, rocky valleys, the building of terraces may have 
appeared simply an effective way of clearing the land by piling up the stones and leaving the largest 
area as tillable land (Cook, 1916). By AD 300 agricultural terraces (andenes) were widely used. The 
construction of these andenes for agriculture continued to develop over almost all the Andes, 
reaching its highest point during the Inca Empire, just before the Spanish conquest (Mujica, 1995). 
 
Inca Empire 
Between AD 1250 and AD 1532, the Inca Empire was established. The Incas improved the 
terracing and irrigation techniques. Thanks to the development of a hierarchical political system, 
compelled taxes in the form of labour supply (mitas), extended infrastructure and food storage, the 
Incas were able to dominate large regions. Starting from 1440, the Incas expanded their area, 
conquering other tribes and disseminating their culture and agricultural techniques throughout the 
western part of South America. Social organisation was an important factor in enabling the Incas to 
accomplish what they did in agriculture (Cook, 1916). The Inca society was characterised by a 
strong hierarchy and an efficient planning (Araujo, 1986). The aim of agriculture was not 
maximising yields, but sustainable management. The needs of the society were optimised within the 
absolute borders of the ecosystem (Rist and Martin, 1991). The agricultural land was divided in 
three categories: 1) land used for religious purposes, with mostly maize production for ceremonial 
rituals; 2) land for the state, destined for food production for the state; 3) land for the communities 
and its inhabitants for private food production (Chonchol, 1995).  
 
The Incas organized terracing as part of a systematic and nationwide policy of land improvement 
and colonisation (Donkin, 1979). The prime objective of terrace-building was to expand maize 
cultivation wherever possible, in association with irrigation. Above the normal altitude limit of 
maize (3200 – 3500m) rainfed terraces were presumably used for the staple food crops – tubers and 
cereals (Mujica, 1995). The ultimate benefits were higher, more concentrated and less fluctuating 
yields, but there is hardly any evidence suggesting that terraces were constructed to prevent soil 
erosion. Terraces enabled irrigation on slopes and the consequently extension of agriculture into 
climatically marginal areas. Relatively steep terraced sites had the advantage of a fuller solar 
exposure. Crops on terraces receive more sun than they would if they were planted as densely on a 
flat field. The terraced slope also receives a more equal distribution of airflow, and the turbulence of 
warm air reduces the risk of frost. Terraces allowed water systems to function with little human 
effort, relying on gravity and a sophisticated engineering system. Besides, on sloping fields there 
were no dangers of flooding and sedimentation like in the valley bottoms. It was probably easier to 
construct irrigation structures and terraces on slopes than to develop a good drainage system to 
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cultivate in the valleys. Furthermore, rural settlements were situated on hill tops for defence 
reasons, and fields that were immediately adjacent were easier to protect and cultivate (Donkin, 
1979; Mujica, 1995). 
 
Spanish conquest 
In 1532, the Spanish conquered South America, and the indigenous civilization (the Inca Empire) 
collapsed in the following years. The Spanish arranged alliances with the indigenous elite, the 
former Inca rulers, which accelerated the diffusion of European customs and traditions (Burga and 
Manrique, 1990), and changed agriculture drastically. The Spanish introduced new crops (wheat, 
barley, vegetables), animals (sheep, cattle, horses and donkeys) and also new practices like the 
plough and animal traction. In order to make efficient use of animal traction, the Spanish cultivated 
only the gentle slopes in the valley bottoms, abandoning the ancient terraces and the indigenous 
system of vertical control (Rist and Martin, 1991). The Spanish had much interest in mining 
activities in the mountains, and agriculture was more and more neglected (Tapia, 1993). 
Meanwhile, the mining industry became the trigger of the economy. New urban centres emerged, 
and money, markets, as well as private property were introduced (Burga and Manrique, 1990). 
 
The Spanish applied extensive agriculture and productivity decreased while irreversible soil erosion 
processes started (Rist and Martin, 1991). Haciendas appeared in order to meet the demand for food 
crops on the emerging markets of the urban and mining centres, and the European demand for 
tropical products, like coffee, cocoa, sugar cane and cotton (Chonchol, 1995). Most haciendas were 
situated near the urban centres at the coast (Cotlear, 1989). As land was abundant and labour 
became scarce due to a population decrease and the expanding labour-demanding mining industry, 
livestock keeping and dairy production became increasingly important in the Andes (Burga and 
Manrique, 1990). The hacienda was based on the Spanish social agricultural systems, consisting of 
large land property and fixed workforce living on the estate. Agricultural land, including its 
inhabitants, was redistributed. Land that the Incas used for religious purposes was given to the 
Catholic Church and the land of the Inca state to the Spanish Crown (Chonchol, 1995). The Spanish 
relocated the indigenous population in peasant communities in the 16th century, officially to protect 
Indian rights, but also to make more efficient use of their (decreasing) labour force and to 
Christianise them. First, the communities had to pay taxes, but later many had to deliver labour to 
the nearby haciendas instead (Cotlear, 1989). 
 
Republic of Peru 
Once the independent Republic of Peru was established in 1825, more attention was paid to the 
agricultural development (Tapia, 1993). Export of primary agricultural products, like sugar, cotton 
and wool, became more important (Burga and Manrique, 1990). Especially haciendas with sheep 
and cattle farming in the Andes expanded due to the increasing international demand for animal 
products, mainly wool (Tapia, 1994). 
 
Agrarian Reform 
After a military revolution in 1968, an agrarian reform was proposed in order to redistribute land 
and modernise the agricultural sector. Another important objective was to defeat the capitalist elite 
by introducing co-operatives and direct state interference. The Agrarian Reform in Peru started in 
1969 and ended in 1978. Before the reform the haciendas controlled about 75% of the land, whereas 
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the indigenous rural population had access to only 15% of the land of low quality. Agricultural 
production stagnated and food demands were exceeding the production, leading to extreme poverty 
of the rural population. In the Andes, land of the haciendas was returned to the peasant 
communities (Sheahan, 2001). Though the indigenous people recovered the land, the territory of 
each peasant community was not distributed along altitude anymore like in ancient times. This 
disrupted the ‘vertical control’ strategy (Morlon, 1996). 
The agrarian reform resulted in a new structure with three types of exploitation (Chonchol, 1995): 
− collective property of production units with strong state intervention;  
− private property with small commercial farms (often former hacienda owners);  
− subsistence farming by a majority of small-scale farmers, who were either independent or 
member of a peasant community.  
The majority of the farm households in (the southern part of) the Peruvian Andes belong to the third 
type of exploitation. This thesis will therefore focus on this type of farming system. However, these 
small-scale farm households are not self-sufficient anymore, so mere subsistence farming is rare.  
 
3.1.3 Contemporary agriculture in the Peruvian Andes 
 
Contemporary small-scale agriculture in the Peruvian Andes is a mix of indigenous knowledge and 
customs, and exogenous (European) crops, animals and tools. Agriculture is most affected by the 
climatic risks (e.g. El Niño, drought or frost) and plagues. However, farm households in the 
Peruvian Andes have limited disposal of formal mechanisms to reduce risk, like access to credit or 
insurances (Escobal and Agüero, 1997). Therefore, farm households diversify their farming 
activities the same way they diversify their livelihood (section 3.2) in order to reduce risk.  
 
Crop cultivation and risk  
Small-scale farm households apply a risk-spreading strategy within crop cultivation: crops are sown 
in fields at different ecological zones with different micro-climates, sowing is spread over time, and 
various varieties with different climatic resistance are cultivated. The specific characteristics of 
each crop in relation to frost resistance and growing period determine the cultivation altitude of 
each crop. A hundred meter difference in altitude shortens the growing period by two weeks 
(Bernet, 1995). As maize is the most delicate, this crop always receives priority and is cultivated in 
the lowest areas, even though potato and other tuber crops have higher yields in these zones. When 
new crops are introduced, these are sown in the lower areas, while the ‘regular’ crops are moved 
upwards the slope (Mayer, 2004). The most important determinant of the cropping pattern is the 
consumption demand of the household, and not profit maximisation. 
 
Livestock 
Livestock comprises a crucial component in the diversification of agricultural production and 
farmers’ income in the Andes. Farmers keep different animals in order to diversify animal 
production (meat, wool, dung, milk) and other benefits (working power, savings). The oxen plough 
is nowadays a common technology. Sheep, introduced by the Spanish besides cattle, became more 
important than the domestic camels: llama and alpaca. In rougher and higher zones, where water 
availability and fodder quality limit sheep keeping, llamas and alpacas still dominate. Sheep are 
important producers of meat, wool and dung, but also serve for the exchange of goods or services. 
Wool is transformed locally into handicraft goods. Animal feeding depends on the available fodder 
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in a community, which consists mainly of communal pastures and crop residues. As fodder is scarce 
during the dry season, fodder crops like barley and alfalfa are grown for cattle. Most of the 
activities concerning livestock husbandry are undertaken by women and children, while men are in 
charge of the labour-intensive crops (Bernet, 1995). 
 
Reciprocity: exchange of labour 
Reciprocity is an important principle in Andean society. The reciprocity becomes most visible in 
the mutual help with labour-demanding activities. These reciprocal labour exchanges are very 
important to overcome labour shortages, especially during the harvest season. There are different 
types of reciprocal assistance: 
− Ayni: reciprocal exchange of goods and services, mainly labour, between households (Rist and 
Martin, 1991).  
− Minka: labour in exchange for food, goods or money (Rist and Martin, 1991). 
− Faena: each household belonging to the community is obliged to deliver labour for community 
purposes (Bernet, 1995), like improvement of roads, cleaning of irrigation structures, 
construction of a school (Gonzales de Olarte, 1986). These activities are normally carried out 
during the dry season when the agricultural activities are less labour-demanding. 
 
Land tenure in peasant communities 
One can distinguish two types of small-scale farm households in the Andes: farm households 
belonging to a peasant community (comunidad campesa), and the individual farm households 
(Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). Individual farm households who do not belong to a registered peasant 
community, have private ownership over their land (Figueroa, 1989). But the majority of the small-
scale farm households in the central and southern Andes are member of a peasant community (see 
section 3.2.3 for further discussion). Farm households that are member of a peasant community do 
not have private land property rights, and cannot sell or buy land. Instead, each family has users’ 
rights for certain pieces of land. This user right is passed on to the children. 
 
Two main types of user rights exist: the temporal user right (aynoka) for land that is managed by the 
community and the permanent user right (sayaña) for land that is privately managed. The sayaña 
land with permanent user right is often located near to the houses. These fields are intensively 
cultivated by the farm household (with use of fertilisers, irrigation, et cetera). The crops grown are 
important for home-consumption and for market sales (Bernet, 1995). The communal aynoka land 
is, in general, rainfed marginal land situated at the upper slopes of the community territory. This 
land is managed by means of a specific Andean fallow and rotation system, the so-called sectoral 
fallow system (Figure 3.1). The rotation has to be collective in order to keep the animals outside the 
land under cultivation (Figueroa, 1989). The communal land is divided into a certain number of 
sectors corresponding to the number of years of fallow the soil needs to rehabilitate (varying 
between 6 to 10 years). However, these fallow periods are shorter nowadays due to the increased 
land pressure. The community decides collectively on the fallow period and crop rotation for each 
sector. Each household owns several plots in each sector. During the cultivation period, land use 
rights to these fields belong to the farm households who cultivate them. Farmers tend to cultivate 
these fields extensively, as the crops in the aynokas are much more exposed to climatic risks. 
Another problem is that harvests in aynoka fields are more likely to be stolen. During the fallow 
period the temporary property rights are transferred to the community. Aynokas under fallow are 
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used as pasture, and all community members have equal rights to pasture their animals on these 
fallow aynokas (Bernet, 1995). The aynoka system is still of importance in the central and southern 
part of the Peruvian Andes. In the north, however, this system disappeared long time ago (Tapia, 
1994).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Communal sector rotation (aynoka) in time 
 
Farm households thus have several fields scattered across the community. The fragmentation of the 
land is caused by ecological, economic and demographic factors. Scattered fields reduce the risk of 
total crop failure and increase the possibility to cultivate different crops (Mayer, 2004). The 
distribution of fields makes sure all families have access to soil types of different quality and at 
different agro-ecological zones. Furthermore, it spreads labour demands over the season, as crops 
are planted and ripen according to altitude (Rhoades, 1986). When the parents die or ‘retire’, the 
land is divided among all children of the family. Each gets a part of the different fields that have 
different qualities and different agro-ecological conditions (Figueroa, 1989). In order to achieve a 
fair division of land, the fields get more and more fragmented. 
 
Irrigation 
Irrigation has a long history in the Andes and contributed to the development of, among others, the 
Inca Empire. However, nowadays large parts of the impressive irrigation infrastructures of the Incas 
are abandoned (Gelles, 2000). Rivers, creeks, springs and lakes constitute the sources of water 
supply for irrigation. Water is directed from canals towards the fields making use of gravity, and 
water is applied on the fields through surface irrigation. The physical (canals, wells, et cetera) as 
well as the social (people responsible for supply and division) infrastructure is organized at 
community level. The construction and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure is regulated by 
the community, making use of faena. The community assembly chooses the men responsible for the 
irrigation structures and division of water (Gonzales de Olarte, 1986). 
 
Erosion in the Andes 
Throughout the Andes soil erosion and land degradation are considered to be among the most 
serious environmental problems (Byers, 1990). It is assumed that 57% of the land in the Andes is 
affected by moderate to severe erosion (Felipe-Morales, 1993a). Land use is the determining factor 
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of soil erosion (Harden, 1993), with roads and cultivated steep slopes as main contributors. Lack of 
vegetation cover is the most important, and the slope the second most important factor causing soil 
erosion (Harden, 1988). Overland flow producing areas (like roads an bare fields) often cause rill 
erosion down-slope (Harden, 1992).  
 
Table 3.2 Estimated soil erosion rates for Andes regions in Peru and Ecuador 
Authors Conditions 
(rainfall, slope) 
Experiment Treatment Erosion 
(Mg ha-1 yr-1)
Maize, up-down ploughing  20.0 
Maize-potato-oat rotation, up-down ploughing  14.2 
Maize-potato-oat rotation, contour ploughing 6.9 
(Felipe-
Morales, 
1993b) 
500-750 mm  
Slope: 25% 
Runoff plots, 
40 m2 
Maize-potato-oat rotation, mulching 3.7 
(Low, 
1967)  
Simulation, 
USLE 
Peru 
Southern Andes 
0 – 70 
10 – 30 
Natural vegetation 0.4 – 1.1 
Sweet potato, contour ploughing 0.6 – 1.4 
Sweet potato, up-down ploughing 1.8 – 4.0 
(Pastor, 
1992) 
1050 mm 
Slope: 30-60% 
Runoff plots, 
40 m2 
Clean fallow (bare) 3.1 – 14.9 
Maize – pea rotation 4 – 45 (Torre, 
1985) 
2000 mm 
Slope: 20%  Pea – cassava rotation 12 – 70 
(Alegre 
and Rao, 
1996) 
2200 mm 
Slope: 15-20% 
Runoff plots, 
150 m2 
Bare soil 
Annual crops (rice – cowpea) 
Contour hedgerow cropping 
141 
79 
6 
(Byers, 
1990)  
Rainfall 
simulations Maize 82 
(Harden, 
1988) 
800-1400 mm 
Slope: >50% 
Rainfall 
simulation 
Thin dusty soils 
High-altitude, organic matter rich soils 
Intermediate elevation, dark Andean soils 
20 
40 
80 
 
Only a few attempts have been made to quantify soil erosion in the Andes (Table 3.2). Estimates of 
soil erosion rates in the Peruvian Andes vary between 0 and 140 Mg ha-1 y-1. However, in many 
studies most erosion occurred only during one or two rainfall events (Crissman and Espinosa, 
1996). The empirical results are time- and site-specific, and cannot easily be extrapolated to other 
regions, as there is a risk to overestimate the erosion problem. On the other hand, most studies do 
not include potential upslope runoff sources, and erosion caused by runoff water might be 
underestimated (Harden, 1992). Even though the exact quantity of erosion is not known, SWC still 
seems to be indispensable for a sustainable agriculture on the steep slopes. As soil is a production 
factor and a major asset for the Andean farmer (Crissman and Espinosa, 1996) it is important to 
maintain and improve it. However, hardly any research has been done in Peru to measure the effect 
of SWC practices on soil erosion and crop yield. According to Felipe-Morales (1993a) a positive 
effect of SWC practices on crop production is obtained due to soil conservation, but also to water 
conservation.  
 
SWC interventions in Peru 
As said before, Peru has a long history in terracing. Main purpose of the terraces in ancient times 
was the facilitation of agriculture on steep slopes and the modification of the micro-climate 
(enabling irrigation and reducing the risk of frost) in order to create favourable conditions for crops 
like maize (Cook, 1916; Mujica, 1995). In some regions these ancient terraces are still used. But 
 41
abandonment is almost total on non-irrigated terraces. The irregular rainfall regime makes labour 
and seed investment too risky for the low crop prices obtained, so land use has changed to livestock 
keeping, promoting erosion and collapse of walls because of the cattle and sheep grazing on the 
terraces. Furthermore, there is a shortage of labour that is needed for long-term soil conservation 
practices like terracing (Inbar and Llerena, 2000).  
 
Attempts have been made to rehabilitate ancient terraces, but programmes failed, as the original 
characteristics of the material used, workmanship, or design were not considered. In case the 
traditional social organisation of the Andean communities and the socio-economic principles of 
reciprocity and redistribution were used, terraces have been maintained and continue to be used 
even after the restoration programme ended. Communal participation is a must in any programme 
related with recovery of traditional technologies (Mujica, 1995). Another factor frustrating the 
rehabilitation is that there has been a shift of focus in the Andean economy from crop production as 
main activity to one of many survival strategies of small farm households over the past century. 
Also, communities are now more fragmented and heterogeneous, with weakened traditional 
authorities and abandoned traditional systems of land management (Rodríguez and Nickalls, 2002). 
 
Since the early 1980s, NGO’s and governmental institutions in Peru became more and more 
interested in SWC to prevent soil erosion (Alfaro, 1988). The governmental programme 
PRONAMACHCS (Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hidrográficas y de Conservación de 
Suelos) has been the most important promoter of SWC activities in the last two decades. The main 
SWC practices that are promoted by the various programmes are: slow-forming terraces, bench 
terraces, infiltration ditches, rehabilitation of ancient terraces and reforestation.  
 
Various experiences of NGO’s and governmental programmes have shown that SWC interventions 
are most successful when it enables the cultivation of an important crop for the local economy 
(Agreda, 2000a; Rodríguez and Nickalls, 2002). Combination of terraces with irrigation is 
desirable, as this enables two crops a year. A package containing a diversity of technologies is also 
desirable (Winters et al., 1998). As farm households and agricultural systems are diverse there 
exists no ‘one solution fits all’ practice. A technology package offers farm households the 
possibility to choose those practices that fit their farming system most. The promotion of SWC 
practices together with measures that enhance short-term profitability of agriculture increases the 
probability of a successful adoption (Winters et al., 2004).  
 
Most programmes use direct incentives to stimulate adoption. Frequently used incentives are goods 
in kind (Winters et al., 1998; Agreda, 2000b) and more recently the organisation of farmer 
competitions (IIDA, 2001; Kessler, submitted). An advantage of these competitions is that during 
the evaluations, farmers learn from each other during the informal discussions (Valverde and 
Sotomayor, 2003). Strengthening of the social organisation and the local economy seem to be 
prerequisites for a successful SWC intervention (Kessler, submitted). Incentives can stimulate 
adoption of SWC but have to be provided carefully (Winters et al., 1998; Agreda, 2000b). 
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3.2 Economic development in Peru 
 
In order to understand the peasant economy and poverty in Peru, one has to understand the 
economic history. In this section, the national economy and the process of the marginalisation of the 
peasant economy are explained. 
 
3.2.1 Explaining inequality and poverty in a nutshell 
 
Peru is characterised as a lower middle-income country by the World Bank (2004a), but is dealing 
with high levels of poverty and inequality. Poverty and inequality in Peru have three main causes: 
demographic changes, geographic conditions, and economic policies (Gonzales de Olarte, 1997). 
 
Demographic changes 
After the Spanish conquest, the indigenous population decreased from about 8 to 1.3 million within 
70 years due to violence and European diseases, like the flue, smallpox, and measles (Wachtel, 
1971; Morlon, 1996). In the coastal region, the indigenous population disappeared almost 
completely, and was replaced by Europeans and slaves from Africa. In the 19th century, death rates 
decreased due to improved health services, resulting in a population growth (Cotlear, 1989). In 
2005, the population is estimated at almost 28 million, with a current growth rate of 1.5% (INEI, 
2005). 
 
The urban population grew more rapidly than the rural population in the last four decades, due to 
the migration from rural towards urban areas (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). The reason for this mass 
migration was the industrial expansion in the 1960s in the urban areas, especially at the coast. 
However, in the period 1975-1990 Peru suffered a severe economic crisis, leaving many people in 
the urban areas without sources of income, inducing urban poverty (Gonzales de Olarte, 1997). In 
2002, the rural population still constituted 28% of the total population (INEI, 2005). Despite the 
migration towards the urban areas, the absolute number of people living in rural areas still 
increases, resulting in an increased pressure on the natural resources. As a consequence, agricultural 
production decreased while the poverty increased in the rural areas, especially during the violent 
period in the 1980s (Gonzales de Olarte, 1997). 
 
Geographic conditions 
In Peru, the land suitable for agriculture is limited and dispersed, as the major part is either arid, has 
steep slopes, or is covered under rain forest. The land available per active labour force is low 
compared to other South-American countries. In 1994, land per labour force was 1.46 ha in Peru in 
comparison with 3.74 ha for South America as a whole (Sheahan, 2001). Due to bad access to 
markets, climatic risks, and low productivity of the soils in the Andes, most farm households 
produce only for home consumption. Escobal and Torero (2000) show that the most important 
cause of differences in wealth between the coast and the Andes is the difference in infrastructure 
and private assets like education, farming experience and household size. The inferior infrastructure 
in the highlands, in turn, is closely related to the geography. 
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Changes in economic policies 
Until the 1940s, Peru’s most productive sector was agriculture. After the Second World War, when 
there was an increasing demand for minerals (like copper, zinc, silver, gold), the government 
facilitated foreign investment in the oil and mining industry. At the end of the 1950s, 
industrialisation took off. However, the industrial production was mainly to satisfy domestic 
demand, and the industry was little competitive and hardly generating foreign exchange. As a result, 
the industrialisation depended on the growth of the export of minerals, which was subject to the 
demand of developed countries. Though the mining industry only contributed 9% to the national 
income, it was pulling (or slowing down in bad economic times) the Peruvian economy, together 
with the fishing industry (especially the export of fishmeal), as these were the most dynamic, fast-
growing sectors. The increased employment in the cities stimulated the migration from the rural 
towards the coastal urban areas. As the industrialisation grew slower than the urban population 
growth, the third sector of services with low-earning jobs (e.g. street vendors, domestic employment 
and construction) was growing the fastest (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994).  
 
Economic politics have been unstable for the last decades, changing from orthodox to heterodox 
and back, which is also known as the ‘péndulo peruano’. This instability caused insecurity for 
investors, affecting negatively the investment rate and creation of employment and income 
(Gonzales de Olarte, 1997). During the orthodox (liberal) governments, investments were mainly 
made in infrastructure, whereas the heterodox (interference) governments invested in productive 
activities, mainly state companies (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). The liberal government, who had 
power until 1962, considered foreign investment as a promising way towards modernisation, but did 
not bother about rural poverty or the unequal land distribution (Sheahan, 2001). Under heterodox 
governments state intervention and protectionism were heavily intensified. In 1985, a huge conflict 
arose between the government and the private sector when the government tried to nationalise the 
financial system. As the economy collapsed, violence increased (Sheahan, 2001). Rural areas in the 
Andes did not benefit from any economic and political changes. Investments were only made in 
sectors and areas with a sufficient economic (profit) and political (votes) return, ruling out the less 
profitable small-scale agriculture and the powerless rural areas (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). 
 
3.2.2 Impact of economic development on agriculture 
 
The agricultural sector 
The demand for agricultural products for urban consumption and agro-industrial use grew rapidly 
between 1950 and 1975 due to population growth, urbanisation and industrialisation, but the export 
demand and rural markets grew slowly or not at all. The production on commercial large-scale 
farms at the coast grew rapidly but this expansion was not sufficient to keep up with the growing 
food demand in urban centres. Whereas Peru used to be a net exporter of agricultural products, in 
the 1980s it turned into a net importer (Sheahan, 2001). The share of agriculture in the Gross 
National Product of Peru declined from 24% in 1950 to 15% in 1970 (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994), to 
only 8% in 2003 (WorldBank, 2004b). 
 
The agricultural sector was exposed to a major liberalisation programme in the 1990s (the so-called 
Fujishock), inspired by the successful shock treatment in Chile (Mayer, 2004). This reform 
eliminated much of the highly interventionist policies, liberalised trade, eliminated price controls 
 44 
over agricultural products and most agricultural input subsidies (Escobal, 2001). The inflation was 
controlled, and the economy recovered, resulting in an agricultural production increase, even in the 
rural areas in the Andes. At the same time the Fujimori government made a major effort  to invest in 
rural roads, electrification, and drinkable water and sewage systems in the rural areas (Escobal, 
2001). This investment in rural areas and the successful elimination of the guerrilla restrained the 
increased inequality caused by the liberalisation (Mayer, 2004). Though the production increase 
helped to reduce poverty in the rural areas, opportunities outside agriculture are needed to alleviate 
poverty effectively in these areas (Sheahan, 2001). 
 
Agricultural development in the Andes 
According to Sheahan (2001), three factors restrained agriculture in the Andes: the distribution of 
land, lack of education and violence (guerrilla). The missing land market prevented the 
intensification and technological change in rural areas (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). Former 
landowners removed their capital from the rural areas after the Agrarian Reform, as they had to give 
up their land (Sheahan, 2001). At the same time, imported food was subsidised to keep prices low 
for the urban population. Small-scale farmers were discouraged to intensify and produce for the 
market, as they lacked capital, technology and access to the markets. While the large-scale 
modernised farms at the coast increased their production to meet the increasing demand in the 
coastal urban areas, the small-scale farmers dropped out, as they could not compete. Due to their 
low productivity, high transportation costs and high risks it was not profitable for them to sell their 
products on the urban markets (Glave, 1992). They had the choice either to become subsistence 
farmers or migrate to the urban areas (Figueroa, 1989; Gonzales de Olarte, 1994).  
 
The exclusion of small-scale farmers from the markets  
The low productivity of agriculture in the Andes is mainly due to lack of dynamic markets (Kervyn, 
1988). In order to understand the exclusion of the small-scale farmers from the markets, one has to 
consider the supply and demand of agricultural goods in Peru (Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2 Supply and demand for agricultural products (after: Gonzales de Olarte, 1994) 
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The domestic supply of agricultural products in Peru (EFGH) is composed of the supply of 
commercial large-scale farms at the coast (EF), the supply of cooperatives (FG) and the supply of 
individual farm households (GH). When there is a demand D, the large-scale farms will supply 0q1, 
the cooperatives supply q1q2, and the individual farm households will supply the small amount of 
q2q3. All will receive the price p1 for their products, which means that the large-scale farms and the 
cooperatives have a considerable profit. However, supply changes when agricultural products are 
imported from neighbouring countries for lower prices. The imported supply is presented by the 
line I and is supposed to be infinite elastic (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). Now, the supply is presented 
by the line EFI: the large-scale farms supply 0q1, the cooperatives q1q4, and the rest, q4q5, is 
imported. As prices drop to p2, it is not profitable anymore for the individual farm households to 
produce for the domestic market. 
 
3.2.3 Peasant economy: the economy of small-scale farm households 
 
The general sense of the debate in the 1970s and 1980s about peasant economy in developing 
countries (LDCs) was that it was tied to the wider political economy, resulting in an extraction of  
the surplus value from rural areas and constraining farm households’ access to resources (primarily 
land), creating unfavourable relationships between rural people and the market and state. It was 
assumed that peasantry not only provided cheap food to the urban economy, but also cheap labour 
(Bebbington, 1999). However, according to Gonzales de Olarte (1986) this notion of functional 
dualism does not apply (anymore) for the peasant economy in Peru. Most of the agricultural 
products of small-scale farmers in the Andes are traded on rural markets, not on urban markets 
where imported and agro-industrial goods are traded. The peasantry does not supply cheap labour to 
urban areas either. The urban areas have sufficient labour available, as unemployment is high, and 
this labour is better qualified (skilled, higher education) than the peasant labour (Kervyn, 1988).   
 
In the 1990s the discussion shifted towards the question whether peasant economies are viable or 
not (Bebbington, 1999). The peasant economy in the Andes is reflected as an impossible situation in 
which the peasantry limps along with low-productivity agriculture and migration, as the other 
options – disappear or modernise violently towards competitive production – are not very likely to 
happen (Niekerk, 1994). However, though agrarian livelihoods in the Andes might be in crisis, 
there are other rural livelihood options that offer sustainable alternatives (Bebbington, 1999). The 
farm households manage to adapt to extreme conditions like insufficient resources, unfavourable 
markets and a State that is insensitive to them (Mayer, 2004). Viable rural livelihoods are 
characterised by (Bebbington, 1999):  
− A relative success of households to sustain or increase their access to different resources,  
− Access to different opportunities to turn those resources into sources of livelihood improvement,  
− Access to means through which these resources contribute to their livelihoods,  
− Access to social networks and institutions in order to secure the other three types of access. 
 
This view stresses the importance of social capital in a peasant economy. Social capital includes 
institutions, relationships, attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute 
to economic and social development. Though social capital enables people to interact and gain 
access to resources and networks, it can also have a negative impact, as specific (ethnic) groups 
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might be excluded from society or networks (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2001). In the Peruvian 
Andes, social capital is partly institutionalised through peasant communities. 
 
Peasant communities 
Peasant communities are an important institution, as it determines the access of farm households to 
land and (extra-household) labour. The peasant communities are territorial groups whose members 
depend on each other via the exploitation of common resources and maximisation of  the collective 
well-being (Kervyn, 1988). At community level there are two sorts of communal resources: natural 
resources like land and pastures, and created resources like irrigation structures, schools, and health 
centres (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994). Due to the social structure, efficient use is made of the marginal 
resources and technology, as farm households organized in a community have better possibilities to 
reproduce and develop than individual farm households (Gonzales de Olarte, 1986). The 
community structure helps to surmount the difficulties that individual households encounter due to 
economies of scale, like the proportion of production factors (especially labour), infrastructure, the 
scheduling of tasks, the extension of available land and the collective defence of the territory 
(Mayer, 2004). 
 
De Vries and Gilvonio (2001) describe a peasant community as “a form of social organisation 
characterised by corporate control of land and other communal resources, the existence of rules and 
obligations enforced by communal decision-making bodies and, related to this, forms of reciprocal 
and communal labour (faenas) for the construction and maintenance of roads, irrigation canals, 
buildings, et cetera”. The community is governed by the community assembly (asamblea comunal), 
which is formed by all adult community members. It is the highest organ that can take decisions and 
it elects the Communal Directive Board (junta directiva comunal). The latter legislates about access 
to natural resources and administers justice. The authorities of the communities enjoy a relative 
autonomy for their internal administration (Kervyn, 1988). They are recognized and legitimized by 
the Peruvian government (Gonzales de Olarte, 1986).  
 
Farm households and rural livelihoods 
A farm household is defined as a peasant family that (Ellis, 1988): 
− owns a certain quantity of land, as well as means for production,  
− uses mainly family labour for agricultural production (except during certain peak periods), 
− is part of a larger economic system, and  
− is partially engaged in markets, which tend to function with a high degree of imperfection.  
 
A farm household in the Peruvian Andes is normally a nuclear family (Figueroa, 1989). The 
objective of the farm household is to assure its maintenance and reproduction. Production is meant 
for subsistence and interchange, in order to diversify consumption and increase levels of well-being. 
Farm households try to minimise variation in production, income and expenditure (Gonzales de 
Olarte, 1994). When farmers face a relatively known probability of risk (e.g. climatic risk) they 
establish insurance mechanisms, like crop diversification, dispersion of land or reciprocal labour 
exchange, in order to control the risk even if these mechanisms limit the production efficiency 
(Figueroa, 1989). More risks are taken, once the minimum income is assured, or when the 
opportunity cost of a production factor is low. For example, households take risks in labour 
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allocation when household members migrate temporally to search for off-farm employment 
(Kervyn, 1988).  
  
The principal resources for farm households are: arable land, pastures, livestock, water and 
irrigation structures. Labour is the largest resource, and the most flexible as well. Farm households’ 
agricultural production is limited by three restrictions (Gonzales de Olarte, 1994): 
− the agro-ecological zone defines the type of crop and type of livestock; 
− the need for subsistence defines which products the household consumes and how much; 
− the rural and urban demand defines the products farmers produce for the market (wheat, potato) 
even though they are not competitive, leaving those products for which they are competitive 
(olluco or quinoa), as there is no demand. 
 
Agricultural production has not been sufficient to sustain the reproduction of the farm household for 
decennia, and farmers are therefore forced to look for other income opportunities outside the 
community (Araujo, 1986; Gonzales de Olarte, 1986; Figueroa, 1989). Escobal (2001) estimated 
that 51% of the net income of Peruvian rural households originates from activities other than 
farming. In order to assure a relatively stable income throughout the year, farm households 
undertake a portfolio of activities which are interwoven. Agriculture and livestock keeping are 
important to assure the household consumption. The remaining labour is dedicated to the production 
of Z-goods and to the labour market (Figueroa, 1989). The agricultural calendar determines the 
rhythm of labour allocation to the different activities (Figueroa, 1989). The interdependency of 
these activities may limit technical change, as a positive change for one activity may cause negative 
changes for other activities (Kervyn, 1988). Richer households tend to rely more on non-farm 
sources and on the commerce of agricultural products than the poor (Escobal, 2001; Mayer, 2004). 
The richer households are more capable of selling products, as they have more personal contacts, 
speak Spanish and have more capital. These households also have access to skilled off-farm 
employment, whereas poor households are mainly working as (unskilled) labourer at the local 
labour market. As members of rich households have a better education it is easier for them to adapt 
in unknown cities. Furthermore, they have ‘working capital’ which allows them to finance the travel 
of a household member, his accommodation and the time to look for a job (Figueroa, 1989). 
 
Markets for labour, land and goods 
Farm households in the Andes are partly integrated in the markets. On average, 50% of the total 
income (products obtained form agriculture, livestock, non-farm activities and selling labour off-
farm) is destined for subsistence, and the other 50% is interchanged at the market, with livestock 
sales and labour bringing in most money. Goods that were produced in the community in the past 
(ceramics, food and drinks, clothing) are now replaced by goods produced in urban areas, like 
drinks, clothes and footwear (Figueroa, 1989).  
 
The principal market failures in the rural Andes are (Agüero and Robles, 1997): 
− Externalities: the social benefit is different from the private benefit due to the absence of 
infrastructure for transport or lack of technological innovations. Furthermore, environmental 
effects of fertilisers or pesticides use, or irrigation costs, are not considered in the prices for 
agricultural products. 
− Inadequate assignment of the user and owner rights of common and public resources. 
 48 
− Absence or scarce development of markets like markets for water and land. This includes an 
inadequate register of property rights, which hampers the growth of the land market. Also 
important are the imperfect information flows, as is the case for credit and labour markets. 
− Lack of competition: this comprises the monopolistic structures in input markets. 
 
The local labour market is partly non-monetary: i.e. the reciprocal labour exchange system. 
Normally, ayni is applied between poor farm households, whereas minka is between rich and poor 
households (the rich paying the poor). The amount of compensation depends on the personal 
relationships (Figueroa, 1989). The land market is very limited, as land is common property in most 
peasant communities. In 1995 a new law was accepted: ‘nueva ley de tierr’. This new land law 
created the possibility for community members to dispose freely their land and to manage their land 
individually. Farmers are interested to formalise their rights on the arable land for which they 
already have permanent user rights. However, at the same time they want to preserve the communal 
system and collective management of the pastures. There are still many practical problems that 
impede the implementing the new law into practice (Monge and Urrutia, 1997). 
 
An important restriction for farm households is that they depend on the agro-ecological zone for the 
agricultural products they produce (Agüero and Robles, 1997). Also, there exists a certain 
inelasticity of a farm household’s agricultural products in relation to its price. This inelasticity is not 
a result of traditional behaviour of farm households, but rather of the fact that the household’s 
portfolio of activities is affected when the product of one activity is changed. For example, if the 
price of potatoes increases, it is impossible for a farmer to cultivate only potato, as other activities 
are important for his survival as well (Figueroa, 1989).  
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The Andes region has a complex geography, creating both opportunities and constraints to its 
development, as it is affected by its inaccessibility, fragility of natural resources and economic 
structure, marginality of productive activities and its diversity of agro-ecological zones. Political 
economic and demographic forces have dictated agricultural development. The peasant economy in 
the Andes has been marginalised, as the contribution of the agricultural sector to the economic 
development of Peru gradually decreased. However, small-scale agriculture did not disappear. On 
the contrary, peasants are increasingly integrated into markets, as they become less self-sufficient. 
The marginalisation of small-scale agriculture is thus the product of a national economic 
development that neglected modernising agriculture in marginal areas, and that could not absorb 
peasant labour either (Kervyn, 1988). Agriculture, and particularly food crops, has lost profitability 
in the open market context (Appendini, 2001). As a consequence, farm households undertake a 
portfolio of activities and always look for new opportunities to assure their livelihoods. Though 
agricultural production is still important for the survival of many households, as it assures their food 
consumption needs, it is not the primary source of income anymore.  
 
This raises the question what the consequences of this marginalisation of Andean agriculture are for 
SWC. Rural households can adapt to environmental degradation, either by mitigating its effects on 
their livelihoods by depending less on the natural resources, or by rehabilitating degraded resources. 
Considering the soil, this implies that farm households either choose to become less dependend on 
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agriculture, or to invest in soil improvement. Whether they choose for the first or the second option 
depends on their endowments, institutions and technologies (Scherr, 2000). However, most 
programmes aiming at poverty reduction and natural resource conservation in the Andes have tried 
to address poverty by introducing agricultural technologies and conservation interventions. Yet 
farm households with whom they worked depended on non-farm income activities or migrant 
remittances (Bebbington, 1999). This might explain disappointing responses to SWC interventions 
in some cases. On the other hand, due to the low revenues from agriculture, farm households can be 
‘investment-poor’ (Reardon and Vosti, 1995), as they lack the assets to maintain their resources like 
land. Though land has become a less important resource for their income, it is still an essential 
resource for the livelihood of most farm households, ‘justifying’ SWC interventions. 
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4 The research context 
 
This research is executed in two areas in the southern part of the Peruvian Andes: the district 
Pacucha (department Apurímac) and the district Piuray-Ccorimarca (department Cusco). In both 
areas, programmes were undertaken to improve rural livelihoods and to promote sustainable 
agriculture and, more specifically, soil and water conservation (SWC). Most research was carried 
out in Pacucha. As many secondary data and information was already available on Piuray-
Ccorimarca, less research was done in this area. This chapter describes the two research areas, the 
farm households, and the programmes and their activities. It is realised that the two research areas 
constitute two different case studies, each with a distinct bio-physical and socio-economic context, 
and with different SWC interventions. 
 
4.1 Data collection in research areas  
 
The information presented in this chapter is based on grey literature (e.g. programme reports), 
consultancy reports and fieldwork, which consisted of transects, household surveys and informal 
talks with programme staff and farmers.  
 
Transect walks 
In November and December 2001, transects were made in the two research areas. Based on field 
observations, different areas within each watershed were selected, in order to cover the 
heterogeneity of the area as much as possible. Accessibility on foot appeared to be an important 
restriction though. Once a slope was selected, a transect walk was made along a straight line. 
Characteristics on land use, slope, soil, vegetation, erosion and SWC practices in the immediate 
surroundings (up to 5 meter each site of the line) were noted. GPS, compass, an inclinometer, and a 
measuring tape were used as tools to determine and register the transect line.  
 
Household survey 
In January and February 2002 a survey was carried out among 180 farm households in Pacucha and 
192 farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca. A stratified sampling procedure was applied in order to 
ensure that sub-samples of programme participants would be sufficiently large to carry out 
statistical analyses. Within each strata farm households were selected randomly. Three strata were 
defined in Pacucha: farm households not participating in any agriculture-oriented programme; farm 
households participating in MARENASS; and farm households participating in PRONAMACHCS. In 
Piuray-Ccorimarca the following three strata were defined: farm households not participating in any 
agriculture-oriented programme; farm households participating in ARARIWA; and farm households 
participating in PRONAMACHCS. During the data collection in the latter area, it appeared that the first 
stratum was difficult to find. Almost all farm households encountered were PRONAMACHCS 
participants, of whom a large part was participating in ARARIWA as well. It might be that farm 
households who do not participate in any agriculture-oriented programme are not much interested in 
agriculture either, as they work off-farm, and were therefore not found at home by the interviewers. 
 
After testing the survey form, local students with knowledge of agriculture and of the local 
language Quechua were recruited in order to carry out the survey. The survey forms were checked 
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on a daily basis during the data collection period, in order to correct any mistakes made by the 
interviewer. 
 
Cross-sectional data were collected on farm household characteristics, the farming system, 
characteristics of farmland, agricultural production, programme involvement, use of SWC practices, 
and the perception and opinion of the farm households. A few observations were left out of the 
analysis because of extreme values and unreliable or incomplete data. 
 
Informal interviews 
During different fieldwork activities (e.g. transects, yield measurements, survey, courtesy visits) 
informal talks with farmers were made as much as possible. Statements and opinions of farmers 
were noted in a fieldwork diary. Also programmes were visited regularly, in order to collect 
programme reports, but also to have informal discussions with programme staff. The discussions 
and exchanges of ideas with Peruvian researchers were another important source of information. 
 
4.2 Description of research areas 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the location of both research areas, Pacucha and Piuray-Ccorimarca. Both 
departments, Apurímac and Cusco, are characterised as poor. Apurímac is one of the departments 
with the largest percentage (78%) of poor2 inhabitants. 75% of the inhabitants of Cusco are also 
considered as poor. The high percentages are related to the rural poverty, which is due to the low 
land productivity, reduced size of agricultural properties, bad infrastructure, difficult access to 
markets and lack of access to education and health services (INEI, 2002). 
 
Figure 4.1 Location of research areas in the southern Peruvian Andes 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 ‘Poor’ is defined, as not having the means to provide basic consumption of the household. 
 
Pacucha 
Piuray-Ccorimarca 
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4.2.1 Description of Pacucha 
 
Pacucha is situated in the province Andahuaylas. Population density in this area is about 48 persons 
km-2 (Philip and Reichard, 2002). Pacucha is situated at about 30 km from the small town 
Andahuaylas, connected by an unpaved road. Every Sunday there is an agricultural fair in 
Andahuaylas where farmers can sell or buy goods. Most farm households dedicate some time to off-
farm activities like, trade, wage labour or fishing, to get some extra income. The lake attracts local 
tourists, but in very modest amounts. The local population does not (yet) profit from this tourism 
(mainly day trippers from Andahuaylas). In the 1980s, the guerrilla Shining Path was active in this 
area. During this period this region was difficult to access and therefore is less developed than other 
parts of Peru. People still suffer traumas of this frightening period. After the imprisoning of the 
guerilla leaders in 1992, programmes (re)started their activities gradually. 
 
The district Pacucha is larger than the sub-watershed3 considered in this thesis. The sub-watershed 
Pacucha (68 km2) ranges from 3000 till 4000 m.a.s.l. The climate is thus temperate and the area can 
be defined as a quechua zone (see section 3.1.1). The geology in the northern part of the watershed 
is different from the southern part. The northern part is characterised by deep soils susceptible to 
mass movements like creep. Also karst4 processes influence the landscape. In the southern part 
hardly any mass movements occur. Soils are shallow, and the geomorphology consists of gullies, 
denudational slopes and alluvial fans. East of the lake Pacucha, a large floodplain is formed. Also 
the vegetation is different in the northern and southern part. As the northern slopes are less exposed 
to sunshine than the southern part, the soils are more humid and vegetation is more abundant (Philip 
and Reichard, 2002). 
 
Based on climatic data of the local weather station in Andahuaylas, it was calculated that the 
average annual rainfall over the period 1990 – 2001 was 697 mm (ranging from 441 mm in 1992 to 
948 mm in 2001), with average annual maximum temperature of 20.5°C and an average annual 
minimum temperature of 5.6°C. Temperatures do not change much throughout the year, but rainfall 
does. The rainy season is from October till April, with January till March being the wettest months. 
During the dry season (May till September), minimum temperatures drop to 1 till 5°C. However, 
the weather station in Andahuaylas is situated at a lower altitude (about 2900 m.a.s.l.) than the sub-
watershed Pacucha, so actual temperatures in Pacucha might be a few degrees lower. During the dry 
season night frost occurs at the lower parts of the watershed. 
 
In November 2001 four transects (T1–T4) were made in the watershed5, to explore the bio-physical 
features of the area (Figure 4.2). The four transects are presented in Appendix 4.1. Soils are silt 
                                                 
3 When ‘Pacucha’ is mentioned in this thesis, it is meant the sub-watershed, not the district. 
4 Karst is a German word meaning ‘bare stony ground’, describing limestone terrain characterized by a lack 
of surface drainage, a discontinuous or thin soil cover, abundant enclosed depressions and a well-developed 
system of underground drainage including caves due to the solubility of limestone (Philip and Reichard, 
2002).  
5 The transects were chosen in such a way that different landscape units were explored. Some parts of the 
sub-watershed were too steep (north-west) or were reforestation areas (south-west), and therefore not taken 
into consideration. 
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loam or loam, and slopes are steep. Different erosion features are present in the watershed. In the 
southern part, there is a risk of sheet erosion and gully erosion. The gullies in the reforestation area 
are vegetated and thus not active anymore. However, a few active gullies can be noticed in the 
arable fields. In the northern part creep and toppling of the soil take place. Farmers have adjusted 
their land use to the soil. The unstable soils in the north are used as pasture and are under permanent 
cover, whereas the shallow soils susceptible to sheet and gully erosion are reforested with 
eucalyptus. Different SWC practices are found in the sub-watershed: infiltration ditches in the upper 
parts with pasture, gully control, reforestation, and terraces in arable fields. However, terraces are 
small, and SWC practices are few and scattered along the slope. The SWC practices in the upper 
parts of the watershed are often neglected. These are the so-called aynoka fields (section 3.1.3), and 
thus are under communal management. Most of these fields are under fallow for several years and 
used as pastures. During this period, the SWC practices are not maintained. There are no ancient 
terraces in this area, so farmers do not have a history in terracing. According to Cavassa and 
Bedoya (2001) only 7% of the total area contained SWC practices, which are promoted by 
programmes.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Map of sub-watershed Pacucha 
 
Maize and potato are the main crops in Pacucha, and, to a lesser extent, barley, wheat and beans. 
Maize is cultivated at the lower fields of the slopes and in the floodplain, often in combination with 
irrigation. Cereals are cultivated at the higher and rainfed areas. Potato is cultivated anywhere in the 
sub-watershed, depending on the variety. Most farm households produce for their own 
consumption. Surpluses are sold on the markets in Pacucha or Andahuaylas. Potato is the main cash 
crop. Few chemical agricultural inputs are used. Livestock mainly consists of cows, sheep, pigs, 
poultry and guinea pigs. Dairy products (surplus) are sold locally. Two governmental programmes 
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are promoting SWC practices in this watershed: MARENASS, during the period 1998-2003, and 
PRONAMACHCS since 1995. 
 
4.2.2 Description of Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
The sub-watershed Piuray-Ccorimarca is situated in the province of Urubamba, department Cusco. 
A small part of the sub-watershed belongs to the province Anta. Population density in the area is 88 
persons km-2 (Antezana, 2002). The sub-watershed Piuray-Ccorimarca is situated at 30 km from the 
departmental capital Cusco and reached by a well maintained paved road. The economic activities 
and tourism in Cusco and its surrounding villages have a large influence on life in this area. Most 
farm households work in agriculture, but they also spend considerable time on off-farm 
employment like taxi driver, porter on the Inca Trail or handicraft. Farmers are orientated towards 
the market, even though a large part of the harvest is still for home consumption. 
 
The sub-watershed Piuray-Ccorimarca (96 km2) ranges from 3300 till 4575 m.a.s.l. (Antezana, 
2002). The agro-ecological zones encountered in the watershed are quechua (south-west) and suni 
(north-east). The watershed can be divided in two parts: Piuray (north-east), the area surrounding 
the lake Piuray that is characterised by steep slopes, and Ccorimarca (south-west), a flat area with 
gentle slopes and many problems of waterlogging, as drainage is lacking. Most erosion features and 
SWC practices can be found in Piuray (Guzman, 2002).  
 
The rainy season is from November till March. Average annual rainfall is estimated at 824 mm 
(IMA, 2001). Average maximum temperatures are 20°C and average minimum temperature is 
around 0°C. In the upper part of the sub-watershed the annual average temperature is 7.5°C in 
contrast to the annual average temperature of 10.3°C in the lower part (IMA, 2001). From May to 
August night frost occurs in the upper part of the watershed, affecting the crops (Guzman, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Map of sub-watershed Piuray-Ccorimarca 
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Five transects (T1–T5) were made in the watershed to explore the bio-physical features of the area 
(Figure 4.3). The five transects are presented in Appendix 4.2. The soils are mainly loamy sand or 
silt loam. Slopes of arable land are less steep than in Pacucha, and the valley bottom in the south-
western part has very gentle slopes. Most erosion features are encountered in the north-eastern part 
of the watershed. Sheet erosion is often severe, but also signs of crusting, gully erosion and land 
slides are present. There is a diversity of SWC practices: infiltration ditches, slow-forming terraces, 
bench terraces, rehabilitated ancient terraces, naturally formed terraces (pata pata), et cetera. Pata 
patas are small natural terraces that have been formed by the accumulation of soil due to gravity 
and tillage. The bank is normally covered by native shrubs (Callañaupa and Egas, 2000). In some 
parts of the watershed the SWC practices are badly maintained if not abandoned completely. This 
happens often on communal land, the so-called aynoka. About 63% of the total area in the north-
eastern part of the watershed (Piuray) contains SWC practices promoted by programmes (Cavassa 
and Bedoya, 2001). 
 
Main crops are potato and other tubers (oca, olluco), and, to a lesser extent, beans, oat, barley and 
wheat. The latter three are mainly used for fodder. In the lowest part of the watershed some maize is 
grown. The crop potato suffers from many pests and diseases. All farmers use chemical inputs 
(fertilizers and pesticides) for potato. Contamination of drinking water due to these chemicals has 
become a problem. Livestock consists of cows, sheep, poultry and guinea pigs, and in the higher 
parts also some llamas and alpacas. 
 
4.3  Farm households in the research areas 
 
The value of the agricultural production is not significantly different between the two areas, but the 
income level from off-farm employment is significantly higher in Piuray-Ccorimarca (Table 4.1), as 
there are more off-farm opportunities. Also, the education level of the head of household is higher 
in Piuray-Ccorimarca. Though the agricultural production is not significantly different, more 
agricultural production (mainly potato) is destined for the market in Piuray-Ccorimarca. These 
differences suggest that farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca are more integrated into the markets 
than farm households in Pacucha. 
 
Farmland seems to be less suitable for agricultural production in Pacucha: less land is located in the 
valley bottom, slopes are steeper and more land has stony soils. Farmers were asked about their 
opinion and perception of soil erosion and SWC practices (Table 4.2). Soil erosion and decreasing 
soil fertility are considered major problems at farm level in both areas. Knowledge about soil 
erosion and SWC seems to be more widespread in Piuray-Ccorimarca than in Pacucha, probably 
due to the long period of SWC interventions. Many farmers observe negative effects of soil erosion. 
Soil loss, production loss, crop damage and loss of inputs, are most often mentioned as problems 
due to soil erosion. Most farmers seem to be well aware of the causes and effects of soil erosion, 
especially in Piuray-Ccorimarca. However, the reasons to implement SWC practices on their farm 
was not to prevent these negative effects, but rather because it was recommended by the 
programmes. Most farmers also mentioned the same SWC practices that are promoted by the 
programmes as solutions for soil erosion. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, some farmers also stated they had 
installed the practices because of the incentives they could obtain (i.e. money, food or tools). 
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Table 4.1 Description of farm household characteristics  
Independent variables 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
 
Variable Description Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Farm household characteristics 
Family size Total amount of farm household members 5.108 1.987 4.745 1.889 * 
Gender = 1 if gender of head of household is male, 0 if female 0.835 0.372 0.957 0.202 ***
Age Age of head of household 39.8 13.0 40.0 12.6  
Education Ranking of education level of head of household 2.659 1.259 3.239 1.329 ***
Dependency 
ratio 
Number of household members younger than 16, 
divided by total number of household members 0.459 0.223 0.454 0.217  
Farm household assets 
Off-farm 
income 
Total amount of off-farm income (S/.) that farm 
household earned during year 2001 1943 2084 3969 5426 ***
Agricultural 
production 
Monetary value (S/.) of farm household’s 
agricultural production of the year 2001 1234 1512 1578 2753
Farm area Total amount of hectares farmland owned by farm household 1.068 1.409 0.728 1.166 * 
Livestock Monetary value (S/.) of livestock owned by farm household 2523 1901 2417 1585  
Farm household behaviour 
Market Ratio of total agricultural production that is sold on the market 0.136 0.210 0.315 0.231 ***
Off-farm / 
farm income 
Amount of off-farm income divided by total 
value of farm production: crop and livestock 0.952 0.190 1.439 1.956 ***
Farmland characteristics 
Valley Ratio of total farmland located in valley 0.361 0.357 0.573 0.376 ***
Rainfed Ratio of total farm without access to irrigation 0.422 0.348 0.395 0.400  
Gentle slope Ratio of total farm with gentle slopes 0.446 0.386 0.355 0.367 **
Steep slope Ratio of total farm with steep slopes 0.201 0.333 0.085 0.205 ***
No stones Ratio of total farm without stones 0.374 0.361 0.697 0.352 ***
Means of both watershed are significant different at (*) 0.1 level, (**) 0.05 level, (***) 0.01 level 
 
 
Reasons not to install SWC practices were lack of time, lack of knowledge or programme assistance 
(especially in Pacucha), or because it was not necessary (especially in Piuray-Ccorimarca). These 
results suggest that SWC practices are more common in Piuray-Ccorimarca and that these practices 
are implemented on most of the sloping and degraded land, whereas in Pacucha the diffusion of 
these practices is not as far. As the SWC interventions are more recent in Pacucha, this was 
expected. Also, more farmers copied the practices (without programme influence) in Piuray-
Ccorimarca, indicating a more widespread diffusion of the SWC practices. 
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Table 4.2 Opinion and perception of farmers concerning soil erosion and SWC 
 
Issue 
 
Answers 1 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
Decreasing soil fertility 25.0% 26.1% 
Soil erosion 36.7% 30.3% 
Frost & hail 14.4% 17.6% 
Problems at 
farm level 
Pests & diseases 5.0% 18.6% 
Rainfall 77.2% 71.3% 
Runoff 16.7% 5.9% 
Steep slopes 35.6% 42.6% 
Inappropriate practices 10.6% 21.3% 
Excessive irrigation 5.6% 8.5% 
Causes of 
erosion 
Does not know 8.9% 4.3% 
Soil loss 50.0% 69.7% 
Loss of production 49.4% 29.8% 
Crop damage 54.4% 26.1% 
Loss of seeds 20.6% 12.2% 
Loss of fertilisers 21.1% 9.6% 
Sedimentation 9.4% 20.2% 
Effects of soil 
erosion 
Does not know 13.3% 4.3% 
Slow-forming terraces 53.9% 70.7% 
Bench terraces 53.9% 65.4% 
Infiltration ditches 58.9% 60.6% 
Ancient terraces - 27.7% 
Reforestation 28.9% 53.2% 
Contour ploughing 25.0% 26.1% 
Organic fertilisers 30.6% 9.6% 
Does not know 10.0% 3.7% 
Solutions for 
erosion 
Number of solutions mentioned 2.7 3.3 
Recommended by programme 53.3% 39.4% 
To receive programme incentives  4.4% 15.4% 
Expected agricultural benefits 4.4% 14.4% 
Has others seen doing it 5.6% 10.6% 
Reasons to 
install SWC 
practices 
Soil improvement 3.3% 5.3% 
Not needed (flat land) 20.6% 70.7% 
Waiting for programme assistance 21.1% 6.9% 
Lack of time / labour 30.6% 10.6% 
Reasons not to 
install SWC 
practices Lack of knowledge 8.9% 3.2% 
No practices abandoned 85.6% 80.3% 
No benefits obtained 1.1% 2.7% 
Programme ended  2.8% 1.6% 
Lack of labour 7.2% 9.0% 
Reasons to 
abandon SWC 
practices 
Lack of means 0.6% 5.9% 
1 Only the most often stated answers are presented here 
 
 
4.4 SWC interventions in the research areas 
 
4.4.1 Programmes with SWC activities  
 
There are many NGO’s and governmental programmes in Peru, especially in the Andes. Also in the 
two research areas various programmes are present. The programmes most important for the 
promotion of SWC practices are MARENASS and PRONAMACHCS in Pacucha, and the NGO Arariwa 
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and MIMA-PRONAMACHCS in Piuray-Ccorimarca. Descriptions of the different programmes are 
given below. 
 
MARENASS 
MARENASS (Manejo de Recursos Naturales en la Sierra Sur) is a pilot of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and started in 1998. The main goal of MARENASS is to intensify the agriculture and 
increase the commercial value of productive natural resources. The programme promotes a range of 
activities like: improvement of pastures, SWC, house improvement, horticulture, sanitary facilities, 
construction of corals, preparation of compost, handicraft, public works in community, 
empowerment, and increasing community dynamics. All activities are aimed to increase agricultural 
production and improve rural livelihoods. The main distinctive features of the programme are the 
participatory demand-driven approach, the emphasis on empowerment and the organisation of 
farmer competitions (called PachaMama Raymi) on several activities. The competitions are 
organized at community level, with farm households competing against each other, and on district 
level, with communities competing. At each competitions three prizes can be won, which consist of 
a certain amount of money to be received in the form of a cheque. Participants select the jury 
members, who judge the work done by each participating household.  
 
When a community agrees on joining with the programme, a contract is signed between the 
community and MARENASS. The community has to open a bank account, to which funds are 
transferred that are destined for different programme activities. Participation of community 
members is voluntarily. MARENASS uses community promoters (promoter communal) as 
intermediaries between the programme and community members. These promoters are leading 
farmers with management skills, and selected by the community assembly. In Pacucha there used to 
be only one community promoter for the five communities participating in the MARENASS 
programme. But after two years they added two more, as it appeared that the promoter spent most 
of his time in his own community.  
 
MARENASS’ methodology is based on three pillars: support, productivity and sustainability (Figure 
4.4). MARENASS provides financial support to the communities (the first pillar). FAT (fondo de 
asistencia técnica: $2500) is a fund that enables participating communities to hire technical 
assistance. The fund FPC (fondo de producción y comercialización: $1500) is meant for women, to 
stimulate their commercial activities. FOPRO (fondo para pago a promotores comunales: $85 per 
month) is spent on the salary of the community promoter. The fund FOPRE (fondo de ausipicio de 
premios) provides the money for the prizes of the competitions. After four years all financial 
support to the community ends.  
 
Productivity consists of knowledge transfer in order to improve agricultural productivity. This 
knowledge transfer is achieved through farmer-to-farmer extension and is demand-driven. The 
community hires temporarily technical assistance, the yachaq, with the money of the FAT. A 
yachaq, which can be a farmer with much experience, a consultant or a technical staff member of 
any programme, trains several farmers, the yachachikoq, in certain topics. The yachachikoq are 
selected by the communities participating in the MARENASS programme. After the training, the 
yachachikoq, on their turn, teach other community members the new techniques they learned. The 
objective of this extension system is to create a local knowledge market.  
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Sustainability (the third pillar) refers to the attempt to raise consciousness among the farmers that a 
sustainable management of their natural resources can improve their livelihoods and welfare, as 
well as their children’s. Empowerment is an important aspect of the programme. Communities have 
to manage themselves the funds they receive. They also have to organize the trainings, by inviting 
experts (professional or other farmers) on a certain theme they find important. All activities carried 
out in the community, are organized by the community council or the promoter. However, they can 
get advice from MARENASS on how to manage the administration, or where to find experts. The idea 
of this organisation structure is that the programme staff should be as few as possible, and 
participants should do most of the work.  
 
Technical assistance
 Productivity 
SAP 
Support 
CCT 
Sustainability 
yachaq 
yachachikoq 
Contests PMR 
yachachikoq PMR 
Salary 
promotores 
comunales 
prizes Women groups, for 
commercialisation 
of products 
FAT FPC FOPRO FOPRE
 
Figure 4.4 Three pillars of MARENASS 
 
In Pacucha it seems that MARENASS achieved success at household level. Most of the participants 
are very pleased with the knowledge they gained, their self-development and empowerment, and the 
work they did. However, many commented that four years is not enough. They need a few years 
more of the programme’s support, to be able to continue on their own. At community or watershed 
level, the programme cannot be considered a success in Pacucha. Some ‘private’ communities were 
not allowed to participate, as they are not officially registered as peasant community, and therefore 
MARENASS could not sign an agreement with them. In other communities, some households were 
not able or willing to participate, and the participation rate stayed low (10 to 20 % of the 
community members). This is due to bad relationships between community members. It seems that 
the intervention of MARENASS increased the bad understanding in some communities. Therefore, the 
impact of the activities on watershed level is quite low. The success of this type of programme 
depends largely on the influence of the community promoter, and on the internal organisation of the 
community. However, MARENASS has been more successful in other, more remote and poorer, areas. 
In total the programme worked in 360 communities, reaching about 33,000 households which is 
60% of the total population of these participating communities (Zutter, 2004).  
 
PRONAMACHCS 
PRONAMACHCS (Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hidrográficas y Conservación de 
Suelos) is a programme of the Ministry of Agriculture and was created in 1981 in order to promote 
SWC in the Andes. In the first two initial stages (1981-1986 and 1987-1992), PRONAMACHCS played 
a supplementary role within the public agricultural sector. The main objectives were: develop and 
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experiment with techniques for conservation of natural resources in the Andes; transfer of proven 
techniques to the target group; strengthening of the conservationist consciousness in public and 
private organs. In the third stage (from 1993 onwards), the conservation objectives were 
incorporated in the objectives of the central government. The main objective of this third stage was 
the integrated treatment of resources (water, soil, plants) of selected sub-watersheds in the Andes. 
The following tasks can be distinguished: investment in marginal areas in order to increase the 
production capacity by investing in production means, services and infrastructure, including 
irrigation structures; participation of the population in the execution of programme activities by 
providing labour; promotion of SWC practices with use of direct incentives like food, tools and 
inputs (Heredia, 1997). According to PRONAMACHCS, lack of knowledge is the principal restriction 
for farmers to implement SWC practices. Technology transfer is the solution to promote SWC. By 
involving the farmers in the SWC activities, they learn how to implement these practices and at the 
same time they can observe the impacts (Chang-Navarro, 1986). 
 
In 2000, PRONAMACHCS worked in 866 watersheds situated in 18 departments, which is equivalent 
to 133 provinces or 942 districts. It is estimated that in this year 232,772 households were reached. 
The programme is financed for a period of 5 years by the World Bank (US$ 51 million), and the 
Peruvian government (US$ 14.3 million), whereas the local population contributes its labour force 
with an estimated value of US$ 27.9 million. In 1995 the area with SWC practices was 12,067 ha, 
increasing to 38,920 ha in 2000. Half of this area constituted of slow-forming terraces, 39% was 
with infiltration ditches and the rest with new or rehabilitated bench terraces (PRONAMACHCS, 
2000). PRONAMACHCS has agencies in the whole Andes region, and can reach almost every Andean 
farmer with its activities. It is said that the former president Fujimori used this programme first to 
control the guerilla, and later to ensure votes of the rural people during elections. In each village 
PRONAMACHCS organizes activities once a week under the direction of a technical engineer. Each 
household that supplied at least one member a week to participate in the activities receives tools at 
the end of the year.  
 
In 1998, PRONAMACHCS started a new programme6 with a sub-component called MIMA (Manejo 
Intensivo de Microcuencas Altoandinas). This was a pilot programme carried out in 6 sub-
watersheds in the Peruvian Andes. The objective of MIMA is to increase the income of rural families 
and alleviate poverty through adequate and sustainable management of the natural resources 
(Gonzales and Antezana, 2003). MIMA works intensively in the selected sub-watersheds to promote 
watershed management through knowledge transfer, making use of research tools like participatory 
approaches and GIS. MIMA was also implemented in the sub-watershed of Piuray-Ccorimarca 
(Antezana, 2002), which is considered a successful case. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The new programme was called ‘Proyecto Manejo de Recursos naturals para el Alivio de Pobreza en la 
Sierra’: project of natural resource management for the alleviation of poverty in the Andes. 
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Arariwa 
In 1984, the NGO Arariwa7 was established and started development experiments rather than 
programmes. During the years, however, the NGO developed more activities and covered a larger 
intervention area, that is, 8 of the 13 provinces in the department Cusco. The objective of Arariwa is 
to contribute to economic growth and sustainable development through the expansion of capabilities 
and rights of the population, improving the quality of their lives, promoting their cultural identity, 
and consolidate the democratic institution  (Arariwa, 2004). Arariwa’s intervention is based on four 
components (Cavassa, 2004):  
− Promotion: contributing to sustainable rural development, focussing on knowledge transfer 
(agriculture and livestock, institutions and family health) while working with the local 
population. 
− An education centre on integrated rural development (CENFOPAR): training for young people 
from peasant communities on subjects like agriculture, leadership, personal values, et cetera. 
− Microfinance:  financial services, promoting savings, training on communal banks. 
− Small businesses (SEMAR): promoting commercial activities like crop and animal production, 
transformation of agricultural products and commercialisation. 
 
Arariwa also promoted SWC practices in the past, like infiltration ditches, slow-forming terraces 
and rehabilitation of ancient terraces. By installing infiltration ditches in the upper parts of the sub-
watershed of Piuray-Ccorimarca, Arariwa wanted to reduce the waterlogging problems in the valley 
bottom in order to intensify the cultivation in the valley. In order to stimulate farmers to participate 
in the installation of these practices, Arariwa paid for the labour. In the beginning, farmers received 
full payment but over time a certain percentage of the payment was destined for funds to be spent 
on public goods like electrification, improvement of school building, or road construction (Gonzales 
and Antezana, 2003). 
 
4.4.2 Reflections on SWC interventions in research areas 
 
SWC interventions and practices 
Appendix 4.3 gives an overview of the SWC practices that are promoted by the programmes. Most 
programmes promote especially mechanical practices, like slow-forming terraces (PRONAMACHCS), 
bench terraces (MARENASS) and infiltration ditches. MARENASS is the only programme that pays also 
attention to organic fertilisers. But little or no attention is paid to agronomic practices like crop 
rotation, cover crops, protection of field boundaries or mulching. 
 
Successful intervention 
The most successful community in Piuray-Ccorimarca in terms of widespread participation in 
programme activities and technology adoption is Taucca. Arariwa as well as PRONAMACHCS claim 
this success. According to programme staff, there are several reasons for the successful 
                                                 
7 Arariwa is a Quechua word meaning ‘guardian of the crops and animals’ or ‘mayor of the fields’. This 
guard not only anticipates and defends the crops against damage by animals and thieves, but also provides 
knowledge on agriculture, keeps up with the agricultural calendar, and represents the community in front of 
nature and the gods. He therefore has a huge responsibility. The name Arariwa was given to the NGO by a 
group of farmers with whom the NGO had been working during 8 years. 
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interventions. The community is situated in the upper part of the watershed and none of the farmers 
are working in Cusco. Agriculture is thus their only source of income (Scheelbeek, 2004). Another 
important factor is that 80% of the households are member of the Evangelic Peruvian Church. This 
changed the people’s behaviour: they do not drink alcohol which is a huge problem in many 
communities in the rural Andes; a saving  and hard-working attitude is created; and virtues like 
punctuality, honesty and solidarity are important in daily life (Gonzales and Antezana, 2003). 
Nowadays, Taucca is the demonstration area for visiting farmers and organisations. 
 
In Pacucha, the most successful community in SWC is Manchaybamba. This community is located 
in a steep narrow valley, and little land is available for agriculture. Livestock was pastured on the 
very steep slopes and pasture land was degraded. However, bench terraces enabled irrigation on the 
lower parts of the slopes, and farmers started to grow alfalfa. With this alfalfa they feed their 
(improved) livestock, and as a result milk production increased and women had to spend less time 
on livestock herding. 
 
Conflicts between programmes 
Often various programmes work in the same sub-watershed, focussing on the same target group. 
However, each programme has its own interests, and wants to realise visible results within a short 
period in order to assure continuity of funding. Direct incentives are often used as an instrument in 
the competition for participants and results (Cavassa and Bedoya, 2001). Programmes blame each 
other that the others ‘buy’ the farmers and that the adoption of SWC practices achieved by the other 
programmes is not sustainable, whereas their own approach is the right one. This competition posed 
a serious problem in Piuray-Ccorimarca, and to a lesser extent in Pacucha as well. In Piuray-
Ccorimarca, conflicts existed between PRONAMACHCS and Arariwa for one decade. The first one 
provided food or tools and the latter paid the farmers for their labour. Sometimes it happened that 
both programmes considered the same SWC practices as their achievement and the same farmers as 
their promoters. In Pacucha same conflicts existed between PRONAMACHCS and MARENASS: one 
person was the promoter of both programmes as well, and there was no coordination between the 
different programmes (Cavassa and Bedoya, 2001).  
 
In 2000 a process was started in order to coordinate the activities of the different programmes in 
Piuray-Ccorimarca and to decrease the competition. The two watershed management committees 
(one for Arariwa and one for PRONAMACHCS) were combined in one, in order to tune the activities 
and empower the local population (Antezana, 2002). Though the Watershed Management 
Committee should be an intermediate between the farmers living in the watershed and the 
organisations working in the same area, in practice the committee became the representative of the 
programmes instead of the farmers. The (N)GO’s still determine the agenda of activities, and the 
competition for participants as well as for donors continues, as they threaten each other’s right to 
exist (Scheelbeek, 2004).  
 
Conflicts between participants 
In some of the communities in Pacucha, the same households participating in the MARENASS 
activities, won every competition, and thus received all the prize money. This caused jealousy, and 
‘losers’ thought this was unfair and they were discouraged to continue the activities. Rumours were 
started about biased jury members. Another complaint was that large farm households had more 
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labour available, and therefore won the competitions, as they were able to spend more effort in the 
implementation. Therefore, it was decided to compete among groups of families, instead of 
individual families. The participants of each community divided themselves among three groups, 
who worked together according to the ayni-principal. As there were always three prizes to hand out, 
each group received a prize. In this way, each participating household got some money, according 
to the amount of labour delivered. This distribution of the prizes (the incentives) was considered 
fairer. 
 
Another problem in some communities in Pacucha was that the families, who participated in 
MARENASS since the beginning, did not allow other families to participate. Some farm households 
wanted to participate in the programme after they saw the first results. As the funds provided by 
MARENASS are destined for the whole community, this should be possible. But some participants 
prevented others to enter the programme, because of existing rivalry between families. 
 
Attitude of programme staff and participants 
Some field staff of PRONAMACHCS addressed the issues of the importance of motivated programme 
staff for a successful intervention, and the limited possibility they had to adapt the programme’s 
objectives and approaches to local circumstances. Heredia (1997) found that most staff of 
PRONAMACHCS are mainly concerned about finishing their (quantitative) tasks in order to ensure 
their job, rather than that they are concerned about natural resources or rural livelihoods. The target 
group of PRONAMACHCS has two main reasons to participate in the programme activities. Firstly, the 
benefit of the SWC practices to reduce the agricultural risks and to assure the reproduction. 
Secondly, to obtain the benefits of incentives. The participants consider the two objectives as 
complementary. They search for possibilities to secure the reproduction of the household and a 
better use of the natural resources at their disposal. There exists interdependency between the 
programme staff and the participants: they need each other to satisfy their personal objectives, but 
this bond does not have anything to do with ethical reasons like altruism, conservation, et cetera. 
Behaviour of all actors is determined by short-term benefits. Furthermore, as PRONAMACHCS has a 
central top-down structure, there is no room for adaptation of interventions to local circumstances. 
This top-down approach created structures of interaction that provoke all actors to aim at small 
short-term benefits, instead of strengthening the capacity of field staff and the target group 
(Heredia, 1997).  
 
The role of programme incentives 
Cavassa and Bedoya (2001) carried out a study on the effect of programme incentives in four 
watersheds, among which Pacucha and Piuray-Ccorimarca. In their research, farmers confirmed that 
if there had not been incentives for SWC practices, they would not have installed these practices. 
However, spontaneous adoption sometimes occurs when farmers obtain direct benefits. In some 
cases, extension agents and technical staff have the feeling that their ‘message’ is not worth it if 
they have no incentives to offer. Farmers have an ambivalent opinion regarding programme 
incentives. They acknowledged the positive as well as the negative effects. As positive effects they 
mentioned: involvement in SWC, financial revenues, and access to knowledge. As negative effects 
they considered: dependency, conflicts because of jealousy, and indifference for other voluntary 
community activities. There was no relationship between type of incentives and adoption rate of 
SWC practices. Instead, community leadership and availability of labour seemed to be more 
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important factors. When SWC practices were implemented on communal land, direct programme 
incentives became more important to stimulate the installation. The programme incentives allowed 
a large participation of the population, as well as the construction and rehabilitation of SWC 
practices. But at the same time the programme incentives formed a disincentive for future 
maintenance.  
 
The authors conclude that programme incentives, like competitions and farmer-to-farmer training, 
and market incentives are the most appropriate to achieve sustainable adoption of SWC. 
Programmes should be transparent and use a participative approach. Two main problems are 
identified that should be solved:  
− Lack of labour and a weakened social organisation of Andean communities complicate 
collective action, hampering the sustainable management of natural resources. 
− Bad access to the markets, and low prices for products, limit the possibilities of economic 
improvement that could be obtained through SWC. Infrastructure and information about the 
markets have to be improved to solve this problem. 
 
Programme incentives and target groups 
Appendix 4.4 gives an overview of the programme and market incentives that play a role for the 
promotion of SWC practices in the research areas. A programme incentive can be interesting for a 
specific target group, and not for another. The food-for-work incentive of PRONAMACHCS was 
attractive to, and meant for, poor farm households with low food security. The farmer competitions 
of MARENASS seem to attract innovative farmers who are eager to learn and have sufficient assets 
(labour or capital) to invest in new technologies. The cash payments of Arariwa might especially 
attract farm households with little land but abundant labour, who look for off-farm opportunities to 
increase their income. Programmes have to be well aware of which target group they want to reach, 
and which incentives attract that particular group. 
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The geographic and institutional contexts differ between the two research areas Pacucha and 
Piuray-Ccorimarca. Pacucha is located in the quechua zone, and maize, beans and potato are the 
main staple crops. Piuray-Ccorimarca is situated at a higher altitude, in the quechua-suni zone, with 
potato as the main crop. Access to markets is better in Piuray-Ccorimarca than in Pacucha. 
Therefore, farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca are better integrated into the markets for off-farm 
labour and for agricultural products, than those in Pacucha. Note that the heads of the farm 
households in Piuray-Ccorimarca also have a higher education level.  
 
Due to different soils and climate, erosion features are different as well. Nevertheless, the same 
SWC practices are promoted in the two areas: bench terraces, slow-forming terraces, infiltration 
ditches and reforestation. SWC practices have been promoted in Piuray-Ccorimarca since the early 
1980s. In Pacucha though, SWC interventions are more recent, as this area was inaccessible due to 
extreme violence till 1992. Farmers’ explanations why SWC practices are less common in Pacucha 
than in Piuray-Ccorimarca were that they had not sufficient time, no knowledge or were still 
waiting for programme assistance. This latter statement illustrates the paternalistic dependency that 
has been created over the last decades because of state interferences and the presence of many 
 67
(N)GOs. An important reason for farm households to implement SWC practices was because 
programmes, in which they participated, recommended this. External intervention has been the key 
driver of SWC implementation for a long time. It partly depends on the local geographic (e.g. 
Manchaybamba) or socio-economic (e.g. Taucca) context whether these external interventions are 
successful or not. Each programme has its own philosophy and approach that fits a specific type of 
farm household. However, they all ‘fish in the same pond’, and this often causes conflicts between 
different programmes. The same can happen the other way around. Participants do not want other 
households to participate, as they fear that they will receive less benefit when they have to share. 
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Transects in Pacucha 
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Transect 1 Community of José Olaya (starting point: S13°37.970’, W073°18.694’; ending point: S13°37.361’, W073°18.910’) 
 
 
 
Vegetation 
Grasses, 
shrubs  
Grasses, 
herbs, 
cactuses 
Grasses, 
cactuses, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
herbs, 
stones 
Grasses, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
herbs, 
cactus 
Grasses, 
cactus, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
shrubs, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
shrubs 
Grasses, 
shrubs, 
cactus 
Soil cover 50 – 95% 40 – 50  % 40 – 65 % 20 – 90 % 70% 60 – 75% 15 – 55 % 20 – 90 % 50 – 95 % 50 – 75 % 60 – 95 % 
Max. slope 65 % 70 % 75 % 75 % 60 % 50 % 45 %  55 % 55 % 60 % 50 % 
Slope 
transect 10 – 35 % 30 – 45 % 30 – 45 % 10 – 30 % 15 – 20 % 2 – 8 % 2 – 10 % 20 – 30 % 45 – 50 % 40 – 45 % 20 – 40 % 
Soil texture Silt loam  Loam Loam Silt loam Silt loam Loam Loam Loam Loam Loam  
Land use Pasture, fallow 
Pasture, 
fallow 
Reforest., 
pasture Reforest. 
Fallow, 
potato 
(irrigated) 
Reforest., 
fallow 
(potato) 
Fallow 
Natural 
vegetation, 
reforest. 
Fallow Maize, potato Maize 
Erosion 
features Toppling 
Toppling, 
sheet  
Sheet, land 
slide 
Sheet, gully 
(vegetated) 
Gully 
(vegetated) Sheet  
Sheet, gully 
(vegetated) 
Sheet, 
toppling Sheet  Sheet  Sheet  
SWC 
practices Infiltr.d. Infiltr.d. Infiltr.d.  
Infiltr.d., 
slow-form. 
terraces 
Infiltr.d., 
bench 
terraces 
Bench 
terraces 
(potato) 
Infiltr. 
ditches 
(reforest.) 
Bench 
terraces 
Bench 
terraces, 
infiltr.d. 
Bench 
terraces 
State SWC Neglected Regular Abandoned  Regular Neglected Regular Good (new) Regular Regular Regular 
Remarks 
At start 
dense soil 
cover 
Some stones, 
irrig. canal Stones 
Shallow 
soils, many 
stones; irrig. 
canal 
Terraces in 
potato fields 
Infiltr.d. in 
reforest. 
area are 
new 
Irrigation 
canal 
Many small 
footpaths 
Abandoned 
house, with 
eucalyptus 
House Many maize fields 
General remarks: all terraces are installed on agricultural fields; infiltration ditches are found on pasture land and within the eucalyptus reforestation, 
sometimes also on agricultural fields in combination with terraces. 
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Transect 2 Community of Tahuantinsuyo (starting point: S13°36.977’, W073°17.290’; ending point: S13°36.670’, W073°17.489’) 
 
 
Vegetation Grasses  Grasses Grasses, cactus, shrubs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Crop residues Crop residues 
Crop 
residues 
Soil cover 40 – 60% 35 – 70 % 50 – 70 % 40 – 50% 40 – 50 % 50 – 60 % 50 – 60 %  
Max. slope 30 % 45 % 35 % 35 % 40 %  40 % 30 % 25 % 
Slope 
transect 15 – 30 % 45 % 25 – 30 % 20 – 30 % 20 – 35 % 20 – 35 % 20 – 25 % 20 % 
Soil texture Silt loam  Silt loam – loamy sand Silt loam Silt loam Loamy sand Loam Loam Silt loam 
Land use Pasture, wheat Wheat, fallow Fallow, wheat Barley, fallow Fallow, wheat, beans 
Fallow, tarhui, 
barley, beans, 
wheat 
Wheat, barley, 
maize Maize 
Erosion 
features Sheet erosion 
Sheet, land slide / 
gully 
Some sheet, some 
rill  
Sheet erosion, 
gully, rills Not identifiable Not identifiable Not identifiable None 
SWC 
measures Infiltration ditches    
Bench terraces, 
infiltration ditches Bench terraces   
State SWC Regular    Good good   
Remarks Waiting for rains to sow wheat 
Many crop 
residues, stony 
soils 
Stones  
Many stones; 
irrigation canals, 
but no water 
Many stones (30% 
of soil cover) 
Many stones; at 
lower parts maize 
with irrigation. 
Irrigation 
General remarks: all terraces are in agricultural fields; infiltration ditches are found in pasture land. This zone is very dry. There is spare vegetation, 
soils contain many stones. The bench terraces belong to one farmer, who continues constructing new terraces. He states that he can only cultivate on 
terraces, as stones are removed and water is better retained. Unfortunately, no irrigation can be applied here. 
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Transect 3 Community of Ancco Pachana (starting point: S13°35.691’, W073°18.223’; ending point: S13°36.052’, W073°18.364’) 
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Vegetation Grasses, shrubs Grasses Grasses Grasses Grasses Grasses Grasses 
Soil cover 30 – 90% 20 – 90 % 25 – 100 % 20 – 95% 20 – 100 % 100 % 50 – 100 % 
Max. slope 45 % 25 % 27  % 20 % 23 %  22 % 20 % 
Slope 
transect 30 – 45 % 20 – 25 % 18 – 27 % 17 – 20 % 17 – 23 % 16 – 22 % 15 – 20 % 
Soil texture   Loam     
Land use Fallow (cereals) Pasture, fallow (cereals) 
Fallow (cereals), 
pasture 
Pasture, fallow 
(potato) 
Fallow (potato, 
maize), pasture Pasture Pasture, fallow 
Erosion 
features 
Not identifiable (soil 
was recently 
ploughed) 
None Not identifiable / none 
Not identifiable / 
none 
Not identifiable / 
none None 
Not identifiable / 
none 
SWC 
practices        
State SWC        
Remarks  Stones (10% of soil cover)   
Some stones (5% of 
soil cover)   
General remarks: in this community, no SWC-oriented programme is present. As it is not a recognized peasant community, land ownership is private. 
Field boundaries are well defined by the planting of eucalyptus and shrubs at the borders. No mechanical SWC practices are found, but no erosion 
features are found either. Soils are either densely covered with grasses, or recently ploughed. Slopes are gentle. The dense vegetation indicates that at 
this slope more water is available. Due to the dense soil cover, and lack of material, it is difficult to determine the soil texture. Eucalyptus trees and 
shrubs are also found along the footpaths. 
 
Grassland Grass with shrubs Shrubs Arable fields Arable fields under fallow Trees Scattered trees
Legend: 
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Transect 4 Community of Santa Elena (starting point: S13°35.174’, W073°19.430’; ending point: S13°35.720’, W073°19.285’) 
 
 
Vegetation Grasses, shrubs 
Grasses, 
herbs, shrubs 
Grasses, 
herbs, shrubs 
Grasses, 
herbs, shrubs 
Grasses, 
shrubs 
Grasses, 
herbs, shrubs 
Grasses, 
shrubs 
Grasses, 
shrubs, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
shrubs Grasses 
Soil cover 5 – 95 % 80 – 85 % 70 – 85 % 50 – 95 % 50 – 80 % 80 – 100 % 25 – 100 % 25 – 90 % 80 – 90 % 10 – 95 % 
Max. slope 63 % 57 % 50 % 50 % 70 % 70% 85 % 200 % 79 % 55 % 
Slope 
transect 58 – 63 % 50 – 57 % 35 – 50 % 33 – 50 % 37 – 70 % 20 –  70% 30 – 85 % 43 – 200 % 17 – 79 % 15 – 55 % 
Soil texture Silt loam  Silt loam    Loam  Loam  
Land use Potato, pasture Pasture Pasture Pasture Pasture Pasture Pasture, maize, beans 
Natural 
vegetation Pasture 
Fallow (wheat), 
pasture 
Erosion 
features 
Toppling, 
‘cracking’, risk 
of land slides 
Toppling / 
crawling 
Toppling / 
crawling none none none 
None / not 
identifiable Not identifiable 
Crawling, land 
slides 
Crawling, land 
slides 
SWC 
practices 
Infiltration 
ditches       Bench terraces   
State SWC Regular       Good   
Remarks Soil is very unstable 
Soil is very 
unstable 
Soil is very 
unstable 
Soil is very 
unstable    
Very steep 
slope 
Soil slides 
downwards  
 
General remarks: the whole slope is susceptible for land slides. Apparently the cohesion of the soil is very low, and the soil is crawling down. 
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APPENDIX 4.2   
 
Transects in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
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Transect 1 Community of Cuper Bajo (starting point: S13°24.342’, W072°00.891’; ending point: S13°24.515’, W072°01.067’) 
 
 
Vegetation Grasses, herbs, shrubs Grasses Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs   
Soil cover 10 – 50 % 30 – 50 % 15 – 25% 10 – 20 % 0 – 30 % 0 – 30 % 
Max. slope 25 % 30 % 50 % 60 %  20 % 10 % 
Slope 
transect 5 – 25 % 5 – 30 % 5 – 50 % 15 – 60 % 3 – 20 % 0 – 10 % 
Soil texture Loamy sand   Loamy sand   
Land use Fallow (wheat / barley) Fallow / pasture Fallow / pasture Fallow / pasture, potato Fallow, potato Potato, beans 
Erosion 
features Not identifiable Not identifiable 
Rill erosion, gullies in 
surroundings Sheet erosion Not identifiable Not identifiable 
SWC 
practices 
Terraces formed over 
time; infiltration ditches 
Terraces formed over 
time 
Infiltration ditches, 
terraces formed over 
time 
Terraces formed over 
time 
Infiltration ditches; terraces 
formed over time  
State SWC Neglected – regular  Regular Regular Regular Regular  
Remarks At the upper part laterite,   Laterite  Tillage perpendicular to contour lines 
Tillage perpendicular to 
contour lines 
General remarks: the terraces on these slopes seem to be formed ‘naturally’ (so-called pata pata), and reinforced later. Often shrubs grow on the 
banks. The upper part of the slope is under fallow for five years in total and is now used for pasture. Considering the type of vegetation, this part is 
fallow for two or three years now. After these five years, farmers will start cultivating again and terraces will be rehabilitated.  These soils are very 
susceptible for rill and gully erosion. Also, they contain a lot of laterite. 
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Transect 2 Community of Cuper Alto (starting point: S13°23.684’, W072°02.178’; ending point: S13°24.464’, W072°02.720’) 
 
 
Vegetation Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses 
Soil cover 50 – 60% 10 – 80  % 30 – 80 % 40 – 80 % 10 – 90% 0 – 80 % 0 – 50 % 0 – 80 % 5 – 100 % 
Max. slope 40 % 30 % 20 % 25 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 
Slope 
transect 10 – 35 % 5 – 30 % 5 – 15 % 0 – 25 % 5 – 20 % 5 – 25 % 5 – 30 % 10 – 25 % 10 – 20 % 
Soil texture Loamy sand – loam Silt loam Silt loam  Loam  Silt loam – loam Loam  
Land use Pasture, fallow (cereals) Fallow (cereals) Fallow (cereals) 
Fallow (cereals, 
beans) 
Fallow (cereals), 
barley 
Fallow (cereals), 
barley / wheat 
Fallow (cereals), 
barley, potato Fallow, potato 
Fallow, pasture, 
potato 
Erosion 
features Sheet erosion 
Sheet erosion, 
crusting, rills 
Sheet erosion, 
crusting Not identifiable  
Sheet erosion, 
crusting 
Sheet erosion, 
crusting Crusting Not identifiable 
SWC 
practices 
Infiltr.d.; terraces 
formed within 
time 
Infiltr.d. ; 
terraces formed 
within time 
Infiltr.d.; terraces 
formed within 
time 
Infiltr.d.; terraces 
formed within 
time 
Infiltr.d.; terraces 
formed within 
time 
Infiltr. d.; 
terraces formed 
within time 
Infiltr.d., terraces 
formed within 
time 
Infiltr.d.; terraces 
formed within 
time  
Infiltration 
ditches 
State SWC Neglected Neglected Neglected Neglected Neglected Neglected / abandoned 
Regular / 
neglected 
Neglected / 
abandoned 
Regular / 
neglected 
Remarks 
Many stones (till 
30% of soil 
cover) 
Traces of 
contour 
ploughing 
Traces of 
contour 
ploughing 
Many scattered 
fields with 
different 
management  
 
Traces of few  
abandoned 
infiltration 
ditches 
Scattered 
maintenance of 
SWC practices 
Contour 
ploughing  
General remarks: as fields with different owners are scattered along the slope, management is also different. In some fields infiltration ditches are 
well maintained, while in neighbouring fields they are neglected or even removed. The upper part of the slope is under fallow since about 2 years. 
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Transect 3 Community of Tangabamba (starting point: S13°26.488’, W072°04.698’; ending point: S13°27.858’, W072°05.039’) 
 
 
Vegetation Grasses, shrubs 
Grasses, 
shrubs, 
eucalyptus 
Grasses, 
shrubs, 
eucalyptus
Grasses Grasses, shrubs 
Grasses, 
shrubs, 
eucalyptus
Grasses, 
eucalyptus Grasses Grasses Grasses Arable Grasses Grasses 
Soil cover 35 – 90 % 30 – 90 % 30 – 90 % 15 – 80 % 5 – 70 % 5 – 90 % 60 – 90 % 20 – 90 % 20–100 % 20–100 % 10 – 40 % 20 – 80 % 20 – 70 % 
Max. slope 35 % 50 % 85 % 30 % 85 % 50 %  45 % 25 % 10 % 15 % 10 % 20 %  30 % 
Slope 
transect 3 – 33 % 10 – 50 % 15 – 85 % 5 – 20 % 5 – 65 % 15 – 50 % 5 – 45 % 5 – 20 % 5 % 5 % 5 % 5 – 20 % 20 – 30 % 
Soil texture Loam Loam Loam Loam     Loam Clay loam  Clay loam  Silt loam 
Land use 
Pasture, 
fallow, 
barley 
Potato, 
reforest. 
Reforest., 
potato 
Potato, 
pasture 
Natural 
vegetation, 
pasture 
Natural 
vegetation, 
reforest. 
Reforest., 
pasture 
Pasture, 
cereals 
Pasture, 
cereals 
Cereals, 
pasture Cereals Cereals 
Cereals, 
fallow 
Erosion 
features 
Sheet 
erosion, 
crusting 
Not 
identifiable 
Crusting, 
landslide, 
gully 
Crusting 
Some 
severe 
sheet 
erosion 
Sheet 
erosion None 
None, not 
identifiable
None, not 
identifiable
None, not 
identifiable
None, not 
identifiable
None, not 
identifiable
None, not 
identifiable 
SWC 
practices    
Infiltration 
ditches 
Infiltration 
ditches         
State SWC    Regular Regular         
Remarks Contour ploughing       
Tillage with 
tractor 
Tillage with 
tractor 
Bad 
drainage 
Bad 
drainage   
General remarks: at small scale it is difficult to recognize erosion features. But at larger scale, one can clearly see that slopes are eroded, as 
landslides and gullies are visible. At the valley bottom, farmers complain about problems with waterlogging due to bad drainage. 
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Transect 4 Community of Pongobamba (starting point: S13°25.550’, W072°01.184’; ending point: S13°25.459’, W072°01.306’) 
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Vegetation Grasses, shrubs Grasses, shrubs Potato 
Soil cover 30 – 90 % 10 – 90 % 20 – 90 % 
Max. slope 70 % 25 % 5 % 
Slope 
transect 0 – 70 % 0 – 25 % 5 % 
Soil texture Loamy sand – silt loam Silt loam – loam Loam 
Land use Pasture, fallow Fallow, potato Potato 
Erosion 
features Sheet erosion Gully  
SWC 
practices Ancient terraces Rehabilitated ancient terraces Rehabilitated ancient terraces 
State SWC Abandoned, regular Regular Well maintained 
Remarks   Use of irrigation 
 
General remarks: on the slopes in Pongobamba, the ancient Inca terraces, the andenes, are rehabilitated for a large part. Crops are cultivated on the 
well maintained ancient terraces with access to irrigation. 
 
Grassland Grass with shrubs Shrubs Arable fields Arable fields under fallow Trees Scattered trees
Legend: 
Gully 
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Transect 5 Community of Umasbamba (starting point: S13°25.084’, W071°59.593’; ending point: S13°25.134’, W071°59.968’) 
 
 
Vegetation Grasses, herbs, shrubs Grasses Grasses, herbs Grasses, herbs Grasses Grasses Grasses, herbs 
Soil cover 70 – 90 % 30 – 50 % 50 – 80% 10 – 20 % 10 – 80 % 10 – 80 % 30 – 90 % 
Max. slope 40 % 30 % 50 % 110 %  40 % 50 % 25 % 
Slope 
transect 20 – 25 % 5 – 30 % 10 – 35 % 15 – 110 % 10 – 20 % 10 – 50 % 10 – 25 % 
Soil texture  Silt loam Loam Loamy sand Clay loam   
Land use Pasture, fallow Fallow Fallow  Fallow, pasture Fallow, potato Fallow Potato, cereals 
Erosion 
features Not identifiable Not identifiable  Crawling Not identifiable  Not identifiable 
SWC 
practices Infiltration ditches 
Infiltration ditches, 
slow forming terraces, 
bench terraces 
Infiltration ditches, 
bench terraces Bench terraces 
Infiltration ditches; 
bench terraces Bench terraces  
State SWC Regular, neglected Regular, neglected Regular, neglected Regular Regular   
Remarks        Irrigation 
 
General remarks: the soils contain many stones. Most fields are fallow since 2 or 3 years. 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
 
Overview of SWC practices in research areas 
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SWC 
practice What Where Who PRONAMACHCS MARENASS Benefit Costs Remarks 
Bench 
terrace 
(Stepwise) terrace with 
horizontal platforms and banks 
made of stones or earth. Some 
have an inward or outward 
inclination. High amounts of 
earth and stones have to be 
moved. 
Lower parts of 
slope where 
irrigation is 
applied, gentle 
slope, 
reasonable soil 
depth. 
Households 
with 
sufficient 
labour or 
working in 
ayni groups.
Installs these 
terraces at lower 
parts with gentle 
slopes and 
sufficient soil 
depth. 
These terraces are 
preferred by farmers 
because enable 
intensification of 
agricultural 
production (two 
harvests per year) 
and yield increase.  
Yield increase, but 
probably only in 
combination with 
irrigation and 
(organic) 
fertilisers. 
Needs large 
investment of 
labour for 
construction 
and 
maintenance. 
 
Slow 
forming 
terrace 
An embankment of earth or 
stones is made at regular 
interval along the contour line. 
Downslope, an infiltration ditch is 
made. A terrace is formed over 
time, as the soil settles upstream 
the embankment. The 
embankment should be raised 
now and then. No soil movement 
by humans needed.  
Often at middle 
part of slope; 
gentle to steep 
slope. 
Sufficient soil 
depth is 
necessary.  
Anyone. 
Installs these 
terraces at middle 
to upper middle 
part of slopes. 
Only few farmers 
install these terraces. 
Probably not enough 
benefits, and fields 
need large size. 
Increased soil 
moisture content 
because of water 
harvesting effect. 
Benefits on very 
long-term. 
Low 
investment of 
labour. Often 
not sufficiently 
maintained. 
 
Infiltration 
ditches 
Ditches of 0.6 by 0.4 by 2 meter. 
Is meant to store runoff water. 
At upper part of 
slopes, often in 
pasture land or 
reforestation 
areas.  
Community 
work. 
Installs the 
ditches on 
community land 
(pasture, 
reforestation), but 
also in 
combination with 
terraces. 
Less applied, as 
farmers are working 
less on upper part of 
slopes. Sometimes in 
combination with 
reforestation. 
Reducing runoff, 
increase of soil 
humidity. 
Low 
investment of 
labour. 
 
Compost / 
worm 
humus 
Processed domestic garbage 
and manure. 
Used on most 
productive fields 
near farm. 
Mainly 
applied by 
participants 
of 
MARENASS. 
 
Provides extension in 
preparing compost 
and humus. 
Increased soil 
fertility and 
production. 
Labour costs 
for 
preparation. 
Collection of 
manure. 
This practice gives 
benefits on short-term. 
Is adopted on large 
scale by participants of 
MARENASS. 
Tree 
planting 
Afforestation of degraded 
slopes, mainly with eucalyptus 
and pine. 
Degraded 
slopes with 
shallow soils. 
Community.
Reforestation with 
main objective 
SWC. 
Reforestation with 
objective of SWC and 
firewood stock. 
Firewood.  
Trees are suitable for 
effective SWC, but 
possibilities are limited 
because of altitude. 
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APPENDIX 4.4 
 
Overview of incentives for SWC practices in research areas 
 82  
Type of incentive What For whom Advantage Disadvantage 
Tools for work 
According to presence and amount 
of labour delivered during 
programme activities, a farm 
household receives a certain 
amount of tools from PRONAMACHCS.
Poor farm households. 
Farmers do not have to buy tools 
they need for installing SWC 
practices. Large group of farmers 
is reached. 
Farmers do not always need the tools 
they receive. It creates expectancy 
among farmers; whenever a programme 
wants to work with them, they expect to 
receive some direct incentives. 
Food for work 
According to the presence and the 
amount of labour delivered during 
programme activities, a farm 
household receives food from 
PRONAMACHCS. 
Families with small 
children, households in 
remote areas, poor farm 
households. 
Most children do not get enough 
vitamins and proteins. When 
specific food is given, this problem 
can be solved. Large group of 
farmers is reached. 
When common food is distributed, this 
can distort the local food production and 
market. Dependency is created, as well 
as expectancy (see above). 
Farmer 
competitions 
MARENASS organizes competitions 
among farmers and communities; 
the group who implemented most 
new technologies wins a cheque 
(money). 
Innovators, leaders; 
farmers who have more 
assets and are willing to 
innovate and develop. 
Competition stimulates the 
enthusiasm of farmers to 
participate and to implement new 
techniques properly. 
Some farmers consider this rewarding 
system unfair. Those who did their best, 
but have less household labour available, 
do not receive anything. The “laggards” 
and uninterested farmers are not 
reached. 
Cash payment
ARARIWA paid farmers for the labour 
they provided when installing SWC 
practices. 
For areas where off-farm 
employment possibilities 
are scarce. All farmers are 
interested in extra income. 
Farmers can obtain extra income. 
It is seen as an opportunity for off-
farm activity. Large group of 
farmers is reached. 
Farmers participate for the money they 
can earn, not because they think the 
SWC practices are important. 
D
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Extension / 
training 
Farmers are trained in new 
technologies. 
Those who are keen to 
learn new technologies. 
Mostly farmers with some 
education and “who like 
being farmers”. 
Farmers learn why certain 
activities are proposed, and how 
they can implement them. 
Takes a lot of time and effort. The 
“laggards” and uninterested farmers are 
not reached. 
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Improvement 
farming 
practices 
 
 
MARENASS integrates SWC 
activities with other themes, like 
improvement of livestock, housing, 
common pasture land and irrigation 
systems. 
Innovators, “leaders”, 
farmers eager to learn. 
Farmers often do not prioritise 
SWC. They might decide to 
participate in the programme 
because they want to improve their 
livestock, and then learn also 
about SWC. Furthermore, 
increased income from agricultural 
activities enables them to invest in 
SWC. 
Lot of knowledge and trainings on 
various themes has to be easily 
accessible for farmers. 
Increased 
output 
Some technologies increase the 
agricultural output. 
All who produce for own 
consumption and/or for the 
market. 
Higher yields, more production.  
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
 
Facilitate 
access to 
markets 
When marketing of agricultural 
products becomes more 
interesting, farmers will be keener 
to intensify and increase their 
production. 
All who produce for the 
market. 
Lower transaction costs, facilitating 
marketing of products. 
Needs high investments by government 
in infrastructure. 
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Chapter 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of bench terraces on soil productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A revised version of this chapter is presented at the IX Congreso Nacional y II Internacional de la 
Ciencia del Suelo: “El Suelo: Manejo Integrado de Recursos Naturales”; Cusco, 15-19 Noviembre 
2004.  
An abstract is published as: H. Posthumus (2004) El impacto de terrazas de absorción en la 
productividad del suelo. In: J. Alegre, M.S. Braulio y M. Ara. El Suelo: Manejo Integrado de 
Recursos Naturales. Memorias del IX Congreso Nacional y II Internacional de la Ciencia del Suelo. 
15-19 Noviembre 2004, Cusco. UNSAAC, UNALM. p127. 
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5 Effects of bench terraces on soil productivity 
 
There exists a general consensus that soil erosion threatens agricultural production worldwide. The 
rate of erosion is influenced by the slope of the land, soil composition, vegetation cover, climate 
and management practices, whereas soil depth, soil biota, organic matter, water-holding capacity 
and nutrient level influence the soil’s productive capacity (Pimentel, 1993). Soil erosion reduces the 
soil productivity by adversely affecting these soil properties; for example, by decreasing the soil 
depth and plant available water capacity, removing valuable nutrients and altering soil physical 
properties (Enters, 1998). The purpose of soil and water conservation (SWC) practices is to 
maintain and increase the soil productivity by combating soil erosion. However, quantitative 
assessment of the effect of soil erosion or SWC practices on soil productivity is very difficult, as 
discussed in section 2.1. Each of the above-mentioned factors not only influences soil productivity 
separately, but also interacts with the other factors (Pimentel, 1993). Furthermore, these processes 
are location and time-specific. Besides maintaining the soil productivity, SWC practices also 
conserve water on the field by reducing the runoff. Often, this aspect is important for the farmers 
(see section 2.1), as runoff reduction is easier to perceive in the field than the conservation of soil 
productivity which is a long-term process. Though fully aware of this complex system of soil 
productivity, in this chapter the effect of SWC practices is determined by measuring soil properties 
and maize production on bench terraces and sloping fields in the sub-watershed Pacucha, Peru.  
 
5.1 Materials and methods 
 
Erosion affects the soil by selectively removing soil particles. The soil quality decreases due to loss 
of nutrients and degradation of the soil structure. The following measurements were carried out in 
order to analyse differences in soil characteristics between soils with and without SWC practices on 
sloping fields: infiltration measurements, soil analysis and yield measurements.  
 
Measuring infiltration rates 
The implementation of bench terraces might have an immediate effect on soil properties, as the soil 
is disturbed during the construction. In order to compare the infiltration capacity between bench 
terraces and sloping fields, a mini rainfall simulator (www.eijkelkamp.com) was used. The mini 
rainfall simulator is a small portable rainfall simulator for the use in the field. The rainfall simulator 
consists of three parts (see Figure 5.1): 
1. A sprinkler (A) with a built-in pressure regulator for the production of the standard rain shower. 
2. An adjustable support (B) for the sprinkler. 
3. A ground frame (C), which is placed on the soil and prevents the lateral movement of water 
from the test plot to the surrounding soil. 
 
The runoff plot of the rainfall simulator covers an area of 0.0625 m2 and is surrounded with a metal 
frame so that all runoff water is collected at the lowest point. The rainfall intensity produced by the 
rainfall simulator was about 6 mm min-1. This high intensity is needed to compensate for the short 
falling distance, in order to obtain a realistic kinetic energy of the rain drops. Though the practical 
use of the absolute values of these measurements is disputable, the results are useful for comparing 
the infiltration rates of different sites. 
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Figure 5.1 Elements of the portable rainfall simulator 
 
Ten sites, or five pairs of existing bench terraces and accompanying sloping fields, were selected in 
2002. On each site, three up to seven infiltration measurements were carried out using the rainfall 
simulator. The amount of repetitions depended on the variability of the infiltration measurements. 
Though the platforms of bench terraces are horizontal, it was impossible to find horizontal spots for 
the infiltration measurements, as farmers make ridges on the platforms for crop cultivation. 
Therefore, the runoff plot was installed on the side of the ridges, causing an inclination. However, 
the simulations on the terraces were still under a smaller inclination than on the sloping fields. 
 
One simulation run took 5 minutes, and then the sprinkler had to be refilled. A simulation was 
executed until a constant runoff rate was reached. As a consequence, most simulations took about 
20 to 30 minutes. During the simulation, the amount of runoff was measured every minute starting 
from the moment that runoff occurred. The infiltration rate was determined by distracting the runoff 
rate from the rainfall intensity. The measurements were carried out during the dry season and thus 
on a dry soil. However, two weeks of rainfall disturbed the measurements and therefore the 
measurements on the bench terraces of site 3 were carried out on a humid soil. 
 
Soil fertility 
Soil samples were collected in order to determine the soil fertility and soil texture. In 2002 soil 
samples were collected on the same sites where the infiltration measurements had taken place, 
resulting in 10 samples. In 2003, soil samples were collected for each site where maize yields were 
measured, at 32 different locations in total. A few samples were collected in the valley bottom as 
well for comparison, as these soils are supposed to be the most fertile. All soil samples were 
collected at a soil depth of 5 to 10 cm. The soil samples were analysed in the laboratory of the 
Agricultural University La Molina in Lima, Peru. Texture, organic matter content, and the 
quantities of total nitrogen (N), phosphate (P) and potassium (K) were determined. 
 
Yield measurements as a proxy for soil productivity 
Despite its limitations, crop yields are still frequently used as indicators for soil productivity, as the 
main product of the soil in agriculture is, of course, the crop yield. Crop yield is only a good 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  86 
estimator of the difference in productivity between two soils when: (a) the same crop is used; (b) 
this crop is ‘optimal’ for both soils; (c) all non-soil factors affecting crop yield are held constant for 
the situation in which yield is measured (Rijsberman and Wolman, 1984). As farmers are most 
concerned about decreasing crop yields, the concept of erosion-induced productivity loss (section 
2.1) is used for the analysis by measuring crop yields (Erenstein, 1999; Stocking and Clark, 1999). 
 
Maize was chosen as crop for the yield measurements, as it appeared that this crop was most 
extensively sown on both bench terraces and sloping fields during the rainy season. During the 
measurements it appeared that three different maize varieties were sown: Almidon, Morocho and 
Cancha. Almidon produces the largest cobs and grains, but also needs more water and a longer 
growing season, and is therefore mainly sown on the flat and fertile soils at the bottom of the 
valleys where more water is available. Morocho is a local maize variety that produces smaller 
grains, but also needs less water and nutrients, and it has a shorter growing season. This variety is 
normally sown on the sloping fields. The yield and the demand for water and nutrients of the variety 
Cancha lies in between those of Almidon and Morocho. Almidon is often sold on the market, as it 
has the best price. Morocho and Cancha are mainly used for home consumption.  
 
In 2002, crop yields were measured at the same 10 sites as the infiltration measurements. At each 
site, 3 or 4 plots of 4 m2 were laid out randomly on the site. Care was taken that the plants within 
the sample plots were representative for the site. The plants were cut of just above the soil, and the 
maize cobs were removed. The plants were counted in order to determine the plant density (number 
of plants per m2). The vegetative parts of the plant, i.e. the stalk and leaves, were weighed for the 
plant biomass (kg m-2). The vegetative parts of Morocho were already quite dry at harvest time, but 
most Almidon plants were still green during the measurements. The maize cobs were weighed 
separately for the grain yield (kg m-2). In order to convert the fresh weight of the grain yield into a 
dry weight, the local technique to desiccate the grains was applied. A sub-sample of 22 cobs were 
taken aside and put in the sun for several weeks in order to dry the grains. When they were 
completely dry, the grains were weighed again, in order to establish a conversion factor to calculate 
the dry weight of the grain yield. The average ratio dry weight / fresh weight of the maize cobs 
appeared to be 0.54, with a standard deviation of 0.04. Dividing the dry weight of the grain yield by 
the plant density resulted in the plant productivity (kg plant-1). 
 
Additional yield measurements were carried out in 2003, in order to have a larger sample needed 
for statistical analyses. Unfortunately, it was not possible to evaluate the same 10 sites as in 2002, 
as farmers had sown other crops, or the maize had been harvested already. In 2003, sites were 
selected randomly. If different maize varieties were sown at a site, these samples were considered 
as different observations. In total 46 observations were obtained: 22 observations were collected on 
bench terraces and 24 observations on sloping fields. Among these 46 observations, there were 6 
pairs of observations on bench terraces and accompanying sloping fields. In 2003, two sample plots 
of 16 m2 were laid out randomly for each observation. The measurements were done according to 
the same method as in 2002.  
 
The yields were measured at the moment the farmer started to harvest his field. During the 
harvesting the farmers were interviewed about their farming practices, like sowing and harvesting 
date, use of fertilisers, use of irrigation, crop rotation, and ploughing equipment. Also, the size of 
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the total cultivated field was measured as well as the slope and the altitude. In case of bench 
terraces, the dimensions (height, length, width and slope of terrace platform – the modified slope) 
were measured as well. In 2002, the soil depth could be easily measured by pushing a metal stick 
into the soil after the infiltration measurements when the soil was still humid. In 2003, this appeared 
to be quite difficult as the soil was dry. In that year, the soil depth had to be estimated for many 
sites. 
 
Statistical analysis 
The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and the Student test, or t-test, were applied to verify 
significant differences in infiltration rates, soil fertility and grain yields between the bench terraces 
and the sloping fields. The zero hypothesis that the average values of these factors are equal for 
bench terraces and sloping fields can be verified with these tests. The Pearson procedure is applied 
to define linear correlations coefficients between the factors and yields, in order to get better insight 
in how factors are related to each other and to the maize yield. 
 
With the data of the rainfall simulations and the yield measurements, linear regression models were 
estimated in SPSS. The multiple regression model is defined as (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998): 
εββββ +++++= kikiii XXXY K33221  [5.1] 
where Y is the dependent variable, the X’s are the independent variables, and ε is the error term. 
Standardised coefficients were calculated in order to indicate the relative importance of the 
independent variables. Using the data of the rainfall simulations, a linear regression with the 
infiltration / rainfall ratio as dependent variable was determined stepwise by omitting insignificant 
variables one by one. The same procedure is followed for the regression models estimated for crop 
production. 
  
5.2 Effect of bench terraces on soil properties  
 
Infiltration and water storage 
Table 5.1 shows the results of the infiltration measurements done with the portable rainfall 
simulator. The main difference between the bench terraces and sloping fields is obviously the slope. 
The zero hypothesis that the infiltration/rainfall ratios are equal for bench terraces and sloping fields 
is accepted (significance level is 0.713). Apparently the infiltration capacity of the soil is not 
affected by terracing. However, the average values of the infiltration/rainfall ratios of the 5 sloping 
fields are significantly different (at 0.001 level), whereas the average values of this ratio of the 5 
bench terraces are not different (0.477 level). This finding shows that infiltration capacity becomes 
more homogenous due to terracing. 
 
Applying a multiple linear regression analysis with the infiltration/rainfall ratio as dependent 
variable gives more insight into the infiltration process (Table 5.2) The significant independent 
variables explaining the infiltration/rainfall ratio are: soil depth, soil texture (sand fraction) and soil 
organic matter content. The standardised coefficients show that soil depth has the largest influence 
on the infiltration/rainfall ratio, followed by the soil texture and soil organic matter respectively. 
These three parameters are also the only significant variables determining (positively) the final 
infiltration rate.  
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Table 5.1 Results infiltration measurements, Pacucha 2002 
Site Bench terraces Sloping fields 
 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 
Soil texture  Loam Loam Clay loam
Clay 
loam
Clay 
loam  
Silty 
clay 
loam
Clay 
loam Loam 
Clay 
loam Loam
Soil organic matter (%) 2.4 3.0 3.0 2.2 2.4 1.6 2.8 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.2 2.9 
Soil depth (m) 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 
Modified slope (%) 4 1 1 7 9 2 30 12 50 45 10 35 
Inclination runoff plot (%) 22 19 19 23 19 30 42 28 56 58 34 35 
Intensity (mm/min) 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.6 6.6 
Final infiltration rate 
(mm/min) 1.8 1.2 2.3 1.7 2.4 1.7 2.2 1.0 1.9 2.4 3.5 2.1 
Rainfall (mm) 167 187 169 136 220 126 164 147 115 153 239 166 
Runoff (mm) 81 106 73 68 85 73 73 99 61 63 53 87 
Infiltration (mm) 86 80 95 68 135 54 92 47 54 90 186 80 
Infiltration / rainfall ratio 0.49 0.42 0.53 0.47 0.61 0.42 0.52 0.33 0.45 0.58 0.78 0.47 
 
Table 5.2 Results regression analysis on infiltration/rainfall ratio, Pacucha 
Coefficients  Coefficients Sign. Standardised Coefficients 
  β  Beta 
Constant -0.412 0.004  
Soil texture: % sand 0.007 0.002 0.519 
Soil organic matter (%) 0.093 0.009 0.380 
Soil depth (m) 0.661 0.000 0.698 
 Model results: Adjusted R2 = 0.917; significance = 0.000; N=10 
 
Though the infiltration capacity of the soil is determined by soil depth, soil texture and soil organic 
matter content, it is expected that bench terraces improve the water storage due to the modification 
of the slope. As the terrace platforms are horizontal, ponding of excessive rainfall or irrigation 
water occurs instead of overland flow (runoff), and water thus has more time to infiltrate. Farmers 
confirmed this assumption. They stated that the soils on the bench terraces stay humid twice as long 
as the soils of sloping fields. Whether terracing improves the infiltration capacity or not, does not 
make much difference, as excessive water will infiltrate after each rainfall event, when the water is 
retained on the terrace platforms. As soil organic matter positively influences infiltration, it is 
expected that compost also improves infiltration and thus soil moisture content. 
 
Soil fertility 
Soil erosion and SWC practices might influence the amount of nutrients available in the soil. 
However, results of the soil samples show that the only soil characteristic that is significantly 
different for sloping fields, bench terraces and valley bottom, is soil depth (Table 5.3). This 
significance is caused by the deep soils (up to 2m) in the valley bottom. The soils of bench terraces 
contain slightly more phosphorus and potassium than soils of sloping fields but this difference is not 
significant. As terrace construction implies soil disturbance, and the bench terraces are relatively 
young (i.e. two to four years), the turning over of the soil during the construction might have caused 
this difference. 
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Table 5.3 Soil properties of sloping fields and bench terraces, Pacucha 
 Valley bottom 
(n = 5) 
Sloping field 
(n = 20) 
Bench terraces 
(n = 17) 
ANOVA results
 Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. F Sign. 
Soil depth (m) 1.08 0.23 0.47 0.15 0.56 0.08 37.917 0.000 
Soil texture         
% sand 36.0 9.4 38.3 9.3 39.9 5.5 0.494 0.614 
% loam 34.4 3.8 32.5 7.1 31.9 6.4 0.286 0.753 
% clay 29.6 7.1 29.2 7.0 28.2 3.7 0.169 0.845 
Soil fertility         
Organic matter (%) 3.34 0.47 3.24 0.70 3.29 0.82 0.048 0.953 
Nitrogen (%) 0.22 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.07 0.336 0.717 
Phosphorus (ppm) 25.4 11.8 23.5 19.2 34.1 21.7 1.383 0.263 
Potassium (ppm) 368 205 370 222 521 416 1.160 0.324 
 
 
5.3 Effect of bench terraces on maize production 
 
In the years 2002 and 2003, the maize production was measured in several farmers’ fields in the 
watershed of Pacucha, in order to determine the impact of terracing and organic fertilisers on crop 
production. Maize receives only organic fertilisers, either compost or manure. Appendix 5.1 shows 
the descriptives of all variables measured. 
 
Effect of bench terraces on maize yield 
Table 5.4 shows the results of the yield measurements for bench terraces and sloping fields. The 
grain yield consists of two components: plant productivity (kg grains per plant) and plant density 
(plants per m2). Different sub-categories were made according to: maize variety (Morocho or 
Almidon); natural slope (more or less than 25%); and organic fertilisation (yes or no). 
 
Table 5.4 Analysis of means of crop measurements, Pacucha, 2002 and 2003 
   Plant productivity (kg plant-1) 
Plant density 
(plants m-2) 
Grain yield 
(kg m-2) 
   
 
N 
Bench 
terraces 
Sloping
field Sign.
Bench 
terraces
Sloping
field Sign.
Bench 
terraces 
Sloping
field Sign.
All  46 0.08 0.08  7.3 5.5 ** 0.53 0.44  
Morocho 30 0.07 0.07  8.6 5.5 ** 0.56 0.39 * Variety 
Almidon 11 0.11 0.11  4.6 5.7  0.47 0.61  
> 25% 24 0.07 0.05  7.9 5.5 ** 0.50 0.28 ** Natural 
slope (%) ≤ 25% 22 0.10 0.10  6.4 5.5  0.57 0.57  
Yes 31 0.08 0.08  7.8 5.4 ** 0.56 0.42  Organic 
fertilisers No 15 0.08 0.09  5.9 5.6  0.44 0.47  
Sign.: Difference between bench terraces and sloping field is significant at 0.1 (*) or 0.05 level (**) 
 
In many cases, plant density is significantly higher on bench terraces than on sloping fields. Though 
on average the grain yield on bench terraces is higher than on sloping fields, this difference is not 
always significant. The positive effect of bench terraces on grain yield is only significant for the 
variety Morocho and at slopes steeper than 25%. Note that Morocho is mainly sown on the steeper 
slopes. Bench terraces have no effect on plant productivity. The increased grain yield is thus due to 
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an increased plant density. Application of organic fertilisers is associated with a higher plant density 
on bench terraces. However, application of organic fertiliser does not result in a significant increase 
in grain production. A possible explanation for this is that organic fertilisers are applied on fields 
with lower soil organic matter content. The soil organic matter content of ‘non-fertilised’ fields 
(3.6%) is significantly higher than the soil organic matter content of fertilised fields (3.2%) at a 
confidence level of P = 0.06. Table 5.5 shows more details on the combined effects of fertilisers and 
bench terraces on maize production. 
 
Table 5.5 Combined effect of bench terraces and organic fertilisers, Pacucha 
 N 
Grain 
yield 
(kg m-2) 
Plant 
productivity 
(kg plant-1) 
Plant  
density 
(plants m-2)
Natural 
slope 
(%) 
Organic 
matter 
(%) 
Quantity 
fertilisers 
(kg m-2) 
Sloping fields 24 0.44 0.080 5.5 24.8 3.2 0.31 
Bench terrace 22 0.53 0.079 7.3 29.6 3.4 0.66 
No fertilisers 15 0.46 0.084 5.7 21.0 3.6 0.00 
Manure 14 0.48 0.080 6.3 32.0 3.3 0.67 
Compost 17 0.51 0.075 6.9 28.4 3.0 0.74 
Bench terrace + no fertilisers 6 0.44 0.081 5.9 22.5 3.8 0.00 
Bench terrace + manure 7 0.50 0.076 7.0 35.0 3.5 0.85 
Bench terrace + compost 9 0.61 0.081 8.5 30.2 3.0 0.96 
Bench terrace + fertilisers 16 0.56 0.079 7.8 32.3 3.3 0.91 
Sloping field + no fertilisers 9 0.47 0.086 5.6 20.0 3.5 0.00 
Sloping field + manure 7 0.46 0.085 5.6 29.0 3.0 0.50 
Sloping field + compost 8 0.39 0.069 5.3 26.4 3.1 0.50 
Sloping field + fertilisers 15 0.42 0.077 5.4 27.6 3.1 0.50 
 
Especially the less fertile soils and steeper slopes receive organic fertilisers; the steepest slopes 
receive manure, the poorest soils receive compost. Despite the fact that fertilised bench terraces 
have a lower soil organic matter content than non-fertilised bench terraces, the bench terraces that 
receive compost result in a higher grain yield. Note that bench terraces receive a higher quantity of 
fertilisers than sloping fields. It is thus concluded that the combination of bench terraces and 
composting results in an increased maize production. 
 
Factors correlated with maize production 
In order to determine the influence of various variables on maize yield, all observations (n = 46) on 
sloping fields and bench terraces are used for the estimation of the correlation coefficients (Table 
5.6). The grain yield (kg m-2) is linear correlated with the modified slope (-), soil depth (+), the 
number of crops harvested per year (+), plant density (+), plant biomass (+) and plant productivity 
(+). The steepness of the slope influences negatively the yield. As bench terraces modify the slope, 
i.e. the slope becomes less steep, bench terraces improve grain yield. Sowing two crops a year 
instead of one, results in higher maize yield. In general, two crops a year are sown on fields with 
favourable conditions. It might be that maize benefits from the fertiliser residuals that are applied to 
the second crop in the dry season, which is normally potato. The correlation coefficients found for 
grain yield on either sloping fields or bench terraces, are quite similar to the correlation coefficients 
for both groups combined. The grain yield on terraces is strongly correlated with plant density, 
while the yield on sloping fields is stronger correlated with plant productivity. The grain yield on 
bench terraces was lower in 2003 than in 2002.  
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Table 5.6 Correlation coefficients for maize production on sloping fields and bench terraces 
 Sloping fields (n=24) Bench terraces (n=22) All (n=46) 
Variables Plant density 
Plant 
prod.
Grain 
yield 
Plant 
density
Plant 
prod.
Grain 
yield 
Plant 
density 
Plant 
prod.
Grain 
yield 
Year of measurement    - -  - -  +  
Natural slope (%)  - - - -  -   - -  
Bench terrace       +   
Modified slope (%)        - - - - 
Soil organic matter (%)    -   -   
N content (%)  +  - -   - - +  
P content (ppm)    - - +   +  
K content (ppm)    - +     
Soil texture: % sand     -   -  
Soil depth (m)   + +      + + 
Growing days  +  - - +   + +  
Crops per year  +  +  + +  + + + 
Morocho  -  + -   - -  
Almidon    - + +   + +  
Plant density (plants m-2)   +  - + +   + + 
Plant biomass (kg m-2)  + + + + +     + + 
Plant productivity (kg plant-1)   + + -     + + 
Significant at 0.01 level: + + is positive, - - is negative correlation 
Significant at 0.05 level: + is positive, - is negative correlation 
 
The grain production per plant or plant productivity (kg plant-1) is correlated with variety, natural 
and modified slope (-), and soil characteristics like nitrogen content (+), phosphorus content (+), 
and sand fraction (-). Plant productivity was higher in the year 2003. Farmers confirmed that the 
maize performance was better in 2003 than in 2002. In 2002 there was a dry spell during the rainy 
season, causing crop failure. The plant productivity is also correlated with the length of the growing 
season. However, this might be partly explained by the fact that the length of the growing season is 
correlated with the maize variety: Morocho needs a shorter period to ripen than Almidon, which is 
known for its higher plant productivity. The crop rotation is also correlated with plant productivity. 
If a second crop is sown during the dry season, the plant productivity of the maize sown in the rainy 
season is higher. The natural slope is negatively correlated with plant productivity, even for bench 
terraces. The natural slope can be seen as a proxy for soil quality. In general, fields with steep 
slopes are poor in soil fertility and shallow in soil depth. 
 
Plant density (plants m-2) is correlated with: bench terraces (+), modified slope (-), year of 
measurement (-), the nitrogen content (-), phosphorus content (-), plant biomass (+) and grain yield 
(+). Bench terraces enable a higher plant density, as the natural slope is modified. The plant density 
on bench terraces was lower in 2003 than in 2002, explaining the lower crop yield in 2003. It is not 
clear whether this difference has to do with the difference in sampling between the two years. It 
might also be that farmers decided to sow the maize less dense in 2003 to prevent crop failure as in 
the previous year. On bench terraces, plant density is negatively correlated with plant productivity. 
Possibly farmers tend to sow maize too dense on terraces, resulting in competition for soil nutrients. 
On the other hand, Morocho is sown on soils with low fertility, and this variety is sown very dense. 
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It might thus also be that low soil fertility leads to high plant densities because of the choice of 
maize variety. The plant density on sloping fields is not linear correlated with any variable. 
 
Considering the linear correlations between the different variables and yield, a correlation diagram 
is drawn explaining how factors are interrelated with each other and with the grain yield (Figure 
5.2). However, some variables that are not significantly correlated might still influence the maize 
production. The Pearson correlation only estimates the linear correlation, but nonlinear correlations 
are ignored. More linear correlations are estimated between variables, but in order to keep the 
picture orderly, some less relevant correlations are left out. 
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Figure 5.2 Factors influencing maize production  
 
The correlations suggest that an increased plant density leads to a decrease in soil nutrients, and 
thus a decrease in plant productivity. This means that if the implementation of bench terraces results 
in an increased plant density, this has be combined with fertilisers to prevent a decrease in soil 
nutrients and a decrease in soil and plant productivity. Bench terraces have a direct positive 
influence on plant density and plant biomass, and an indirect influence on grain yield through the 
modification of the slope and soil depth. The fact that modified slope, and not natural slope, is 
correlated with the number of crops per year implies that bench terraces enable two harvests a year. 
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Linear regression models explaining maize production 
The results of the linear regression models for grain yield (Table 5.7), plant productivity (Table 5.8) 
and plant density (Table 5.9) are shown below. The estimated regression models contain only the 
significant variables.  
 
Table 5.7 Results regression analysis on grain yield (kg m-2), Pacucha 
Significant variables  Coefficients Sign. Standardised coefficients 
 β  Beta 
Constant 0.039 0.837  
Modified slope (%) -0.005 0.041 -0.304 
P content (ppm) -0.003 0.036 -0.293 
Soil depth (m) 0.684 0.016 0.370 
Crops per year 0.196 0.022 0.314 
Application of manure 0.122 0.076 0.237 
 Model results: Adjusted R2 = 0.362; significance = 0.000 
 
The variables modified slope, soil depth and the number of crops harvested per year influence the 
grain yield (kg m-2), as was already concluded in Figure 5.2. Other significant variables are 
phosphorus content and the application of manure. Though compost is also applied as fertiliser, this 
is not significant. Comparison of soil characteristics show that organic fertilisers are applied on 
soils with a low nitrogen (0.19%) and soil organic matter content (3.2%). The nitrogen (0.23%) and 
soil organic matter content (3.6%) of soils that do not receive fertilisers are significantly higher. 
Manure is applied on fields with high nitrogen content of 0.22%, while the fields with compost 
fertilisation have significant lower nitrogen content of 0.17%. Apparently, no effect of compost on 
grain yield can be measured, as the compost is used to compensate for the lower soil fertility.  
 
Table 5.8 Results regression analysis on plant productivity (kg plant-1), Pacucha 
Significant variables Coefficients Sign. Standardised coefficients 
 β  Beta 
(Constant) 0.053 0.051  
Natural slope (%) -0.001 0.006 -0.368 
N content (ppm) 0.141 0.055 0.235 
Crops per year 0.025 0.023 0.269 
Quantity fertilisers (kg m-2) 0.017 0.029 0.262 
Morocho -0.025 0.004 -0.348 
 Model results: Adjusted R2 = 0.481; Significance = 0.000 
 
Plant productivity (kg plant-1) is positively determined by nitrogen content in the soil, fertilisation, 
and the harvest of two crops per year. The maize variety Morocho results in a lower plant 
productivity. Apparently, the natural slope can be seen as a proxy for the soil quality. The natural 
slope is negatively correlated with both soil depth and the nitrogen content. In other words, 
increasing steepness of the slope is associated with shallower and poorer soils. The amount of 
organic fertilisers applied has a positive influence on the crop productivity.  
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Table 5.9 Results regression analysis on plant density (plants m-2), Pacucha 
Significant variables Coefficients Sign. Standardised coefficients 
 β  Beta 
(Constant) 10.970 0.000  
Year -3.562 0.000 -0.576 
Slope (%) 0.077 0.002 0.453 
Modified slope (%) -0.118 0.000 -0.703 
P content (ppm) -0.048 0.005 -0.375 
Soil texture: % clay -0.161 0.017 -0.332 
Irrigation 1.974 0.039 0.297 
Crops per year 1.865 0.027 0.268 
Application of manure 1.911 0.013 0.334 
Quantity fertilisers (kg m-2) -1.023 0.088 -0.207 
 Model results: Adjusted R2 = 0.601; Significance = 0.000 
 
As said before, the plant density (plants m-2) was lower in 2003 than in 2002, which explains the 
negative sign for year. The steeper the slope, the denser the crop is sown. This can be partly 
explained by the fact that the natural slope is positively correlated with the maize variety Morocho, 
which is sown more densely than the other two maize varieties. Plant density is higher on the bench 
terraces, as the modified slope is negatively influencing the plant density in contradiction to the 
natural slope. It is not likely that a low phosphorus content results in a high plant density. But it 
might be that the phosphorus content is correlated with another variable that influences the plant 
density. Soil texture (clay content) is also significant. The clay fraction is negatively correlated with 
the natural slope, which positively influences the plant density. The negative sign for the clay 
fraction can thus be explained by its correlation with natural slope. Crops are sown denser at sites 
with access to irrigation. Though the application of manure positively influences plant density, the 
amount of fertilisers negatively influences plant density. This is contradicting to Table 5.5 where a 
higher quantity of fertilisers is correlated with higher plant density. Here the misinterpretation is 
probably due to multicollinearity8: the quantity of fertilisers is correlated with the dummy for 
fertiliser application and natural slope. The negative sign of the phosphorus content might also be 
caused by these correlations. 
 
Yield increase and area loss due to terracing 
Bench terraces modify (i.e. decrease) the slope, resulting in a yield increase. However, this yield 
increase is mainly caused by an increased plant density on these terraces. Plant productivity is 
determined by crop variety, and bench terraces have no influence on this. Though bench terraces 
enable an increase in plant density and thus grain yield, area is lost because of the implementation 
of these terraces. It is calculated that the area lost due to terracing ranges from 16 to 22 %, with an 
average of 20%. In the previous analyses on crop production this area loss is not taken into account. 
However, when the grain yields are extrapolated from one square meter to one hectare, the grain 
                                                 
8 When independent variables have a high degree of multicollinearity, interpretation of the coefficients 
becomes difficult. A regression coefficient is interpreted to measure the change in Y that is due to a change in 
the variable in question, other things being equal. But any time a given change in one variable occurs, the 
corresponding observation on its highly correlated partner is likely to change in a predictably similar fashion 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998) 
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yield and plant density have to be adjusted for the area that is lost due to terracing. Table 5.10 
shows the adjusted maize production. 
 
Table 5.10 Analysis of means of maize yield measurements, adjusted values, Pacucha 
   Plant productivity (kg plant-1) 
Plant density 
(plants ha-1) 
Grain yield 
(kg ha-1) 
   
 
N 
Bench 
terraces 
Sloping
field Sign.
Bench 
terraces
Sloping
field Sign.
Bench 
terraces 
Sloping
field Sign.
All  46 0.08 0.08  58452 54797  4232 4419  
Morocho 30 0.07 0.07  69065 55008 * 4479 3861  Variety 
Almidon 11 0.11 0.11  36515 57000 ** 3766 6105 ** 
> 25% 24 0.07 0.05  63456 54510  3991 2848  Natural 
slope (%) ≤ 25% 22 0.10 0.10  51223 55040  4580 5749  
Yes 31 0.08 0.08  62629 53988  4504 4243  Organic 
fertilisers No 15 0.08 0. 09  47313 56146  3506 4713  
Sign.: Difference between bench terraces and sloping field is significant at 0.1 (*) or 0.05 level (**) 
 
When the values are adjusted for the area lost due to terracing, differences in plant density and grain 
yield become less significant. Any increase in plant density and/or grain yield enabled by terracing, 
is nullified by the loss of total area cultivated. In case of Almidon, bench terraces even result in a 
significant lower grain yield. However, bench terraces also enabled the cultivation of Almidon 
where it would not have been cultivated on the adjacent sloping fields because of unfavourable 
conditions.  
 
Table 5.11 Results regression analysis on adjusted grain yield (kg ha-1), n=46 
Significant variables Coefficients Sign. Standardised Coefficients 
 β  Beta 
(Constant) 1345 0.787  
Year -1961 0.083 -0.386 
Bench terrace -2787 0.002 -0.643 
Modified slope (%) -102 0.003 -0.739 
N content (ppm) 16108 0.065 0.431 
P content (ppm) -52 0.027 -0.496 
Soil texture: % loam -149 0.018 -0.464 
Soil texture: % clay -111 0.076 -0.280 
Soil depth (m) 5988 0.077 0.354 
Growing days 39 0.085 0.286 
Crops per year 1508 0.070 0.264 
Application of manure 1431 0.073 0.304 
 Model results: Adjusted R2 = 0.414; significance = 0.001 
 
Table 5.11 shows the results of the estimated linear regression for the adjusted values of grain yield. 
It is interesting to see that, when the grain yield is adjusted for the area lost due to terracing, the 
terracing even becomes a restricting factor for the maize production. However, the levelling of the 
slope through terracing still favours the grain yield. Now that the effect of terracing is reduced, 
other soil characteristics became more significant, like nitrogen content (+) and soil texture. Also 
the length of the growing season is positively influencing the grain yield. The estimations of a linear 
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regression model for the adjusted plant density did not differ much from the estimations made in 
Table 5.9. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
 
Infiltration measurements show that soil texture, soil organic matter and soil depth are the main 
determinants of infiltration capacity of the soil. Soil improvement through agronomic measures like 
composting and mulching thus seem to be important to reduce runoff, and as a consequence, soil 
erosion. In addition, it is assumed that bench terraces allow water to infiltrate over a longer time 
period as ponding occurs due to the levelling of the slope. Though measurements could not be 
carried out to prove this assumption, farmers confirm that the soil on bench terraces remains humid 
twice as long as the soil on sloping fields. Statistical analyses show that bench terraces enable a 
higher plant density (plants m-2), resulting in an increased grain yield (kg m-2). The plant 
productivity (kg plant-1) is determined by maize variety, soil fertility and fertilisation. The effect of 
bench terraces on production increase is more pronounced on the fields with steeper slopes. Organic 
fertilisers are applied on soils with a lower nitrogen and soil organic matter content, explaining the 
limited effect of fertilisation on grain yield in this case study. The combination of bench terraces 
and organic fertilisation though, results in a significant increase of maize production.  
 
However, the increase in crop density and, as a consequence, grain yield established through bench 
terraces, is nullified by the amount of area lost (20%) due to the same terracing. If the improved 
conditions due to the terraces are not fully exploited, bench terraces may finally result in a lower 
maize production. In that sense, terracing is only justified if advantage is taken of the improved 
conditions for agricultural production: e.g. cultivation of a second crop during the dry season or the 
cultivation of a cash crop with high market value. Access to irrigation is in many cases a requisite 
for the intensification of agriculture on bench terraces. Others also found that, in the Andes, terraces 
with irrigation and intensive cultivation of high value crops are maintained throughout the years, 
whereas less care is taken of rainfed terraces with extensive cultivation (Coolman, 1986; Rist and 
Martin, 1991). Furthermore, the increased soil productivity has to be combined with other means to 
maximise the benefits of terraces. Improved crop rotations, fertilisation, and an improved portfolio 
of crops linked to markets have an important part to play (Rodríguez and Nickalls, 2002). 
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APPENDIX 5.1  
 
Descriptives of variables measured during yield measurements  
 
Dependent variables Description Mean Standard deviation
Plant density Number of plants per m2 (plants m-2) 6.4 2.67 
Plant productivity Grain quantity per plant (kg plant-1) 0.080 0.035 
Grain yield Grain quantity per m2 (kg m-2) 0.484 0.239 
Independent variables   
Year of measurement = 1 if data is measured in 2003; 0 if in 2002 0.76 0.43 
Altitude Meters above sea level (m) 3163 39.96 
Natural slope Natural slope of field (%) 27.1 15.6 
Bench terrace = 1 if site has bench terraces; 0 if not 0.48 0.505 
Modified slope Modified slope of field (%) – is equal to the natural slope in case there are no bench terraces 15.5 15.93 
Soil organic matter Soil organic matter content in soil (%) 3.30 0.736 
N content Nitrogen content in soil (%) 0.205 0.0586 
P content Phosphorus content in soil (ppm) 29.5 20.77 
K content Potassium content in soil (ppm) 442 325.6 
Soil texture: sand Sand fraction in soil texture (%) 38.7 7.72 
Soil texture: clay Clay fraction in soil texture (%) 28.8 5.51 
Soil depth Soil depth of field or terrace (m) 0.51 0.13 
Growing days Length of actual growing period of maize (days) 216 16.1 
Access to irrigation = 1 if there is access to irrigation; 0 if not 0.8 0.40 
Crops per year Amount of crops in rotation per year at same field  1.17 0.38 
Fertiliser = 1 if fertilisers are applied; 0 if not 0.67 0.47 
Fertiliser: manure = 1 if manure is applied as fertiliser; 0 if not 0.30 0.47 
Fertiliser: compost = 1 if compost is applied as fertiliser; 0 if not 0.37 0.49 
Quantity fertiliser Amount of fertiliser applied (kg m-2) 0.48 0.540 
Variety Morocho = 1 if maize variety is Morocho; 0 otherwise 0.65 0.48 
Variety Almidon = 1 if maize variety is Almidon; 0 otherwise 0.24 0.43 
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Chapter 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis of bench terraces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is a revised version of: 
H. Posthumus and J. de Graaff (2005) Cost-benefit analysis of bench terraces, a case study in Peru. 
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6 Cost-benefit analysis of bench terraces 
 
When inappropriate farming practices are applied in mountainous areas, there is a risk of soil 
erosion. A soil’s vulnerability to erosion depends on how easily it is damaged (which is determined 
by the soil characteristics) and on how significant that damage is for crop production. In case soil 
erosion results in yield decrease, this can be considered a cost. When soil and water conservation 
(SWC) practices are implemented, soil erosion and yield decrease can be prevented, which can be 
considered as an avoided cost, or benefit. However, SWC practices often require a costly 
investment for the implementation. It then becomes important to know whether the long-term 
benefits of reduced soil erosion make these investment costs worth bearing (Pagiola, 1994). In this 
chapter, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is applied to define the profitability of bench terraces. 
 
6.1 Cost-benefit analysis explained 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) centres on the quantification and measurement of the costs and 
benefits of an intervention. CBA is often used for the social appraisal of programmes (Common, 
1996), and is based on applied welfare economics. It addresses the efficiency of an intervention, 
using a monetary approach. This implies that scores on efficiency attributes are valued in terms of 
money (Pelt, 1993). CBA aims at a comparison between the present value of the streams of benefits 
and the present value of all investment and recurrent costs of an intervention (Graaff, 1996). A 
distinction can be made between financial, economic and social CBA: social and economic CBA 
are used to determine efficiency from a society’s point of view, whereas financial CBA is used for 
the private perspective (Davies and Richards, 1999). Social CBA takes income distribution effects 
into account, assuming that it is desirable to prevent the rich becoming richer and the poor poorer. 
Economic CBA only determines the efficiency of the intervention for society, neglecting any 
inequity in the distribution of the benefits (Kuyvenhoven and Mennes, 1985; Pelt, 1993). 
 
In this case study, CBA is used to evaluate the profitability of bench terraces at field level in the 
Peruvian Andes. It is important to know the profitability of bench terraces from farmers’ 
perspective, as they make the decision whether to implement terraces on their land. Another reason 
to study the profitability at field level is that the impact of bench terraces is highly site-specific and 
can thus vary within small areas (Lutz et al., 1994b; Shiferaw and Holden, 2001). The flows of 
costs and benefits in cases with and without bench terraces are compared in order to determine the 
profitability of bench terraces at field level. The remainder of this chapter will therefore focus on 
the application of financial CBA only. 
 
The main steps of financial cost-benefit analysis 
The following steps are defined in the CBA process (Graaff, 1996; Enters, 1998): 
1. Determination of evaluation criteria. 
2. Identification of effects (costs and benefits). 
3. Quantification in physical terms of the effects. 
4. Valuation of effects, including shadow pricing. 
5. Determination of time horizon. 
6. Weighing of the costs and benefits in time (discounting). 
7. Sensitivity analysis. 
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The evaluation criteria 
Several evaluation criteria can be used for financial CBA, but most common are the net present 
value (NPV) and the internal rate of return (IRR). The criteria NPV and IRR are explained below 
(based on: Dixon et al., 1988; Zerbe and Dively, 1994; Common, 1996): 
 
The Net Present Value (NPV)  
The NPV is the most widely used evaluation criterion. It determines the present value of net 
benefits by discounting the streams of benefits (B) and costs (C), arising between the present (time 
zero) and t time periods into the future as calculated as: 
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The subscripts refer to time periods and the discount rate is r per time period. A positive NPV 
favours the “with” situation over the “without” situation, as it will make the firm better off. 
 
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
The IRR is the rate of return on an investment, i.e. the discount rate that would result in a zero net 
present value (the break-even point) of a programme. If the IRR is greater than the alternative or 
opportunity cost interest rate accessible to the stakeholder, it is a favourable investment. The IRR is 
found by an iterative process and is equivalent to the discount rate (r) that satisfies the following 
relationship: 
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The IRR is most useful when – as is commonly the case – the discount rate that should be used is 
uncertain or in dispute (Pagiola, 1994). The IRR is less useful for comparison between different 
interventions. Though the IRR might be higher, the absolute profit, or NPV, might be less, as the 
IRR is a proportional value and the absolute value of the benefits is not considered. IRR is 
applicable for simple cases and clear cash flows. However, a problem arises if negative cash flows 
occur after positive cash flows, as IRR can produce multiple solutions because of the polynomial 
used to calculate the IRR. This is knows as the multiple roots problem (Zerbe and Dively, 1994).  
 
Identification of costs and benefits 
Determining the costs is often a straightforward exercise, unless costs have to be divided into 
financial and economic costs. Identification of the benefits might be more complicated, especially 
when they are intangible (i.e. impossible to quantify the benefit in monetary terms), like improved 
water quality, impact of erosion on yield or secondary benefits to the community (Bojö, 1992). To 
be able to apply CBA, two requirements have to be met: 1) the impacts of the intervention are 
measured on a quantitative and physical scale, and 2) (shadow) prices are used to assess the value of 
the (physical) impact (Pelt, 1993). In this case study, costs are the investment and maintenance costs 
for the farmer who implements bench terraces. The benefit is the change in agricultural production. 
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Quantification of physical effects 
The impact of SWC practices on crop yield has to be quantified before it can be valuated in 
economic terms. The quantification of output in the “with” and “without” situation is often the 
weakest part in CBA studies. The comparison of the with and without situation is difficult, as it is 
not always clear how farming practices affect the soil, and how soil erosion or SWC affects yields 
(Bojö, 1992; Pagiola, 1994). The understanding of these relationships is often limited. Even when 
the understanding is adequate, the ability to quantify them is minimal (Pagiola, 1994). Even though, 
CBA can still use the most reasonable estimates available and test whether different assumptions on 
this point make an important difference (Bojö, 1992). Being aware of its limitations (Pagiola, 1992), 
the “change of productivity approach” (Enters, 1998) is used in this case study for the quantification 
of the effects of bench terraces. This approach relies on crop yields with and without terraces. It is 
assumed that in the “with” situation yields remain constant, but that in the “without” situation 
erosion occurs. The erosion damage equals the value of the lost crop production. 
 
Valuation 
According to CBA, prices are the means to aggregate individual preferences (Pelt, 1993). Hence, 
valuation means the attachment of price tags to the costs and benefits of interventions that have 
been quantified. As such, the costs and benefits of an intervention are reduced to a common unit, 
and CBA is the forum for comparing them (Stocking and Abel, 1989). Prices used for financial 
CBA are normally market prices, reflecting the costs in the budgets of a farm household. However, 
problems may arise where there are no markets or where peasant production is not involved in the 
market. In that case, opportunity costs might be used as shadow prices. The changes in crop 
production will be valued with market prices, but for the labour costs valuation is more 
complicated. 
 
In general, terrace construction requires a huge amount of labour. The amount of labour required 
depends on soil quality, soil depth, availability of material for bank or wall construction, humidity 
of the soil and the degree of mechanisation of the terrace construction (Rist and Martin, 1991). As 
the labour costs mainly determine the investment costs, its valuation is crucial. Stocking and Abel 
(1989) present several methods to valuate the extra labour required for SWC practices, depending 
on the circumstances: 
− If SWC takes up leisure time and no other activity is reduced, opportunity cost is zero.  
− If another enterprise is curtailed in order to practice soil conservation, the cost is the income to 
labour, which would have accrued from that enterprise.  
− If off-farm work is abandoned, then similarly the cost is the amount of earnings foregone.  
− If workers are employed, and there is a perfect labour market, the labour cost is their wage. 
 
In case farm households are occasionally involved in off-farm activities, opportunity costs of labour 
are used. The opportunity cost of labour depends on the nature of the activity performed, the 
characteristics of the labourer (age, wealth and gender), the season (growing or slack season) and 
the availability of non-farm and off-farm employment (Enters, 1998). The opportunity cost of 
labour thus varies among farmers and it might be wrong to use one standard opportunity cost for all 
farmers in a CBA study. 
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Time horizon 
The NPV is very sensitive to time horizons as well as to discount rates. Though many farmers want 
to fulfil short-term needs, it would be wrong to assume that their decision-making is guided by 
short-term thinking (Enters, 1998). They also make long-term investments, whether being it tree 
planting or financing their children’s education. When executing a CBA, the time horizon should 
conform with the production characteristics (Enters, 1998) and the physical and/or economic 
lifetime (Bojö, 1992) of the technology studied.  
 
Discount rate 
The costs and benefits of a programme occur over time, forming streams of costs and benefits over 
the lifetime of a programme. In CBA, future costs and benefits are discounted to their present value. 
An appropriate discount rate is thus crucial for the calculation of NPVs. The rational for the choice 
of discount rate is often a “weak spot” in many cost-benefit studies and often criticised (Pelt, 1993; 
Enters, 1998). The choice of the discount rate should be based on two principles: time preference 
(of the decision maker or stakeholder) and the opportunity cost of capital. The opportunity cost of 
capital is based on the foregone production that results when capital is invested in one project rather 
than another.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Any CBA is based on less than perfect information regarding past and current costs and benefits, 
and more so regarding the uncertain future (Bojö, 1992). Sensitivity analysis is used to test the 
assumptions and to indicate the uncertainty of the CBA-outcome (Pelt, 1993). The sensitivity 
analysis is a technique calculating the quantitative effect of a unit change in a cost or benefit item 
on the intervention’s NPV or IRR. In this way, risk and uncertainty with regard to particular costs 
and benefits can better be identified, and their relative importance in the overall analysis be 
established (Kuyvenhoven and Mennes, 1985). Sensitivity analysis helps to provide a better 
understanding of the critical elements on which the outcome of the intervention depends. It may 
focus attention on the variables for which a further effort should be made to firm up the estimates 
and narrow down the range of uncertainty (Squire and Tak, 1975). 
 
6.2 Materials and methods for CBA of bench terraces 
  
In order to determine the profitability of bench terraces, data of 11 fields of 9 different farmers were 
used for the cost-benefit analyses (see Table 6.1). In 2002, 5 sites were selected with each a terraced 
field (= “with”) and an adjacent sloping field under similar conditions (= “without”). In 2003, 6 
field pairs of “with” and “without” situation were selected. Yield measurements were carried out to 
determine the crop production (see also Chapter 5). Farmers were interviewed about their farming 
practices, the costs and benefits of the terraces, agricultural production and inputs used. The 
involved fields are numbered 1 to 11. Table 6.1 summarises briefly the characteristics of the 
farmers and the fields that were involved in the study.  
 
The NPV, IRR, and opportunity cost of labour at break-even point were used as evaluation criteria 
for the CBA. The labour opportunity cost (OC) at break-even point is the point at which the wage 
for the investment costs of the terraces are “repaid” after 10 years (that is, when NPV = 0). It is 
expected that the multiple roots problem will not occur in the calculations of IRR, as in most cases 
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the cash flows are only negative during the investment year, but become positive afterwards for all 
cases except case 7. The bench terraces were small and built by farmers who were not yet very 
experienced with terracing, thus the lifetime of the terraces were expected to be only 10 years. 
Furthermore, as most farmers were subsistence farmers, a long-term investment of more than 10 
years was not expected. The discount rate is an important element in CBA, but it is difficult to 
determine the appropriate rate. There appears to be an informal consensus that the social rate of 
discount is usually around 5 to 10%, although the rationale behind these figures is often not clear 
(Bojö, 1992). Many empirical studies use private discount rates of 5 till 15%, with a maximum of 
20% in some cases, for financial CBA of SWC practices (Clark, 1996; Enters, 1998). For this case 
study, a discount rate of 10% is applied, but in the sensitivity analysis, calculations are also carried 
out with discount rates of 5% and 20%. 
 
For the fields of 2002 (fields 1 to 5), an initial CBA was done with values on labour costs and crop 
production as given by the farmers, in order to determine the profitability of terraces according to 
the farmers’ beliefs. A second CBA was done involving the data of all fields (1 – 11) using the crop 
production data as measured, and adjusting some extreme values given by the farmers, mainly 
concerning labour input. All CB-analyses are carried out for 0.1 hectare, since most farmers’ fields 
are about this size. 
 
Most terraces were quite small. Only the farmer of fields 5 and 7 has made considerable effort to 
construct terraces, followed by the owners of fields 2 and 9. All farmers participated in MARENASS, 
only the farmers of fields 4 and 6, and 8 joined the activities of PRONAMACHCS as well. All fields 
were near the farmer’s house, and in most cases stones were available in the field for the 
construction of the terraces. The main reasons to construct the terraces were to prevent soil loss and 
improve cropping conditions on fields with many stones and steep slopes. All farmers used both 
family labour and ayni for the construction of the terraces. Ayni is a traditional system of reciprocal 
labour exchange that enables the farmers to have a huge amount of extra-household labour at their 
disposal in case needed. Most farmers derived cash income from off-farm activities. All farmers 
were male, except for an old widow (11); her daughter helped her with her agricultural activities.  
 
Maize was the main crop cultivated on the terraces and the adjacent slopes. The grain production of 
maize multiplied with the average market prices was thus used to calculate the benefits. In 2002, 
other crops (beans, potato, oat) were grown on a few terraces as well together with maize. In these 
cases, the farmers’ estimations of the yields of these crops were used, and added to the value of the 
maize yield. Though the measured yields are only a snapshot of the processes going on, it is 
assumed that the yields as measured will be an average of the yields as expected for the coming 
years, as the measured yields were regular according to the farmers. Yields are assumed to remain 
constant in the “with bench terraces” situation. In the “without” situation, it is assumed that yields 
slowly decline over time, as the farmers stated that the soil fertility in their sloping fields was 
declining, resulting in decreasing yields. A soil loss rate of 10 till 70 Mg ha-1 y-1 was assumed (see 
section 3.1.3) depending on the slope. The relation between soil loss and yield decline was 
simplified by assuming a linear relation between yield decline and loss of soil depth. Allowing a 
minimum soil depth of 0.3 m, the following equation is obtained: 
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( ) %100**3.0
*1.0
SDD
SLYD −=  [6.3] 
where: YD = annual yield decline (%) 
 SL = soil loss (Mg ha-1 y-1) 
 D = soil depth (m) 
 SD = soil density (kg m-3) 
 
The annual yield decline is calculated at a rate of 1 to 3%, depending on the local conditions. These 
rates are similar to other findings (Grohs, 1994; Flörchinger, 1998). In a few cases (1, 8 and 9) 
terraces were constructed on a sloping field on which the owners were not cultivating before the 
installation of the terraces. Yield in the without situation was zero for these cases. 
 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of selected farmers and fields used for CBA  
Fields 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Terraces (m2) 373 832 289 434 1570 126 1570 271 551 274 188 
Field on slope (m2) 800 640 209 690 500 68 1365 748 4125 1050 789 
Natural slope (%) 12 50 45 15 35 35 35 45 10 45 5 
Maize yield terraces 
(kg ha-1) 5553 8289 7418 5238 2464 2811 3130 3898 4476 5318 4214 
Maize yield slope (kg 
ha-1) – 491 12356 4050 923 1637 3814 – – 4106 3848 
Soil type Loam Clay loam 
Clay 
loam 
Clay 
loam 
Clay 
loam 
Clay 
loam 
Clay 
loam Loam Loam 
Clay 
loam 
Clay 
loam 
Soil depth terrace (m) 0.50 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.60 
Soil depth slope (m) 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.90 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.70 0.45 0.70 
SOM1 terrace (%) 3.0 3.0 2.2 2.4 1.6 3.3 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.9 
SOM1 slope (%) 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.2 2.9 5.3 3.7 3.5 3.0 3.8 3.9 
Soil loss2 (Mg ha-1 
yr-1) 40 70 70 40 55 55 55 70 40 70 25 
Annual yield decline 
(%) on slope 1 3 3 1 2 2 2 3 1 3 1 
Distance field to 
farmhouse (m) 500 100 50 0 0 50 0 0 50 500 0 
Access to irrigation 
water in dry season no yes no yes no no no no no no yes 
Family size 5 4 4 3 5 3 5 2 3 4 2 
Age head household 41 29 30 62 59 62 59 64 54 45 65 
% of total household 
labour spent off-farm 30% 30% 70% 15% 30% 15% 30% 0% 15% 30% 0% 
Reasons for 
construction of 
terraces 
To 
recover 
land 
Stones 
/ steep 
slope 
Stones 
/ steep 
slope 
Prevent 
soil 
loss 
Stones 
/ 
prevent 
soil 
loss 
Prevent 
soil 
loss 
Stones 
/ 
prevent 
soil 
loss 
To 
recover 
land 
Program 
recomm. 
Steep 
slope / 
stones
Program 
recomm.
1 SOM = soil organic matter content 
2 The different categories of soil loss are estimated based on the slope of the field and literature. 
Note: fields 4+6 and 5+7 are different fields from two farmers. 
 
The total costs of the bench terraces are mainly determined by the labour costs required for the 
construction and maintenance. For the valuation of labour the standard market wage of S/. 10 per 
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day9 and an opportunity cost of labour S/. 5 per day were used. The opportunity cost of labour can 
be assumed to be much lower than the market wage, as off-farm employment is not available all 
year around. The terraces are normally constructed during periods with less agricultural activities. 
An extra cost of S/. 60 was added to the investment costs for each case, for the tools needed to 
construct the bench terraces. 
 
The farmers received direct incentives from the programmes for the construction of the bench 
terraces. In case of PRONAMACHCS, they received tools for the terrace construction. MARENASS 
organized farmer competitions, and participating farmers had the chance to win S/. 150 in the first 
year after the construction of the terraces. All farmers participating with PRONAMACHCS got tools for 
free during the construction period, reducing slightly the investment costs. The value of the tools 
received, was estimated at S/. 60. The average establishment costs for the terraces was S/. 744 per 
0.05 hectare – the average size of the terraces. The value of the programme incentives was thus 
much lower than the investment the farmers have to make. Still, one of the justifications to provide 
programme incentives to resource-poor farmers is that it helps them to overcome the high 
investment costs (see section 2.3 for further discussion). Therefore, the effect of incentives on the 
profitability of bench terraces was analysed as well. The IRR and opportunity cost of labour at 
break-even point were calculated in case farmers received programme incentives for the 
construction of the terraces, and in case they did not. 
 
In order to test some of the assumptions, a sensitivity analysis is applied for the following factors: 
discount rate (5% and 20% against 10%), time horizon (5 and 15 years against 10 years), the 
assumed yield decline in the “without” case (0% and doubled decline of 2-6% against 1-3 %), and 
the cropping pattern (maize mono-cropping against diversified cropping pattern). The latter only 
applies to 2002, because in 2003 only maize was cultivated on the fields that were used for this 
CBA case study. In order to estimate the returns to the farmers only the opportunity costs of labour 
at break-even points were calculated in the sensitivity analysis instead of the NPVs. 
 
6.3 The profitability of bench terraces 
 
During the interviews, most farmers were enthusiastic about their terraces. They all stated that 
production had increased, the decline of soil fertility was stopped, and that most agricultural 
activities had become easier, as less labour was required for mainly weeding and harvesting. Table 
6.2 shows the results of the CBA based on solely the farmers’ estimations of labour inputs, 
production costs and yields on the terraced and the sloping fields. Except for 4, the farmers’ 
estimates about the costs and benefits of their terraces show that the terraces are quite profitable. 
According to the farmers estimations, the construction of terraces would result in an average 
opportunity cost of labour of S/. 12.6, which is quite attractive, as this is more than the market wage 
(S/. 10). 
 
In Table 6.3 the farmers’ estimations of the maize yield are replaced by the yield measurements. For 
the other crops cultivated, the farmers’ yield estimations are used. Some farmers’ estimations about 
labour input are adjusted, using the averaged values of the interviews and a survey that was carried 
                                                 
9 The Peruvian currency is Nuevo Sol (S/.); the exchange rate in 2002 was: US$ 1 = S/. 3.50 
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out early 2002 (see Chapters 4 and 7). The CBA results are recalculated twice: in case programme 
incentives are given, and if only maize has been cultivated. Surprisingly, four out of five farmers 
believe their terraces to be more profitable (Table 6.2) than what we measured (Table 6.3) in 2002.  
 
Table 6.2 CBA using farmers’ estimations (labour costs and yields), 2002 
Fields 
(field sizes are standardised to 0.1 ha) 1 2 3 4 5 
2002 
(average 1-5)
Establishment labour costs (mandays) 118 119 159 147 124 133 
Value production terraced field (S/.) 803 422 1 1055 539 525 669 
Value production sloping field (S/.) – 156 526 367 364 353 
Annual yield decline sloping field (%) – 3 3 1 2 2 
NPV (S/.) at 10% discount rate, labour cost of 
S/.10 per manday 1332 -134 520 -774 1343 339 
IRR at labour cost of S/.10 per manday 34% 7% 17% -5% 32% 16% 
IRR at labour cost of S/.5 per manday 92% 28% 49% 8% 44% 37% 
OC labour at break-even point at 10% 
discount rate (S/. per manday) 14.6 9.0 12.0 4.6 n.a. 
3 12.6 
IRR, with programme incentives, labour cost 
of S/.10 per manday 37% 10% 19% -4% 
2 35% 18% 
OC labour at break-even point, with 
programme incentives (S/. per manday) 15.0 9.9 12.5 4.9 
2 n.a. 3 13.6 
1 For the oat production an average production of 900 kg ha-1 is used, based on the survey of 2002. 
2 This farmer participated with PRONAMACHCS and thus “only” received tools as programme incentives. 
3 No appropriate opportunity cost of labour can be calculated as the production costs are higher than the 
gains, resulting in negative profit, in the without case. 
 
Table 6.3 CBA using measured data and adjusted farmers’ estimations, 2002 
Fields 
(field sizes are standardised to 0.1 ha) 1 2 3 4 
1 5 2002 (average 1-5)
Establishment labour costs (mandays) 118 119 159 147 124 133 
Value production terraced field (S/.) 598 386 807 916 479 618 
Value production sloping field (S/.) – 74 453 1334 285 537 
Annual yield decline sloping field (%) – 3 3 1 2 2 
NPV (S/.) at 10% discount rate, labour cost of 
S/.10 per manday 187 75 -96 -1731 -869 -1108 
IRR at labour cost of S/.10 per manday  14% 11% 9% – -11% – 
IRR at labour cost of S/.5 per manday 60% 35% 32% – 15% 3% 
OC labour at break-even point at 10% 
discount rate (S/. per manday) 10.6 10.5 9.5 0.8 5.6 3.8 
IRR, with programme incentives, labour cost 
of S/.10 per manday 17% 14% 10% – 
2 -9% – 
OC labour at break-even point, with 
programme incentives (S/. per manday) 11.0 11.4 10.1 1.1 
2 6.2 4.5 
IRR, only maize production, labour cost of 
S/.10 per manday 14% 60% – -1% -1% -5% 
OC labour at break-even point, only maize 
production (S/. per manday) 10.6 >15 
3 3.6 6.4 7.4 6.1 
1 In this case second crop during dry season is potato; the farmer cultivated the second crop only on the 
bench terraces. 
2 This farmer participated with PRONAMACHCS and thus received tools as programme incentives. 
3 No appropriate opportunity cost of labour can be calculated as the production costs are higher than the 
gains, resulting in negative profit, in the without case. 
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Replacing the estimated maize yield with the measured maize yield (Table 6.3) results in an average 
opportunity cost of labour of only S/. 3.6. The opportunity cost of labour raises to S/. 4.3 after 
inclusion of the programme incentives. In case of maize mono-cropping, terraces are slightly 
profitable with an opportunity cost of labour of S/. 6.4. The value of land is determined by its land 
use, and the profitability of terraces is thus determined by the crops that are cultivated, i.e. high-
value crops (e.g. potato, maize) result in a higher profit than low-value crops (e.g. beans, oat, wheat, 
barley). The cropping pattern has a larger influence on the profitability of terraces than the 
provision of programme incentives. 
 
In 2003, 6 other sites were evaluated (Table 6.4). Maize was sown on all sites. Only on field 7 
beans were sown as well, but the yield was unknown. Therefore, only maize production is 
considered for all cases for the CBA analyses of 2003. Except for 8 and 9, it seems that the terraces 
are not very efficient in financial terms. Considering only maize production for both years, the 
terraces analysed in 2003 are less profitable than those in 2002. This might be explained by the 
rainfall pattern. The farmers stated that in 2002 there was a dry spell during the rainy season 
affecting the maize on the slopes but less so on the terraces, whereas 2003 was a year with a regular 
and well-distributed rainfall pattern. Bench terraces have a waterconserving effect, and reduce the 
risk of crop failure due to drought, as happened in 2002. 
 
Table 6.4 CBA using measured data and adjusted farmers’ estimations, 2003 
Fields 
(field sizes are standardised to 0.1 ha) 
6  
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
2003 
(average 6-11)
Establishment labour costs (mandays) 159 124 203 131 155 133 154 
Value production terraced field (S/.) 336 352 462 512 612 515 465 
Value production sloping field (S/.) 220 414 – – 463 449 387 
Annual yield decline sloping field (%) 2 2 – – 3 1 2 
NPV (S/.) at 10% discount rate, labour 
cost of S/.10 per manday -1331 -2344 -707 603 -906 -1122 -1225 
IRR at labour cost of S/.10 per manday  – – 0% 20% -6% – – 
IRR at labour cost of S/.5 per manday -5% – 27% 57% 11% -4% 1% 
OC labour at break-even point at 10% 
discount rate (S/. per manday) 2.4 -1.2 7.6 12.9 5.1 2.6 3.5 
IRR, with programme incentives, labour 
cost of S/.10 per manday – – 2% 23% -4% – – 
OC labour at break-even point, with 
programme incentives (S/. per manday) 3.1 -0.6 8.0 13.5 5.8 3.4 4.2 
 
In Figure 6.1 the results of the sensitivity analysis for the opportunity costs of labour at break-even 
points under different assumptions are depicted. Though different assumptions change the absolute 
values of CBA results, it does not change the conclusions under which circumstances terraces are 
profitable or not. The figure shows that the break-even opportunity costs of labour for the 
construction of terraces in most cases and circumstances are between S/. 0 and S/. 10 per manday.  
 
For fields 1, 8 and 9, in the without cases no crops were cultivated. The farmers decided to install 
the terraces on small pieces of land that were not under cultivation. This explains the high 
profitability of these terraces, because it enabled the farmers to cultivate on a piece of land they 
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otherwise would not use. Note that 1 and 9 installed their terraces on fields with a gentle slope. 
Erosion might not have been a real problem here. 
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Figure 6.1 Sensitivity analysis of the financial CBA results on bench terraces 
 
The owner of field 2 is quite successful with his terraces, which are built on a steep and degraded 
field. This farmer is the only one out of five who underestimated the profitability of his terraces, as 
he under- and overestimated the maize yields on the terraces and the sloping field respectively. This 
farmer also cultivated food crops like beans and oat on his terraces, which he could not cultivate on 
his sloping field. A quarter of his terraces he left fallow, but if he had fully used his terraces, the 
profitability would have been much higher. In case of maize mono-cropping, the opportunity cost of 
labour would even become S/. 32. Furthermore, it is possible to produce two crops a year, as 
irrigation water is available during the dry season. However, there is some risk of frost during this 
period. Though terraces enable the farmer to improve and increase his agricultural production 
considerably, he is only interested in meeting the consumption needs of his family and not in selling 
surplus at the market. This explains the “modest” profitability of his terraces, as the farmer sees no 
need to fully exploit his terraces.  
 
The farmer of field 3 estimated the labour inputs and investment costs high. He successfully 
cultivates different crops (maize, beans and potatoes) on his terraces, which is not possible on the 
sloping field. If he had only cultivated maize, the profitability of the terraces would have been 
disputable. However, as the farmer overestimated the maize yield, this might be the same case for 
the potato and bean production. Whether profitable or not, this farmer seemed to be less interested 
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in his terraces, as he has full-time off-farm employment resulting in a high personal opportunity 
cost of labour. Also, he possesses fertile fields as well where he can produce sufficient food to meet 
the consumption needs of his household. 
 
The disappointing results of 4, 6 and 10 can be explained by the fact that the soil fertility of the 
sloping fields is higher than the soil fertility of the terraces. As the terraces are installed on a more 
degraded part of the fields, a simple comparison in production is probably not the right method. 
Furthermore, 4 and 6 did not suffer water shortage, so the extra benefit of water conservation did 
not have any positive effect on the production on the terraces. Unfortunately, we do not have data 
about crop production “before” the implementation of the terraces. That might have given us more 
accurate results. If we consider low opportunity costs for labour, the terraces 10 become profitable. 
The opportunity cost of labour of this farmer is probably low, as his main activity is agriculture. 
Only in case he needs cash money and if temporarily employment off-farm is available, he will use 
his labour for off-farm activities. Fields 4 and 6 are owned by the same farmer. According to the 
farmer, the terraces 4 are fairly profitable. But the contrary appears from our measurements.  
 
Fields 5 and 7 belong to the same farmer. We measured the yields on the same location in both 
years, though the maize was sown on a different part of the sloping field in 2003 (7) than in 2002 
(5). The farmer estimated the output on the sloping field 5 to be very low. This implies that the 
value of the production (the gain) is lower than the production costs, resulting in a negative profit 
on his sloping field. As in CBA the costs in “without” case are considered as benefits in the “with” 
case, we could not estimate the opportunity costs for the break-even point (table 7). Contrary to 5, 
for 7 the average maize production was lower on the terraces than on the sloping field, resulting in a 
non-profitable outcome. An explanation might be that for 7, the cropping density on the terraces 
(about 50,000 plants per ha) was much lower than on the sloping field (about 70,000 plants per ha) 
in contrast to 5 when it was the other way around. But also the cropping pattern determines the 
profitability of the terraces. In case of 5 also potatoes were cultivated but not in case of 7. 
Nevertheless, the farmer is aware of the soil degradation on his fields, and continues constructing 
terraces. He also stated that terracing is an efficient way to get rid of the many stones in his sloping 
field. Better financial results might be obtained if improved cropping practices like fertiliser input 
and sowing techniques are applied, and more high-value crops like potato are cultivated. 
 
The disappointing results of 11 can be explained by the fact that these terraces are installed on a 
place where it is not necessary, as the slope is gentle (only 5%) and soil fertility is high. The slightly 
higher maize production on the terraces compared to the sloping field is probably due to different 
maize varieties and not the practice of terracing itself. The farmer stated that she constructed the 
terraces because she participated in the farmer competitions of MARENASS, and not necessarily to 
improve her field or production. 
 
If it is assumed that terraces are financially effective whenever the opportunity cost of labour of 
terracing is positive, there are only two cases in which this requirement is not fulfilled. In order to 
know whether the terraces are financially attractive to a farmer, one has to compare the opportunity 
cost of labour of terracing with the personal opportunity cost of labour of the farmer. Though the 
market wage rate is S/. 10 per manday, a lower personal opportunity cost of labour for most farmers 
can be assumed. Case 3 is an exception, because this farmer has a full-time off-farm employment, 
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and his personal opportunity cost of labour is estimated at the market wage rate. Though his terraces 
are quite profitable compared to other cases, they are not very attractive to this farmer. The terraces 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 are less profitable, but apparently these farmers estimate their personal 
opportunity cost of labour at very low rates. As these farmers are old and hardly undertake any off-
farm activities, low personal opportunity costs of labour for these farmers are indeed expected. 
Awareness of soil erosion problems in their sloping fields also was an extra stimulus for the owners 
of fields 4, 5, 6, and 7 to install terraces. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
Due to the improved growing conditions caused by terracing, crops can be sown more densely and 
high-value crops like vegetables, potatoes or improved maize varieties can be cultivated. This 
results in higher productivity, and thus higher profitability of the terraces. The steeper and more 
degraded the field, the more pronounced the positive effect of terracing on productivity. However, 
when farmers (like in case 7) do not take advantage of these improved conditions, terraces become 
unprofitable in any case. Construction of terraces is thus not enough, but has to be combined with 
the extension and introduction of improved agricultural practices like sowing techniques, 
fertilisation and crop rotation. Terraces also enable cropping activities on fields that were left out of 
cultivation because of slope or stones. Terracing also reduces the risk of crop failure during dry 
spells in the rainy season, due to the water conserving effect. 
 
The farmers believed their terraces to be more profitable than what we measured. This was 
surprising, as it is often said that farmers are reluctant to implement terraces because of the 
uncertain profitability. Whether terracing is profitable depends on local agro-ecological conditions 
and is thus site-specific. Whether terracing is financially attractive to a farmer depends on the socio-
economic circumstances, and is thus very personal. For one farmer terracing can be a financially 
attractive investment, whereas for his neighbour it is not. When a low personal opportunity costs for 
labour can be assumed instead of the market wage rate, terracing becomes more attractive. As most 
farmers are employed only occasionally, and off-farm labour is not available all the year round, a 
personal opportunity cost of labour below the market wage rate can be justified. In our research it 
was the case for all farmers, except for one. In case farmers receive programme incentives when 
they install terraces, the effect on the opportunity costs of labour is slight. Though it is often 
believed that farmers only construct terraces in order to receive the programme incentives, this does 
not seem logic when considering all costs and benefits. Though programme incentives might 
convince farmers to install terraces, it does not make the terraces considerably more attractive in 
financial terms. 
 
Using the break-even opportunity cost of labour of terracing as an indicator for the profitability of 
terracing is a useful tool to understand farmers’ rationale. Farmers who depend on steep and 
degraded fields for their food production and income and who have a low personal opportunity cost 
of labour, are more keen on terracing, as this investment improves their livelihood. Farmers with 
access to fertile fields for agricultural production, and who also rely on off-farm income, will be 
less interested in terracing, as it is less financially attractive to them.  
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Profitability of terraces is thus site- and household-specific. It depends on the field characteristics, 
farm management as well as the opportunity costs of the farm household labour. Similar 
conclusions were drawn by Lutz et al. (1994b) and Valdivia (2002). The profitability of SWC 
practices depends on the specific agro-ecological conditions faced, technologies used, on prices of 
inputs used an of output produced, and markets (Lutz et al., 1994b; Wiener et al., 2003). Terraces 
are most likely to be profitable on steep slopes, and farmers will invest in terraces with the highest 
private benefits (Valdivia, 2002).  
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Chapter 7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmers’ adoption behaviour of 
soil and water conservation practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A revised version of this chapter is in preparation as: 
H. Posthumus, C. Gardebroek and R. Ruben (in preparation). Farmers’ adoption behaviour of soil 
and water conservation practices in the Peruvian Andes.  
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7 Farmers’ adoption behaviour of soil and water conservation practices 
 
There is a wide-spread concern about the threat of soil erosion, decreasing agricultural production, 
and a possible decline in food security, in many rural areas in developing countries (LDCs). 
Therefore, initiatives have been taken to prevent soil erosion and to promote sustainable agriculture 
by introducing soil and water conservation (SWC). Programmes on resource conservation and 
sustainable agriculture were initiated to induce farmers to manage their land in a sustainable way. 
The justification of these programmes is that without external intervention farmers will not invest in 
SWC. Even if SWC practices are profitable, this is not a guarantee for adoption, as other factors 
may prevent a farm household from adopting a new technology (Lutz et al., 1994a). The 
profitability of SWC practices is sensitive to key bio-physical and economic variables, such as 
initial soil conditions, discount rates and the effects of SWC on long term productivity (Antle et al., 
2004). Furthermore, farmers face constraints like limited assets and market failures (lack of 
information, no access to credit) that impede adoption of SWC technologies. Programmes 
promoting SWC often rely on incentives to attract farmers and motivate them to implement SWC 
practices. However, the criticism of these programmes is that the SWC practices they promote are 
often not maintained. As soon as the support ends, farmers abandon the SWC practices because 
they were not really interested in these practices, as these interfere with current agricultural 
practices and lowers short-term agricultural output and profit (Winters et al., 2004). 
 
The Peruvian government started SWC programmes in the 1980s through the establishment of the 
governmental programme PRONAMACHCS. Also many local NGOs started SWC activities at this 
time. In 1998, the Peruvian government launched a pilot-programme, MARENASS, in order to try a 
participatory approach instead of the top-down approach of PRONAMACHCS. The importance of 
these programmes and farmers’ adoption behaviour are analysed in this chapter in order to find the 
most important factors determining adoption of SWC practices in the two watersheds Pacucha and 
Piuray-Ccorimarca, Peru. Since the programmes working in the two watersheds as well as the 
physical and social conditions are different (see also Chapter 4), it is expected that the adoption 
process in Pacucha differs from the one in Piuray-Ccorimarca.  
 
7.1 Materials and methods 
 
7.1.1 Conceptual model of adoption process 
 
Sociologists consider the adoption process of new technologies as a multi-stage learning and 
decision process, during which a farmer or producer passes from first hearing about an innovation 
to final adoption (Rogers, 1962). The adopter-perception simplifies this process into a conceptual 
model consisting of three stages (section 2.2). However, this paradigm considers farmers’ 
perception as the starting point before the adoption decision (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Lynne et al., 
1988; Sinden and King, 1990). Though perception definitely influences adoption, perception cannot 
be used as a starting point in an ex-post evaluation of adoption behaviour, as perception is not static 
but dynamic and changing during the adoption process. Often farmers’ perception is “measured” 
after the adoption decision is made. It is quite likely that the perception after adoption is different 
from before the adoption. This makes the use of farmers’ perception as starting point questionable.  
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Leaving aside a few exceptions, most farmers in the research areas who implement SWC practices 
are involved in at least one SWC-oriented programme. Therefore, it is assumed in this case study 
that programme involvement is the starting point of the adoption process (see also: Cramb et al., 
1999; Jagger and Pender, 2003). SWC-oriented programmes are important institutions for the 
dissemination of information about new technologies, and provide various incentives in order to 
stimulate farm households to adopt SWC practices. Based on the adopter-perception paradigm, the 
following conceptual model can be drawn (Figure 7.1). 
 
 
Economic factors Institutional factors 
Programme participation 
Perception 
Land characteristics 
Adoption Effort 
Farm household 
characteristics 
 
Figure 7.1 Conceptual model of the adoption process of SWC practices (based on Ervin & 
Ervin, 1982) 
 
In this conceptual model, the adoption process is split up in several stages. However, a three-step 
econometric model is complicated, as multiple treatment effects and sample selectivity problems 
arise. Therefore, in this chapter only the first two steps will be considered initially in order to 
estimate the impact of programmes on adoption. It is assumed that a farm household first makes a 
decision whether to participate in an SWC-oriented programme or not. The second stage is to 
decide whether to implement SWC practices promoted by the programme (see Figure 7.2).  
 
Programme participation 
no yes 
SWC adoption 
1: 
2: 
yes no 
Probit model 
Regression technique:Decision: 
Linear probability 
model
 
Figure 7.2 Decision tree for estimating adoption of SWC practices 
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Programme participation means that a farm household has contact at least once a year with field 
staff of the programme, and is represented by a binary variable. When a new programme is to start, 
the interventions are announced during the general meeting (asamblea general) of the community. 
In principal, all farm households have equal access to the programmes. Though programmes 
approach communities through the community councils, the decision to participate in a programme 
is made at household level. Farm households participate in a programme because they expect that 
their utility as participants will be higher than the level of utility they would obtain as non-
participants (Edmonds, 1999). Adoption is defined as the decision of the farm household to 
implement at least one SWC practice on its own land. Because of the limitations of this study the 
adoption decision is only evaluated at one moment in time. The econometric models will be 
estimated with the software STATA 8. 
 
7.1.2 Econometric methods for analysis of adoption behaviour 
 
Choices are often dichotomous: it equals 1 if the ith individual chooses for a certain action, and 0 
otherwise. Probit and logit models are the most popular statistical models developed to analyse 
dichotomous response variables (Asfaw and Admassie, 2004). These models assume an underlying 
response variable yi* defined by the regression relationship: 
iii xy εβ +=*    [7.1] 
where xi is a set of independent variables of individual i, β is the set of coefficients to be estimated 
and εi is the error term. In practice, yi* is unobservable. What one observes is a binary variable yi 
defined by 
 yi = 1 if yi* >0 [7.2] 
 yi = 0 otherwise 
 
Then one gets: 
Prob ( ) ==1iy Prob ( ) ( )iiii xxx βββε Φ=−Φ−=−> 1  [7.3] 
where Ф is the cumulative distribution function for ε (Maddala, 1983). 
If Φ of equation [7.3] is chosen to be standard normal, then the probit model is given by (Johnston 
and DiNardo, 1997): 
Prob ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∞− −=Φ== ix tii dtexy β πβ
2
2
1
2
11 , [7.4] 
where t is a standardised normal variable with a mean of zero and a variance of one. The normal 
density function φ is given by (Maddala, 1983):  
( ) ( )221
2
1 tet −= πφ  [7.5] 
 
Decision on programme participation and adoption  
It is assumed that a farm household participates in a programme when the expected utility of 
participation E(UP) is higher than the expected utility of no participation E(U0): ( ) ( ) 00* >−≡ UEUEP P  [7.6] 
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⎧=
0
1
A
However, P* is not observable, but P is equal to one if the farm household participates in a 
programme, which is observable: 
 
if νγ −>> ZP ,0*  [7.7] 
if νγ −≤≤ ZP ,0*  
 
Equations [7.6] and [7.7] account for the adoption decision as well. Though A* is not observable, A 
is observable and equals one when a farm household adopts SWC practices: 
if εαβ −>+> PXA ,0*   [7.8] 
if εαβ −≤+≤ PXA ,0*  
 
Though most farm households who adopt SWC practices also participate in an SWC-oriented 
programme, the latter is not conditional for the adoption decision, as non-participants can also 
decide to adopt SWC practices. The econometric model thus has to deal with a treatment effect, as 
programme participation can be considered as a treatment (Greene, 1997). 
 
Estimating programme impact on adoption behaviour 
The essential problem of evaluating any impact of a programme is that the outcomes for 
participants if they had not participated, cannot be observed (Ravallion, 2001). Therefore, a 
problem of missing-data on the counter-factual arises (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000; Godtland et 
al., 2003). Randomised experiments would solve this problem by generating an experimental 
control group of people who would have participated in a programme but who were randomly 
denied access to the programme (Greene, 1997). However, denying farm households access to 
programme randomly is unethical and politically difficult (Baker, 2000). Therefore, non-
participants are often used as a comparison group to evaluate programme impact (Heckman et al., 
1998). But these observations in the comparison group are not randomly distributed. The farm 
households can self-select into the group of programme participants (or not), causing a self-
selection bias (Edmonds, 1999). This implies that unobserved variables influencing programme 
participation, might influence the adoption decision as well (Baker, 2000), resulting in a “selection 
on unobservables” (Godtland et al., 2003). If this is the case, the estimation of the coefficient of 
programme participation – the programme impact on adoption – will be biased (Blomquist, 2003). 
In other words, it might be that differences between adopters and non-adopters is not due to the 
programme impact, but due to this self-selection process. 
 
The adoption decision [7.8] can thus be written as: 
iiii PXA εαβ ++=*  [7.9] 
where X is a set of exogenous variables explaining A, P is a dummy variable such that Pi = 1 if 
individual i participates in a programme and Pi = 0 otherwise, and εi is the error term of mean zero 
and uncorrelated with X. Remind that the participation decision P is given by: 
iiii ZP νγ +=*  [7.10] 
The error terms εi and νi contain measurement errors and unobserved variables explaining A and P 
respectively. If the same unobserved variables are jointly influencing A and P, εi and νi might be 
correlated causing a selection bias, as explained above. For cross-section data, two standard 
approaches are often used in evaluation studies to correct for the selection bias: the instrumental 
⎩⎨
⎧=
0
1
P
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variable approach and the Heckman selection estimator (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). In this 
chapter the Heckman selection estimator is used. 
 
The Heckman selection estimator is based on the work of Heckman (1979), and is more robust than 
the instrumental variable estimator, but also more demanding on assumptions about the model 
(Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). Remind that the source of the bias is the correlation between the 
two error terms εi and υi. A natural way to solve the problem when one has an instrumental variable 
is to add the residuals from the participation equation to the adoption equation but keeping actual 
participation in the adoption regression (Baker, 2000). In other words, in the first stage the 
probability of participating in the programme and the error term υi are estimated as before, and in 
the second stage the υi is used to statistically adjust the disturbance term εi in the adoption 
regression so that the programme impact estimate will be unbiased, as the true programme impact is 
separated from the selection process (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000; Blomquist, 2003). The error 
terms are assumed to be jointly distributed, i.e. to be bivariate, normally distributed with expected 
means of zero, standard deviations σε and συ, and covariance ρευ. Adopting the standardisation συ=1, 
the conditional outcome expectation (the adoption decision) is written as (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 
2000): 
( ) ( )( )γγφραβ ˆˆ1* iiiiii Z
ZXPAE Φ++==  [7.11] 
( ) ( )( )γγφρβ ˆˆ0* iiiiii Z
ZXPAE Φ−==  [7.12] 
 
If the programme impact differs across agents (i.e. heterogeneous treatment effects), the adoption 
equation becomes (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000): 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ii
i
i
i
i
Tiiii Z
Z
P
Z
Z
PXA µγ
γφργ
γφραβ υευε +Φ−
−−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Φ++= ˆ1
ˆ
1
ˆ
ˆ
,,
*  [7.13] 
 
Note that αT represents the programme impact on the programme participants only. This correction 
term is also called the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR). The IMR is equal to Φ/φ  when Pi = 1 and is 
equal to ( )Φ−− 1/φ  when Pi = 0.  
 
The standard procedure is to calculate the IMRs with the results of a probit model and then add 
them to an OLS equation. The adoption equation is a choice model though, and would normally be 
estimated with a probit model. However, the probit model assumes a homoskedastic error term 
(variance of error term is assumed to be equal to one), whereas the inclusion of IMRs causes 
heteroskedastic error terms. Therefore, the linear probability model is used instead of the probit 
model in this chapter. Though heteroskedasticity results in a loss of efficiency, the least squares 
estimates remain consistent and unbiased. The error terms are inconsistent though, which can cause 
problems when testing coefficients for their significance. Correction for heteroskedasticity through 
weighted least squares is not desirable as it is not efficient for finite samples and it is also sensitive 
to errors of specification (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). Instead, robust standard errors are 
calculated to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors. The linear probability model has 
serious limitations for prediction, but it should be appropriate for the purpose of this chapter: 
explaining past adoption behaviour. The linear probability model might therefore be the most 
appropriate model for the construction of an adoption equation including IMRs. The F-test is used 
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to test the zero hypothesis that the IMRs equal zero. If this hypothesis is accepted, the IMRs are 
omitted, and the adoption equation is estimated with probit models without the IMRs. 
 
In the example above only one treatment or programme was taken into consideration. However, 
taking the example of Pacucha10 two programmes promote SWC: PRONAMACHCS and MARENASS. 
Farm households can thus choose between two ‘treatments’. If these choices for participation in 
PRONAMACHCS or MARENASS are independently made, IMRs for both programmes can be inserted 
into the adoption equation as the covariance of the two error terms (νP and νM) of the two equations 
is equal to zero, i.e., ρ(νP,νM)=0 (Maddala, 1983: p282). If the decisions whether to participate in 
PRONAMACHCS or MARENASS are not independent, only programme participation in general will be 
considered for simplicity, without distinguishing the two programmes. Whether the two decisions 
on programme participation are independently made, can be tested with a bivariate probit. 
 
7.1.3 Sampling and data collection 
 
In January and February 2002 a survey was carried out among 180 farm households in Pacucha and 
192 farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca. A stratified sampling procedure was applied in order to 
ensure that sub-samples of programme participants would be sufficiently large to carry out 
statistical analyses. Within each strata farm households were selected randomly. Three strata were 
defined in Pacucha: farm households not participating in any agriculture-oriented programme; farm 
households participating in MARENASS; farm households participating in PRONAMACHCS. In Piuray-
Ccorimarca the following three strata were defined: farm households not participating in any 
agriculture-oriented programme; farm households participating in Arariwa; farm households 
participating in PRONAMACHCS. During the period of data collection it appeared that these three 
strata were difficult to find. Almost all farm households encountered were PRONAMACHCS 
participants, of whom a large part was participating in Arariwa as well. It might be that farm 
households who do not participate in any agriculture-oriented programme are not much interested in 
agriculture either, as they work off-farm, and were therefore not found at home by the interviewers. 
 
After testing the survey, local students with knowledge of agriculture and of the local language 
Quechua were attracted in order to carry out the survey. The survey forms were checked on a daily 
basis during the data collection period, in order to correct any mistakes or vagueness made by the 
interviewer. In the survey, cross-sectional data was collected on farm household characteristics, the 
farming system, characteristics of farmland, agricultural production, programme participation, use 
of SWC practices, and the perception and opinion of the farm household. A few observations are 
left out of the analysis because of extreme values and unreliable or incomplete data. 
 
7.1.4 Variables used in the adoption model 
 
Different dependent variables are used for the separate stages. Also, the vector of independent 
variables explaining the successive decisions is changing, as it is assumed that different factors play 
a role for each decision. The dependent variables and their descriptives are presented in Table 7.1. 
                                                 
10 The same applies for Piuray-Ccorimarca: the programmes PRONAMACHCS and Arariwa promote SWC. 
  120
The independent variables are described in Table 7.2. Some independent variables are explained 
further in the text below: 
 
Education: the education level of the head of farm household is ranked as follows: Education = 1 if 
no education; = 2 if primary school unfinished; = 3 if primary school finished; = 4 if secondary 
school unfinished; = 5 if secondary school finished; = 6 if higher education; = 7 if professional 
training.  
 
Social standing: the head of farm household is considered to be actively involved in social life of 
community, if he is for example member of the community council or a committee. 
 
Risk taker: the head of household was asked to give his preference between two different deals: a 
risky deal with a chance of high profit or loss, or a deal with moderate profit for sure. Expected 
profit of the two deals was the same. Risk taker = 1 in case the head of household choose the risky 
deal; 0 otherwise. 
 
Long term: the head of household was asked to give his preference between two deals: more money 
on long-term, or less money on short-term. Again, the expected profit of the two deals was 
considered the same. Long term = 1 in case the head of household choose for the long-term deal; 0 
otherwise. 
 
Table 7.1 Description of dependent variables used in adoption behaviour analysis 
Dependent variables 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
 
Variable Description Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Programme participation   
Programme = 1 if farm household is involved in a programme, 0 if not 0.693 0.462 0.931 0.254 ***
MARENASS  = 1 if farm household is involved in 
MARENASS activities, 0 if not 0.568 0.497 NA NA  
PRONAMACHCS  = 1 if farm household is involved in 
PRONAMACHCS activities, 0 if not 0.341 0.475 0.910 0.288 ***
Arariwa = 1 if farm household is involved in Arariwa activities, 0 if not NA NA 0.729 0.446  
Adoption decision   
SWC = 1 if farm household has implemented any SWC practices, 0 if not 0.591 0.493 0.596 0.492  
Bench terrace  = 1 if farm household has implemented bench terraces, 0 if not 0.545 0.499 0.149 0.357 ***
Slow-forming 
terrace  
= 1 if farm household has implemented 
slow-forming terraces, 0 if not 0.142 0.350 0.335 0.473 ***
Infiltration ditch = 1 if farm household has implemented infiltration ditches, 0 if not 0.159 0.367 0.229 0.421 * 
Means of both watershed are significant different at (*) 0.1 level, (**) 0.05 level, (***) 0.01 level 
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Table 7.2 Description of independent variables used in adoption behaviour analysis 
Independent variables 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
 
Variable Description Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Farm household characteristics 
Family size Total amount of farm household members 5.108 1.987 4.745 1.889 * 
Gender = 1 if head of household is male, 0 if female 0.835 0.372 0.957 0.202 ***
Age Age of head of household 39.8 13.0 40.0 12.6  
Education Ranking of education level of head of household 2.659 1.259 3.239 1.329 ***
Dependency 
ratio 
Number of household members younger than 16, 
divided by total number of household members 0.459 0.223 0.454 0.217  
Farm household assets 
Farm area Total amount of hectares farmland owned by farm household 1.068 1.409 0.728 1.166 * 
Livestock Monetary value (S/.) of livestock owned by farm household 2523 1901 2417 1585  
Farm household behaviour 
Social 
standing 
= 1 if head of household is actively involved in 
social life of community, 0 if not 0.324 0.469 0.436 0.497 **
Risk taker = 1 if head of household is risk taker, 0 otherwise 0.489 0.501 0.596 0.492 **
Long term = 1 if head of household chooses for long-term case, 0 otherwise 0.494 0.501 0.638 0.482 ***
Market Ratio of total agricultural production of farm household that is sold on the market 0.136 0.210 0.315 0.231 ***
Off-farm / 
farm income 
Amount of off-farm income divided by total 
value of farm production: crop and livestock 0.952 0.190 1.439 1.956 ***
Presence  Number of months that head of household is present on farm during the last year 11.73 1.098 11.70 1.064  
Farm household motivation 
Incentives = 1 if household adopted SWC because of programme incentives, 0 otherwise 0.040 0.196 0.154 0.362 ***
Programme = 1 if household adopted SWC because of it was recommended by programme, 0 otherwise 0.540 0.500 0.383 0.487 ***
Agricultural 
production 
= 1 if household adopted SWC because of 
increase agricultural production, 0 otherwise 0.080 0.271 0.144 0.352 * 
Conservation = 1 if household adopted SWC because of conservation purposes, 0 otherwise 0.034 0.182 0.059 0.235  
Farmland characteristics 
Valley Ratio of total farmland located in valley 0.361 0.357 0.573 0.376 ***
Rainfed Ratio of total farm without access to irrigation 0.422 0.348 0.395 0.400  
Flat slope Ratio of total farm without slopes, i.e. flat 0.352 0.382 0.559 0.395 ***
Gentle slope Ratio of total farm with gentle slopes 0.446 0.386 0.355 0.367 **
Steep slope Ratio of total farm with steep slopes 0.201 0.333 0.085 0.205 ***
Distance Average distance in km from house till fields 1.355 1.522 0.854 0.926 ***
No stones Ratio of total farm without stones, used as an indication of soil degradation 0.374 0.361 0.697 0.352 ***
Means of both watershed are significant different at (*) 0.1 level, (**) 0.05 level, (***) 0.01 level 
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7.2 Empirical results on adoption behaviour in Pacucha 
 
7.2.1 Comparing programme participants in Pacucha 
 
Comparing the characteristics of different programme participants gives more understanding of 
which farm households are involved in what type of programmes. Four sub-samples could be 
distinguished in Pacucha: those farm households who do not participate in any programme, farm 
households participating in PRONAMACHCS, farm households participating in MARENASS, and farm 
households participating in both programmes. Table 7.3 gives the average values of variables that 
differed significantly per sub-sample. 
 
Table 7.3 Comparison of sub-samples of programme participation in Pacucha 
 Sub-sample 
Variable A 
Significant
difference
No 
programme PRONAM. MAREN. Both All 
 Prob>F N = 54 N = 22 N = 62 N = 38 N=176
Farm household characteristics    
Gender head of household   0.07 0.76 0.95 0.81 0.92 0.84 
Social standing head of household  0.00 0.11 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.32 
Risk taker 0.06 0.56 0.64 0.48 0.32 0.49 
Farm household assets    
Value agricultural production (S/.) 0.00 662 1872 1348 1492 1234 
Agricultural production sold (ratio) 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.15 0.14 
Total farm area (ha) 0.00 0.57 1.35 1.00 1.72 1.07 
Total farm labour (mandays) 0.00 32.7 57.9 61.9 77.1 55.7 
Ratio off-farm / farm income 0.00 1.74 0.48 0.48 0.88 0.95 
Value livestock (S/.) 0.00 1757 3165 2934 2568 2523 
SWC implementation    
SWC practice 0.00 0.07 0.55 0.89 0.87 0.59 
Slow forming terrace 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.34 0.14 
Bench terrace 0.00 0.04 0.50 0.84 0.82 0.55 
Infiltration ditch 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.16 
Labour invested SWC (mandays) 0.00 1 19 38 66 30 
Farmland with SWC (ha) 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.48 0.81 0.40 
Motivation    
SWC: programme recommended 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.81 0.84 0.54 
SWC: because of incentives 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.04 
No SWC: lack of labour / money 0.00 0.28 0.23 0.58 0.42 0.41 
No SWC: lack of knowledge 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.09 
A Variables without units are dummy variables. The average values presented in the table are ratios. 
 
Looking at the household characteristics it appears that farm households involved in programmes 
are more actively involved in the community (social standing). PRONAMACHCS participants are 
mainly male headed households and risk takers, whereas MARENASS participants are more risk-
averse. Farm households participating in both programmes are most reluctant to risk. Participating 
in a programme is apparently not seen as a risk, but rather as a mean to diversify risk. Note that a 
quarter of the non-participating farm households was female-headed. These female-headed 
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households have less labour available11, which can be a constraint to programme participation. 
MARENASS participants counted more female-headed households than PRONAMACHCS participants. 
Required labour input is more flexible for MARENASS activities, and participants work in ayni 
groups. However, PRONAMACHCS participants have to provide a minimum of one manday of labour 
each week, which might be difficult to provide for female-headed households. 
 
Farm households with less assets (land, livestock) and lower agricultural production (in terms of 
value production and labour used for agriculture), who might be considered the poorest, are not 
involved in the programmes. However, one can only guess why the poorest families are not reached 
by the programmes. There may be many reasons why these households are not interested in the 
programme activities: other priorities, health problems, alcoholism, conformism, a resigned or 
passive attitude, no “passion” for or interest in agriculture, et cetera. 
 
When it comes to the actual implementation of SWC practices, it is not surprising that programme 
participants are implementing these practices. The spill-over effect on non-participants is negligible. 
MARENASS participants and farm households who participate in both programmes implement most 
terraces and infiltration ditches. MARENASS participants also put more effort (in terms of labour or 
percentage of farmland with SWC measures) in SWC than PRONAMACHCS participants. Farm 
households involved in both programmes put most effort in SWC. 
 
The main motivation of programme participants to implement the SWC practices was because it 
was recommended by the programme, and programme incentives were important to a minor extent 
for the MARENASS participants. Incentives in the form of contests are an important instrument of 
MARENASS to motivate farm households. Non-participants mainly installed SWC practices in order 
to increase agricultural production, but this was an important reason for farm households involved 
in both programmes as well. Non-participants give lack of knowledge as a main reason for not 
installing SWC practices, whereas lack of labour and money is the main reason for MARENASS 
participants. In Pacucha, the two programmes are thus very important in disseminating the 
knowledge about SWC practices.  
 
7.2.2 Determinants of the adoption process in Pacucha 
 
Programme participation 
As depicted in Figure 7.2, the first stage in the adoption process is the decision to participate in a 
programme. Table 7.4 presents the results of two probit models on participation in PRONAMACHCS 
activities and participation in MARENASS activities. The results of the bivariate probit with 
PRONAMACHCS and MARENASS as dependent variables are given in Appendix 7.1. The zero 
hypothesis that the covariance of the error terms (ρ) of the two probit models for participation in 
MARENASS or PRONAMACHCS is equal to zero is accepted (Prob.>χ2 = 0.5767). The decisions on 
participation in MARENASS or PRONAMACHCS are thus independently taken by the farm household. 
As PRONAMACHCS and MARENASS are two different programmes (top-down versus bottom-up, 
conservation versus livelihood improvement), this is plausible. 
                                                 
11 Female-headed households (on average 3.9 members) are significant smaller than male-headed households 
(on average 5.4 members) in Pacucha 
  124
 
Table 7.4 Probit models estimating programme participation, Pacucha (N=176) 
Dependent variable PRONAMACHCS MARENASS 
Observations y = 1 60 100 
Independent variables β dy/dx β dy/dx 
Constant -2.666*  -1.926 
Farm area 0.319** 0.113 0.195* 0.076 
Valley 0.684** 0.242 0.425 0.167 
Livestock 3.4E-6 1.2E-6 2.4E-5 9.5E-6 
Family size -0.056 -0.020 0.016 0.006 
Gender 0.731** 0.220 -0.110 -0.043 
Age -0.009 -0.003 -0.011 -0.004 
Education  -0.038 -0.013 0.057 0.022 
Dependency ratio 0.929 0.328 0.814 0.319 
Social standing 0.532** 0.194 0.598** 0.226 
Risk taker -0.249 -0.088 -0.464* -0.181 
Long term 0.331 0.117 -0.099 -0.039 
Market orientation -0.450 -0.159 1.160** 0.455 
Presence 0.101 0.036 0.147 0.058 
Off-farm / farm income -0.066 -0.023 -0.193 -0.076 
Log likelihood -95.46 -100.74 
Probability > χ2  0.0015 0.0003 
McFadden R2 0.155 0.163 
Sensitivity 35.0% 75.0% 
Correctly predicted  69.3% 65.9% 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
 
The amount of farmland and the social standing of the head of household are significant in the three 
probit models. Additional significant variables differ per probit model. Farm households 
participating in PRONAMACHCS have more land located in the valley and a male head of household. 
This confirms the suggestion that due to its compulsory weekly activities, PRONAMACHCS is not 
very attractive for female-headed farm households (section 7.2.1). Farm households participating in 
MARENASS are more reluctant to risk and sell a larger part of their agricultural production on the 
market. 
 
Farm households with an active social standing within the community are more interested to 
participate in a programme. When a programme starts its activities in a community, the general 
community meeting (asamblea general) is informed first. Though these meetings are open for all 
community members, only those who are actively involved in community life participate in these 
meetings and are thus the first to hear about new interventions. Farm households who are socially 
active often have a more extended network and thus a better access to information about new 
activities. One might also say that these farm households are part of the “collective”. This stresses 
the importance that programmes take account of and strengthen the social networks / relationships 
and social life within (traditional) communities. When community life is well established and well 
structured, programmes might have more influence. The fact that almost none of the individual 
household characteristics (like age, family size, education level) is significantly influencing 
programme participation, strengthen this supposition. 
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Another result in Table 7.4 is that farm households with more farmland are more likely to 
participate in agriculture-oriented programmes. In general, farmers with more land are more 
oriented towards agricultural production. Table 7.3 also showed that the absolute value of 
agricultural production was lower for non-participants than participants. Farm households who sell 
their agricultural production on the market are more attracted to MARENASS. Also risk-averse farm 
households are attracted to MARENASS. This suggests that these farm households consider the 
activities of MARENASS as risk reducing. They take any opportunity to diversify their income and be 
part of activities to reduce any risk. PRONAMACHCS participants are male headed and have more land 
located in the valley. These farm households with more land located in the valley, often live in the 
lower parts of the watershed, near the main road. According to the farmers, the technical staff of 
PRONAMACHCS comes once in a while to the villages, stay at the road in the valley and use the horn 
of their motorbikes to acknowledge the people that they arrived. Apparently not much effort is 
made to reach the farm households who live in the upper parts of the watershed. 
 
The low scores for the goodness of fit of the estimated models indicate that other factors play an 
important role in programme participation that are not accounted for in the models. Often, 
programme staff plays an important role in the notification of the programme activities and the 
“recruitment” of participants. During informal discussions, farmers mentioned that programme 
participation was highly influenced, either negatively or positively, by staff members or programme 
promoters. Some farmers told that in the case of MARENASS, farm households were kept out on 
purpose by other participants in the beginning. Because of existing conflicts among families and 
jealousy, the early participants did not want other farm households to participate as well. Farm 
households also complained about bad performance of the promoters of MARENASS.  
                                          
Strong rumours exist also about the hidden political agenda of PRONAMACHCS. It is said that the 
purpose of PRONAMACHCS was to get more contact with and control of the rural population in order 
to combat the guerilla Shining Path. The former president Fujimori wanted to attract support from 
the rural people, as this would ensure him of many votes during political elections. Only farm 
households who voted for Fujimori were allowed to join the programme activities of 
PRONAMACHCS. According to all these rumours, farm households do not have equal access to the 
programmes, as is stated by the programmes themselves. 
 
Adoption decision 
The second stage in the adoption process is the adoption decision itself. After getting acquainted 
with the SWC practices through programme activities, farm households decide to implement these 
technologies on their farm or not. As explained in section 7.1.2, by including programme 
participation in the adoption equation, a selectivity bias might cause estimation errors. Although it 
is concluded above that farm households apparently do not have equal access to the programmes, at 
this stage it is still assumed that programme participation is a self-selection process. To avoid biased 
estimates, the correction terms (IMRs) were calculated based on the probit models for programme 
participation, and added in the adoption equation. The results of the linear probability models with 
the correction terms are presented in Appendix 7.2. To test the zero hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the IMRs equal zero, the F-statistic was used. The test showed that this zero hypothesis was 
accepted (Appendix 7.2). There is thus no selectivity bias in the adoption model, and the IMRs can 
therefore be omitted. Omitting the IMRs in the adoption equation also solves the problem of 
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heteroskedasticity, and now probit models can be used for the estimation of the adoption decision. 
Table 7.5 shows the results that were obtained for the adoption models without the correction terms.  
 
Table 7.5 Probit models estimating adoption of SWC practices, Pacucha (N=176) 
Dependent 
variable SWC Bench terrace 
Slow-forming 
terrace 
Infiltration 
ditch 
Observations y=1  104 96 25 28 
Variable β dy/dx β dy/dx β dy/dx β dy/dx
Constant -1.037  -0.264  -3.008**  -2.281**  
PRONAMACHCS 0.842** 0.289 0.899** 0.332 0.682** 0.090 0.114 0.022 
MARENASS 2.307** 0.740 2.279** 0.746 1.183** 0.124 0.781** 0.142 
Farm area 0.155 0.058 0.168 0.066 0.290** 0.032 0.186* 0.035 
Rainfed -0.087 -0.033 -0.441 -0.174 -0.562 -0.061 0.354 0.067 
Flat slope -1.292** -0.481 -0.970** -0.382 -0.678 -0.074 -0.815* -0.155 
Distance -0.045 -0.017 -0.070 -0.027 0.069 0.007 -0.035 -0.007 
No stones -0.558 -0.208 -1.095** -0.431 -0.215 -0.023 0.010 0.002 
Family size -0.088 -0.033 -0.102 -0.040 -0.089 -0.010 0.001 1.1E-4 
Gender -0.022 -0.008 -0.285 -0.110 0.207 0.020 -0.098 -0.019 
Age 0.017 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.001 
Education 0.141 0.052 0.124 0.049 0.245* 0.027 0.155 0.029 
Risk taker -0.274 -0.102 -0.328 -0.129 0.097 0.011 0.302 0.058 
Long term 0.106 0.040 0.286 0.112 -0.396 -0.043 -0.147 -0.028 
Market -0.568 -0.221 -0.909 -0.358 1.175 0.128 0.140 0.027 
Log likelihood -60.10 -63.50 -48.34 -63.66 
Prob. > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0197 
McFadden R2 0.495 0.476 0.328 0.175 
Sensitivity 89.4% 87.5% 28.0% 14.3% 
Correctly predicted 87.5% 84.7% 86.9% 85.2% 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
 
The programmes have a significant influence on the adoption decision as was expected. External 
motivation is thus very important for the adoption of SWC practices. The marginal effects of the 
dummies for the two programmes show that MARENASS has a larger impact than PRONAMACHCS. 
This is probably due to the different approaches the two programmes used. The contests of 
MARENASS motivate the farm households to implement the new technologies. However, there is a 
risk that farm households only implement SWC practices because of the contests, and abandon 
these practices afterwards. Another reason might be that within the MARENASS approach more 
attention is paid to instruct farmers how to implement SWC practices, whereas the technical staff of 
PRONAMACHCS normally supervises the implementation of SWC practices. A third reason can be 
that MARENASS participants decide themselves where to install the SWC practices, but 
PRONAMACHCS participants consult with the technical staff. 
 
The need for SWC practices (“demand”) is another determining factor: farm households with less 
flat, thus more sloping farmland, are more inclined to adopt SWC practices. Bench terraces, the 
most common SWC practices in Pacucha, are implemented on fields with more stones. As stones 
are required for the construction of the terrace wall, it is easier to implement these terraces on fields 
where stones are present. At the same time, these stones are “removed” from the fields, facilitating 
tillage. Farm households with more land opt for less labour-intensive SWC practices like slow-
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forming terraces and infiltration ditches. These practices are less effective than bench terraces, but 
since the farm household own more land they might feel less need to invest in their land resources. 
 
When the adoption decision is estimated for a sub-sample of either MARENASS or PRONAMACHCS 
participants, it appears that in case of the MARENASS participants farm household characteristics 
influence the adoption decision as well (see Appendix 7.3). MARENASS participants who adopt SWC 
practices have more sloping land with stones, a smaller family, are older and have a higher 
education level, are reluctant to risk and have a long term planning horizon. Apparently, MARENASS 
participants consider SWC practices, especially bench terraces, as risk reducing. Smaller families 
adopt especially bench terraces. Though these terraces require a huge investment in terms of labour, 
the terraces are considered as labour-saving, as tillage becomes easier. The adoption decision of 
PRONAMACHCS participants is not influenced by farm household characteristics, confirming the 
supposition that the technical staff of PRONAMACHCS highly influence the adoption decision. The 
fact that the adoption decision of MARENASS participants is influenced by individual household 
characteristics whereas the adoption decision of PRONAMACHCS participants is not, confirms the 
more participatory approach of MARENASS, in which participants take initiative and decide 
themselves whether and where to implement SWC practices (adoption is demand driven). However, 
in the case of PRONAMACHCS, the programme uses a top-down approach, with technical staff 
indicating where to implement SWC practices (adoption is supply driven). The adoption is thus not 
always an individual choice of the PRONAMACHCS participants. 
 
Adoption effort 
As the IMRs in the adoption equation were not significant, another two-stage equation can be 
estimated, in order to analyse the adoption effort. The procedure is similar to the one explained in 
7.1.2, except that adoption effort is conditional on adoption decision (there is thus no effort if farm 
household decided not to adopt SWC practices), and that the adoption effort is estimated for a sub-
sample of observations with non-zero values on adoption (i.e. the group of adopters). This is a 
straight forward Heckman’s two-stage estimation model (GREENE, 2003). The results of the probit 
for the adoption decision (without the IMRs) are used to calculate the IMRs that are inserted into 
the adoption effort equation to avoid biased estimates. The amount of labour (mandays) and 
farmland (ha) dedicated to SWC practices are considered as proxies for effort (Table 7.6).  
 
Farm households with more land put more effort both in labour and land. Most labour is applied to 
fields near the farm house. Surprisingly, farm households with less sloping land invest more labour 
in SWC practices. Apparently, it is preferred to invest more labour in those fields where it is easy to 
implement SWC practices instead of where it is needed but more difficult to implement. The 
question arises then whether the SWC practices are implemented on the right places in an 
appropriate way. Larger families invest more labour, but have implemented SWC practices on less 
land. This seems contradictory. Maybe larger households use their labour inefficiently. Higher 
educated head of households invest less labour, which can be explained by their higher opportunity 
costs of labour.  
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Table 7.6 Regression results of adoption effort of SWC implementation, Pacucha (N=104) 
Dependent variable Labour (mandays) 
Area 
(ha) 
Independent variables β β 
Constant 66.47* -0.035 
Farm area 8.21** 0.570**
Rainfed 25.88* -0.234 
Gentle slope -46.42** 0.202 
Steep slope -30.81 0.339 
Distance -9.56** -0.040 
No stones 22.04 -0.186 
Family size 4.46* -0.129**
Gender 20.23 0.069 
Age -0.62 0.004 
Education -7.94* 0.021 
Risk taker -8.14 0.116 
Long term -8.49 -0.044 
Market  -11.40 -0.278 
Years SWC 8.17* 0.017 
SWC: programme recommended 5.69 0.341 
SWC: programme incentives 26.04 0.481* 
SWC: agricultural production 5.30 -0.015 
SWC: conservation 45.99* 0.398 
IMR (SWC = 1) -39.85** 0.063 
Probability > F 0.0007 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.686 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
 
The motivation of farm household to adopt SWC practices also influences the effort invested in the 
implementation. Farm households who implement SWC practices for conservation purposes and 
who decided to adopt SWC at an early stage, invest more labour. However, this did not result in a 
larger area with SWC practices. Programme incentives are a significant stimulus to increase the 
area with SWC practices, as these incentives are distributed according to the amount of hectares 
with SWC practices. This stimulates the quantity of SWC, but one might question the quality and 
appropriateness of the practices, as the amount of labour is not increased. In short, farm households 
who adopted SWC practices for conservation purposes, invest more labour which probably results 
in a higher quality of the practices compared to the farm households who adopted SWC because of 
the programme incentives. 
 
Determinants of adoption 
Table 7.7 summarises the variables that were significant at different stages of the adoption process 
as estimated for the farm households in Pacucha. The approach of the programme determines which 
farm households participate. It is difficult for female-headed households to participate in 
PRONAMACHCS, as they cannot deliver the required manpower every week. MARENASS, on the other 
hand attracts risk-averse but market oriented farm households. As both programmes were recently 
present in Pacucha, social standing of the farm household was very important for programme 
participation. The adopters of SWC practices are the programme participants, who are actively 
involved in the social community life, have more land and are more oriented towards agriculture. 
The adopters are also those farm households who experience the need for SWC practices, as they 
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have more sloping land. Programme incentives result in more area with SWC practices, but not in 
more labour invested, so the question arises whether these SWC practices are of good quality and 
will be maintained. Apparently, most labour is invested in the near fields, but less labour is invested 
in the sloping fields. 
 
Table 7.7 Determinants of the adoption process in Pacucha 
Programme participation 
In general: 
Social standing (++) 
Farm area (++) 
PRONAMACHCS: 
Gender (male, ++) 
Land in valley (++) 
MARENASS: 
Market oriented (++) 
Risk taker (-) 
Adoption decision 
In general: 
PRONAMACHCS (++) 
MARENASS (++) 
Sloping land (++) 
Bench terraces: 
Stones in field (++) 
Slow-forming terrace: 
Farm area (++) 
Education (+) 
Infiltration ditch: 
Farm area (++) 
Effort 
In general: 
Farm area (++) 
Labour: 
Sloping land (--) 
Distance fields (--) 
Rainfed (+) 
Family size (+) 
Education (-) 
Years SWC (+) 
Conservation (+) 
Area: 
Family size (--) 
Programme incentives (+) 
 
 
7.2.3 Adoption process over time in Pacucha 
 
To get a better insight in the adoption process throughout the years, the farm households are 
compared according to the year when they started implementing SWC practices. Table 7.8 presents 
the results of this comparison. Only variables that were significantly different are shown. 
 
Before 1998, SWC practices were only adopted in Tahuantinsuyo and Santa Elena. At that time 
only PRONAMACHCS was present in these two communities. MARENASS started in 1998 in the five 
peasant communities. In 1998, SWC practices were adopted in Jose Olaya, Tahuantinsuyo and to a 
smaller extent in Churrubamba. This was explained by farmers who complained that in the first 
years of MARENASS there was only one programme promoter who lived in Jose Olaya, and who 
never visited the villages Santa Elena and Manchaybamba. Later, MARENASS contracted more 
programme promoters, one living in Santa Elena. After his appointment in 2000, more farm 
households were involved in the programme activities, and SWC practices were also implemented 
in Santa Elena and Manchaybamba. Programme staff or promoters thus have an important impact 
on the timing and extent involving farm households and disseminating new technologies. 
 
Looking at farm household characteristics, the only differences that are significant are the dummies 
for social standing, risk taking behaviour and long term planning. Farm households adopting SWC 
practices later, are more risk-averse and less long term oriented. The early adopters are definitely 
more concerned with the long term and have more often an important social standing. The early 
adopters are involved in both programmes and are most frequently in contact with programme staff. 
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This confirms that programmes are very important in disseminating new technologies. Whether a 
farm household is an innovator or laggard depends on its time horizon and risk behaviour. Early 
adopters also have more land. Non-adopters have significantly less land and livestock, and also 
spend less time in agriculture. Non-adopters and late adopters have more farmland that is located in 
the valley. For them, there is thus also less necessity to implement SWC practices. Besides, non-
adopters have the least farmland with gentle slopes, where most of the SWC practices are installed. 
 
Table 7.8 Variables explaining adoption process over time in Pacucha 
  First year of implementation SWC practices
Variable A prob>F no SWC < 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  N=72 N=4 N=13 N=24 N=23 N=38 
Community        
Jose Olaya 0.0002 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.09 0.03
Manchaybamba 0.0023 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.39
Tahuantinsuyo 0.0001 0.40 0.75 0.62 0.04 0.22 0.18
St. Elena 0.0152 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.29 0.39 0.34
Churrubamba 0.0000 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.46 0.04 0.05
Farm household characteristics  
Social standing 0.0002 0.14 0.75 0.46 0.54 0.43 0.39
Risk taker 0.0510 0.58 0.50 0.38 0.63 0.48 0.29
Long term planner 0.0634 0.51 0.75 0.69 0.58 0.52 0.29
Farm household assets  
Total farm area (ha) 0.0638 0.71 1.54 1.63 1.47 1.41 1.03
Total farm labour (mandays) 0.0632 41 62 76 72 69 57
Off-farm  income (S/.) 0.0051 1837 1560 4109 1722 2174 1546
Value livestock (S/.) 0.0294 2129 3825 2299 3557 2606 2532
Farmland characteristics  
Farmland in valley (ratio) 0.0741 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.16 0.35 0.43
Farmland gentle slope (ratio) 0.0462 0.35 0.60 0.46 0.63 0.50 0.47
Programme involvement  
Non-participants 0.0000 0.69 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03
PRONAMACHCS 0.0034 0.14 0.75 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.05
MARENASS 0.0000 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.58 0.48 0.71
Both programmes 0.0000 0.07 0.00 0.77 0.29 0.30 0.21
Contact frequency PRONAMACHCS 0.0001 5.21 26.50 32.46 14.63 18.48 9.26
Contact frequency MARENASS 0.0000 2.94 0.00 44.15 31.75 22.78 25.34
SWC implementation  
Slow forming terrace 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.33 0.17 0.16
Bench terrace 0.0000 0.00 0.75 0.92 0.96 0.87 0.95
Infiltration ditch 0.0000 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.35 0.21
Labour invested SWC (mandays) 0.0000 0.00 21.50 87.15 44.33 53.48 45.66
Farmland with SWC (ha) 0.0000 0.00 0.43 0.86 0.91 0.81 0.39
A Variables without units are dummy variables. The average values presented in the table are ratios. 
 
7.3 Empirical results on adoption behaviour in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
7.3.1 Comparing programme participants in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
The programmes PRONAMACHCS and ARARIWA are intervening in the watershed Piuray-Ccorimarca 
for about 20 years. Most farm households are, or have been, involved in these programmes, in 
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contrary to the farm households of Pacucha. Almost all farm households included in the survey 
participated in the PRONAMACHCS activities. This might be due to a sampling error, as students of 
PRONAMACHCS carried out the survey. But on the other hand, PRONAMACHCS has been present in 
this area for 20 years already and the majority of the farm households are indeed participating.  
 
Table 7.9 shows the significant different characteristics for the sub-samples according to 
programme involvement in Piuray-Ccorimarca. In contrast to the results of programme participants 
in Pacucha, the different groups in Piuray-Ccorimarca did not show many significant differences. 
This is due to the fact that there is only a small group of farmers not participating in any 
programme. Only 4 farm households participate only in ARARIWA and not in PRONAMACHCS. 
Therefore, the results on ARARIWA participants might be ignored, as one might question the 
representativeness of this small group. 
 
Table 7.9 Comparison of sub-sample of programme involvement in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 Significant Sub-sample 
Variable A difference No programme PRONAM. ARARIW. Both All 
Prob.>F N = 13 N = 38 N = 4 N = 133 N = 188
Farm household characteristics   
Family size (members) 0.06 4.08 4.18 5.75 4.94 4.74 
Risk taker 0.01 0.85 0.76 0.50 0.53 0.60 
Farm household assets  
Value agricultural production (S/.) 0.00 2054 2929 774 1170 1578 
Total farm area (ha) 0.00 1.21 1.25 0.44 0.54 0.73 
Total farm labour (mandays) 0.01 263 157 78 87 113 
Off-farm income (S/.) 0.09 1832 3088 273 4541 3969 
SWC implementation  
Slow forming terrace  0.06 0.00 0.37 0.25 0.36 0.34 
SWC practice 0.00 0.15 0.61 0.25 0.65 0.60 
Motivation  
SWC: programme recommended 0.01 0.69 0.53 0.25 0.32 0.38 
SWC: because of incentives 0.00 0.54 0.26 0.75 0.07 0.15 
No SWC: lack of labour / money 0.02 0.38 0.21 0.25 0.10 0.14 
A Variables without units are dummy variables. The average values presented in the table are ratios. 
 
The only household characteristics that differ significantly are family size and risk behaviour. As in 
Pacucha, programme participants are more risk-averse than non-participants. Programme 
participants also have larger families. Farm households who participate in ARARIWA have less land 
and less agricultural production than farm households who only participate in PRONAMACHCS and 
non-participants.  
 
Programme participants have significantly more slow-forming terraces than non-participants, so 
also in Piuray-Ccorimarca the programmes play an important role in the dissemination of SWC 
practices. The values for bench terraces and infiltration ditches do not differ significantly among the 
different programme participants. Bench terraces are hardly introduced in this area, and infiltration 
ditches are installed on the communal pasture areas. Programme incentives were an important 
reason to implement SWC practices for ARARIWA participants and (presently) non-participants. 
ARARIWA used to pay farmers to install SWC practices, which they therefore considered as an off-
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farm income opportunity, instead of a conservation activity. Most respondents (both programme 
participants and non-participants) mentioned lack of labour and money as constraints for further 
implementation of SWC practices. As SWC activities have been carried out for 20 years already, 
lack of knowledge is not an issue anymore.  
 
7.3.2 Determinants of the adoption process in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
Programme participation 
In order to explain the adoption process in Piuray-Ccorimarca, the same procedure is followed as in 
section 7.2.2. Appendix 7.4 shows the results of the bivariate probit with PRONAMACHCS and 
Arariwa as dependent variables. The zero hypothesis that the covariance of the error terms (ρ) of the 
two probit models for participation in PRONAMACHCS and Arariwa is equal to zero is rejected 
(Prob.>χ2 = 0.0001). The decisions to participate in PRONAMACHCS or Arariwa are thus related. This 
seems reasonable as the two programmes are similar to each other. As these decisions are 
dependent, they are combined in the analysis for Piuray-Ccorimarca, considering only the decision 
of a farm household whether to participate in a programme, without making the distinction whether 
the household participates in PRONAMACHCS or Arariwa. Table 7.10 presents the results of the 
single probit model for programme participation. The variable gender was omitted in the probit 
model, as it was a perfect predictor for programme participation. 
 
Table 7.10 Probit model estimating programme participation, Piuray-Ccorimarca (N=188) 
Dependent variable Programme 
Observations y=1  175 
Independent variables β dy/dx 
Constant 1.521  
Farm area -0.182 -0.009 
Valley -0.284 -0.014 
Livestock 2.2E-4 1.1E-5 
Family size 0.135 0.007 
Age 0.008 3.8E-4 
Education  -0.254* -0.012 
Dependency ratio -1.668* -0.081 
Social standing 0.510 0.024 
Risk taker -1.088** -0.050 
Long term -0.209 -0.010 
Market orientation 0.127 0.006 
Presence 0.078 0.004 
Off-farm / farm income 0.372* 0.018 
Log likelihood -35.42 
Probability > χ2  0.0340 
McFadden R2 0.251 
Sensitivity 100.0% 
Correctly predicted  93.6% 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
 
Risk behaviour is the most significant explaining variable in the model. Other significant variables 
are education level, dependency ratio and the income ratio. Apparently, the high educated and risk 
taking households do not expect any benefit from participating in programme activities. ARARIWA 
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participants have less land but larger households, and are more market oriented, whereas 
PRONAMACHCS participants are characterised by their dependence on off-farm income (Appendix 
7.4). Note that in Piuray-Ccorimarca individual household characteristics influence programme 
participation, in contrast to Pacucha. As the programmes are present for 20 years, access to the 
programme activities may be more equal for the farm households, as they are all informed about 
these activities, than in Pacucha. Also, Piuray-Ccorimarca is richer and more market-oriented, and 
an individual demand is created for programme activities. The collective aspect of community life 
became less important. Especially the farm households with lower opportunity costs of labour 
(lower education level) and that are risk-averse, have interest in the programme activities. 
 
As in Pacucha, the probit model for programme participation in Piuray-Ccorimarca has low scores 
for the goodness of fit. The rumours about the political intentions of PRONAMACHCS apply here as 
well. Besides that, the programmes exist for a long period, and the diffusion of their activities is 
widespread among the population. Almost all farm households are participating in a programme so 
hardly any distinction can be made between participants and non-participants. 
 
Adoption decision 
Appendix 7.5 contains the linear probability models including the IMRs estimating the adoption 
decision. As in the adoption analyses for Pacucha, the F-tests accepted the zero hypothesis of the 
correction terms (IMRs) being equal to zero. The results of the probit model (without IMRs) for the 
adoption decision are given in Table 7.11. 
 
Programmes positively stimulate adoption of SWC practices, but not the specific practices 
separately. Especially farm households with more rainfed land (without access to irrigation) have 
SWC practices. These rainfed areas are mainly the sloping areas in the upper part of the watershed 
where the programmes put most effort in SWC practices (mainly infiltration ditches and slow 
forming terraces). Farm households, who are younger and have a long term vision, implement 
bench terraces. Farm households with more land install the less intensive slow-forming terraces. 
The variable programme was dropped in the equation for slow-forming terraces, as all farm 
households without slow-forming terraces did not participate in any programme. The infiltration 
ditches are installed on the fields that are furthest away. 
 
The scores for goodness of fit of the probit models on adoption are low, whereas the results for 
Pacucha were fairly convincing. In Piuray-Ccorimarca it is more common that the technical staff of 
the programmes (PRONAMACHCS in specific) decide where to implement SWC practices. The 
adoption decision is not always made at farm household level, as is assumed in the model. Indeed, 
cases were known where the programme decided to implement SWC practices on fields of which 
the owners were not agreed on. These farm households neglected or even removed the SWC 
practices at their fields. Another explanation of the low scores is that in many cases the SWC 
practices were implemented a long time ago. The farm household data that was obtained with the 
survey in 2002 is not representative any more for the moment when the adoption decision was 
taken. This probably distorts the results. 
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Table 7.11 Probit model estimating adoption of SWC practices, Piuray-Ccorimarca (N=188) 
Dependent 
variable SWC Bench terrace 
Slow-forming 
terrace Infiltration ditch 
Observations y=1  112 28 63 43 
Variable β dy/dx β dy/dx β dy/dx β dy/dx 
Constant -1.201  -0.018  0.359  -1.788*  
Programme 1.759** 0.561 0.588 0.088 †  0.579 0.121 
Farm area 0.098 0.038 -0.067 -0.014 0.300** 0.111 -0.228 -0.061 
Rainfed 0.809** 0.313 -0.671* -0.137 0.483* 0.179 1.175** 0.315 
Flat slope 0.055 0.021 -0.393 -0.080 0.166 0.062 0.184 0.049 
Distance 0.026 0.010 -0.052 -0.011 0.005 0.002 0.311** 0.083 
No stones -0.351 -0.136 -0.425 -0.087 0.070 0.026 -0.351 -0.094 
Family size 0.048 0.019 -0.047 -0.010 0.064 0.024 -0.048 -0.013 
Gender 0.080 0.031   -0.642 -0.251 0.171 0.043 
Age -0.016* -0.006 -0.023** -0.005 -0.012 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 
Education -0.077 -0.030 -0.101 -0.021 -0.150 -0.056 0.036 0.010 
Risk taker 0.340 0.132 0.057 0.012 0.165 0.061 0.489* 0.126 
Long term 0.084 0.033 0.779** 0.142 -0.199 -0.074 0.035 0.009 
Market -0.245 -0.095 0.401 0.082 0.016 -0.006 -0.176 -0.047 
Log likelihood -110.99 -70.79 -103.66 -84.47 
Prob. > χ2 0.0026 0.0240 0.0452 0.0016 
McFadden R2 0.125 0.142 0.093 0.165 
Sensitivity 86.6% 10.0% 31.8% 23.3% 
Correctly predicted 69.7% 84.6% 70.9% 78.2% 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
† Programme = 1 predicts failure perfectly: variable programme was dropped and 13 observations 
neglected. 
 
 
Adoption effort 
Also for Piuray-Ccorimarca the adoption effort can be estimated with a two-stage equation since 
there is no selectivity bias in the probit model for adoption. As in section 7.2.2., the results of the 
probit for the adoption decision (without the IMRs) are used to calculated the IMRs that are inserted 
into the adoption effort equation to avoid biased estimates.  
 
Table 7.12 gives the results on estimation of adoption effort in Piuray-Ccorimarca. Larger farm 
households that are younger and have a long term time horizon invest more labour and land in the 
implementation of SWC practices. Farm households with more rainfed land, implemented the SWC 
practices on more fields.  
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Table 7.12 Regression results of effort of SWC implementation, Piuray-Ccorimarca (N=112) 
Dependent variable Labour Area 
Independent variables β β 
Constant -36.64 -0.304 
Farm area 5.38 0.081**
Rainfed 40.51 0.311**
Gentle slope 5.28 -0.106 
Steep slope 43.52 -0.017 
Distance -6.19 -0.032 
No stones -2.38 -0.140 
Family size 11.04** 0.072**
Gender -8.70 -0.142 
Age -2.38** -0.012**
Education -9.55 0.016 
Risk taker -14.05 0.061 
Long term 45.60** 0.189**
Market  40.31 -0.200 
Years SWC 3.30 0.020* 
SWC: programme recommended -4.05 -0.023 
SWC: programme incentives 25.50 0.074 
SWC: agricultural production -0.97 0.115 
SWC: conservation -18.53 0.032 
IMR (SWC = 1) 159.39** 0.811**
Probability > F 0.1150 0.0008 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.308 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
Determinants of adoption 
Table 7.13 summarises the variables that were significant at the three stages of the adoption 
process, as estimated for the farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca.  
 
Table 7.13 Determinants of the adoption process in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
Programme participation 
Education level (-) 
Dependency ratio (-) 
Risk taker (--) 
Off-farm income (+) 
  
Adoption decision 
In general: 
Rainfed (++) 
 
Bench terraces: 
Long term (++) 
Age (--) 
 
Slow-forming terrace: 
Farm area (++) 
 
Infiltration ditch: 
Rainfed (++) 
Distance (++) 
Risk taker (+) 
 
Effort 
In general: 
Family size (++) 
Age (--) 
Long term (++) 
Labour: 
 
Area: 
Farm area (++) 
Rainfed (++) 
Years SWC (+) 
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Programme participants are farm households that are risk-averse and have a low education level, 
and are thus assumed to have a low opportunity cost of labour. Farm households who depend more 
on off-farm income or have a lower dependency ratio also participate. Programme participation is 
only for significant in the probit model for SWC practices. However, most farm households in the 
sample are programme participants. Younger farm households with a long term vision adopt bench 
terraces. Slow-farming terraces are installed on farms with more land, and infiltration ditches are 
installed on rainfed land at a larger distance from the houses. Larger and younger farm households 
with a long term time horizon also make most effort in the implementation of the SWC practices.  
 
Adoption process over time in Piuray-Ccorimarca  
The adoption process in Piuray-Ccorimarca started already in the 1980s. The data collected in the 
survey are from 2002, and as these data are not representative for the characteristics of farm 
households at the time they adopted SWC practices, no clear explanations or trends could be found 
for the adoption process over time in this area.  
 
7.4 Factors influencing farmers’ adoption behaviour of SWC practices 
 
In both watersheds the presence of agriculture-oriented programmes was an important factor 
stimulating the adoption of SWC practices. In general one can conclude that the adopters of SWC 
practices are the programme participants who experience the need for SWC practices. Farm 
households participating in the programmes are risk-averse. Programme participation can be 
considered a risk-reducing strategy, as these programmes help the farm households to diversify 
income and agriculture. The intervention strategies of the programmes partly define which farm 
households participate in the programme, and as a consequence the adoption pattern. For example, 
PRONAMACHCS organises weekly activities, and a participating farm household has to “deliver” 
labour of at least one member every week. This is difficult for female-headed households, as they 
are more labour constrained. However, the low scores on goodness of fit of the participation 
equations were striking. This suggests that in both watersheds, other factors play a role in the 
decision to participate in a programme, that were not accounted for. Farm households mentioned the 
rumours about the hidden agendas of the programmes and some participants. Programme staff 
mentioned the conformism and especially alcoholism of the (often male) head of the farm 
households as a reason of disappointing results. 
 
In Pacucha, the diffusion or adoption process seems to be at an earlier stage than in Piuray-
Ccorimarca where the diffusion of SWC practices is about complete. In Pacucha lack of knowledge 
is still hampering the adoption process and programme incentives are an important stimulus for the 
adoption effort, in contradiction to Piuray-Ccorimarca. Farm households who are actively involved 
in community life are the first to hear about new interventions and to participate. These farm 
households are often the leaders and innovators within the community. When an intervention or 
diffusion of a new technology is still in an early stage, these households participate in the 
programmes, and are the first adopters. This is consistent with the diffusion theory of Rogers 
(1962). Due to the long intervention period in Piuray-Ccorimarca, all farm households are aware of 
the programmes and the SWC practices. The social activity of the farm household does not play an 
important role anymore in the decision on programme participation. Instead, programme 
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participation is more demand-driven in Piuray-Ccorimarca, as participation is determined by 
household characteristics like education and risk behaviour.  
 
An important difference between the two watersheds, is that Pacucha is still less developed and less 
market oriented, whereas farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca have more assets, are better 
educated and live close to the booming (tourist) market in Cusco where they can sell their products 
and have more off-farm income opportunities. Opportunity cost of labour is therefore an important 
factor in decision-making in Piuray-Ccorimarca. When a farm household has a higher opportunity 
cost of labour (higher educated, smaller households and thus less labour available) it is less likely to 
participate in a programme, and invest much labour in the implementation of SWC practices. This 
is not an issue (yet) in Pacucha.  
 
The results of Pacucha suggest that programme staff of PRONAMACHCS decide on the location of 
SWC practices and thus influence the adoption decision. For these participants the adoption 
decision is mainly determined by the land characteristics (rainfed fields and steep slopes), but 
hardly by farm household characteristics. MARENASS participants decide themselves whether to 
implement which SWC practice (i.e. the adoption decision). These findings are explained by the 
approaches of the programmes: MARENASS applies a more participatory approach, emphasising 
knowledge development and empowerment of its participants. PRONAMACHCS and Arariwa, on the 
other hand, apply a more top-down approach, as they consider lack of knowledge as most important 
constraint for sustainable agriculture and rural development, and knowledge transfer thus as a 
solution (see section 4.4.1). A participatory approach, like MARENASS, is considered to lead to a 
more sustainable adoption of SWC practices than a top-down approach (Pretty and Shah, 1997). 
Farm households in Pacucha (mainly MARENASS participants) prefer to invest more in the less 
sloping fields near the houses, whereas in Piuray-Ccorimarca more effort is put in the rainfed fields. 
If farm households individually decide on the adoption of SWC practices, they prefer to invest in 
those fields where SWC might be less needed considering soil conservation, but where 
implementation is easier and cultivation is more intensive. If a programme influences the adoption 
decision, most effort is put in the most degraded areas (rainfed land, with steep slopes and at a 
larger distance) that are cultivated extensively. From a SWC perspective the latter is preferred, but 
from economic point of view the first practice is probably more interesting for the farm household. 
 
Though programmes have a large influence on the adoption behaviour of farm households, the 
programme incentives that are provided seem to be less important. The results in Pacucha indicate 
that programme incentives stimulate an increase of the area with SWC practices, this is not 
accompanied with an increase of labour invested in the implementation. This is probably due to the 
contests organised by MARENASS. A jury judges only the quantity of SWC practices implemented 
by a farm household, not the quality. One might thus doubt the quality and appropriateness of the 
SWC practices that are installed during these contests.  
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
This case study shows that external persuasion through programmes promoting SWC is the key 
driver of the adoption process of SWC practices. Especially in an early stage of technology 
diffusion, the targeting policy of programmes defines the adoption pattern. Though the importance 
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of SWC-oriented programmes on the adoption process is acknowledged by some (e.g.: Cramb et al., 
1999; Tenge et al., 2004), this is rarely taken into account in these analyses to our surprise. Not 
considering the decision on programme participation might lead to biased results on adoption 
behaviour.  
 
The social network of a farm household is an important factor determining programme participation 
and subsequently adoption behaviour. This is also found by others (Nowak, 1987; Baidu-Forson, 
1999; Jagger and Pender, 2003). Especially at the start of the intervention and diffusion process, the 
social network is important in order to be informed early. Once the diffusion process is spreading, 
the individual demand of households for programme participation becomes more important than the 
social network.  
 
In contrast to findings of others (e.g.: Feder et al., 1982; Marsh, 1998; Asfaw and Admassie, 2004), 
farm household characteristics like education or human capital did not seem to have a large 
influence on adoption behaviour, or they had a negative influence. Better educated farmers have a 
higher opportunity cost of labour, and are therefore less interested in the low-earning SWC 
activities (Posthumus and Graaff, 2005). Risk behaviour is an important factor determining 
adoption behaviour. It is often stated that, since SWC practices imply a large investment, risk-
averse farm households are reluctant to adopt these practices (e.g.: Feder et al., 1982; Sinden and 
King, 1990; Marra et al., 2003). In this case study the contrary is found: as risk-averse farm 
households are more interested in programme participation, these risk-averse farmers also adopt 
SWC practices. However, it is not possible to generalise adoption processes, as these depend on the 
technologies, as well as the socio-economic and institutional context (Graaff et al., 2005). 
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APPENDIX 7.1 
 
Bivariate probit for programme participation in Pacucha 
 
Dependent variable PRONAMACHCS MARENASS 
Independent variables β β 
Constant -2.634* -1.938 
Farm area 0.318** 0.193* 
Valley 0.684** 0.427 
Livestock 3.3E-6 2.6E-5 
Family size -0.057 0.015 
Gender 0.727** -0.115 
Age -0.009 -0.011 
Education  -0.036 0.062 
Dependency ratio 0.931 0.813 
Social standing 0.532** 0.605** 
Risk taker -0.254 -0.464** 
Long term 0.327 -0.097 
Market orientation -0.445 1.169** 
Presence 0.099 0.146 
Off-farm / farm income -0.063 -0.189 
Log likelihood = -196.05 
Probability > χ2 = 0.0009 
rho = -0.079 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0 : 
Probability > χ2 = 0.5767 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
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APPENDIX 7.2 
 
Determinants of adoption decision in Pacucha, linear probability models with correction 
terms 
 
Dependent variable SWC Bench terrace Slow-forming terrace 
Infiltration 
ditch 
Observations y=1 104 96 25 28 
Variable β 
Robust 
St.err. β 
Robust 
St.err. β 
Robust 
St.err. β 
Robust 
St.err.
Constant -0.018 0.206 0.140 0.214 0.052 0.203 -0.029 0.196 
PRONAMACHCS -0.047 0.449 0.344 0.521 -0.057 0.552 -0.175 0.703 
MARENASS 0.958** 0.384 0.720* 0.417 0.346 0.489 0.199 0.527 
Farm area 0.033 0.033 0.019 0.038 0.085* 0.044 0.073 0.053 
Rainfed -0.019 0.093 -0.079 0.091 -0.092 0.083 0.062 0.090 
Flat slope -0.259** 0.081 -0.230** 0.084 -0.058 0.054 -0.091 0.071 
Distance -0.012 0.018 -0.017 0.015 0.004 0.011 -0.008 0.013 
No stones -0.109 0.097 -0.212** 0.101 -0.022 0.077 -0.004 0.092 
Family size -0.027 0.016 -0.025 0.017 -0.019 0.018 0.004 0.022 
Gender 0.088 0.133 -0.052 0.150 0.095 0.165 -0.018 0.188 
Age 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 
Education 0.019 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.035 0.016 0.033 
Risk taker -0.026 0.082 -0.043 0.083 0.002 0.077 0.079 0.072 
Long term 0.034 0.078 0.024 0.078 -0.022 0.090 -0.029 0.097 
Market -0.271 0.268 -0.191 0.291 0.053 0.372 -0.057 0.395 
IMR(PRONAMACHCS=0) 0.062 0.341 -0.169 0.377 0.292 0.421 -0.002 0.478 
IMR(PRONAMACHCS =1) 0.134 0.250 -0.102 0.305 -0.029 0.305 0.182 0.436 
IMR(MARENASS=0) -0.348 0.238 -0.221 0.247 -0.051 0.298 -0.002 0.302 
IMR(MARENASS=1) -0.033 0.248 0.113 0.278 -0.221 0.312 -0.093 0.340 
R2 0.564 0.546 0.273 0.155 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0897 
F-test IMRs = 0 
(Prob.> F) 
1.34 
(0.2573) 
1.21 
(0.3106) 
1.05 
(0.3841) 
0.29 
(0.8817) 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
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APPENDIX 7.3 
 
Determinants of adoption decision for sub-samples of programme participants, Pacucha 
 
 MARENASS (N=100) PRONAMACHCS (N=60) 
Variable 
SWC bench terrace 
slow-
forming 
terrace 
infiltr. 
ditch SWC 
bench 
terrace 
slow-
forming 
terrace 
infiltr. 
ditch 
Constant 1.034 3.373* -2.389** -1.354 -0.471 2.237 -2.183 -2.415 
PRONAMACHCS -0.154 -0.095 0.630* -0.059     
MARENASS     1.204** 0.903* 1.276* 0.767 
Farm area 0.373 0.316* 0.241** 0.242** 0.289 0.336* 0.624** 0.243 
Rainfed -0.868 -0.304 -0.426 -0.268 -0.988 -1.756** 0.184 0.583 
Flat slope -3.808** -2.279** -0.707 -0.517 -1.942** -1.461** -0.203 -0.938 
Distance 0.602 0.069 0.106 -0.006 0.187 0.008 -0.134 -0.076 
No stones -2.378** -2.353** -0.387 -0.173 -1.037 -1.334 0.188 -1.043 
Family size -1.120** -0.569** -0.095 0.025 -0.226 -0.111 -0.201 -0.102 
Gender -2.255 -2.029 0.166 -0.428 0.480 -0.344 - -0.040 
Age 0.211** 0.072** 0.017 0.004 0.045 -0.006 0.015 0.021 
Education 1.100** 0.680** 0.315** 0.209 0.249 0.140 0.252 0.225 
Risk taker -1.239* -0.746* -0.008 0.281 -0.674 -0.129 -0.582 0.300 
Long term 1.185* 0.597 -0.204 -0.186 0.912 0.707 -0.584 0.628 
Market 0.052 -0.596 1.500* 0.413 -1.156 -1.372 -1.038 -1.715 
Log likelihood -17.83 -26.62 -42.25 -47.32 -18.74 -22.97 -19.54 -23.97 
Prob. > χ2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0375 0.4319 0.0047 0.0111 0.0107 0.5191 
McFadden R2 0.514 0.416 0.217 0.123 0.445 0.373 0.400 0.202 
Sensitivity 96.6% 94.0% 34.8% 13.0% 91.1% 92.9% 53.3% 16.7% 
Correct 92.0% 84.0% 81.0% 77.0% 81.7% 85.0% 78.6% 76.7% 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
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APPENDIX 7.4 
 
Bivariate probit for programme participation in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
Dependent variable PRONAMACHCS Arariwa 
Independent variables β β 
Constant 2.905* 0.975 
Farm area -0.170 -0.387** 
Valley -0.560 0.291 
Livestock 1.2E-4 1.3E-5 
Family size 0.019 0.226** 
Age 0.004 -0.012 
Education  -0.316** -0.183* 
Dependency ratio -0.483 -0.744 
Social standing 0.531 0.309 
Risk taker -0.587 -1.089** 
Long term -0.341 0.365 
Market orientation 0.454 1.202** 
Presence -0.025 0.001 
Off-farm / farm income -0.170** 0.084 
Log likelihood = -124.96 
Probability > χ2 = 0.0117 
rho = 0.723 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0 : 
Probability > χ2 = 0.0001 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
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APPENDIX 7.5 
 
Determinants of adoption decision in Piuray-Ccorimarca, linear probability models with 
correction terms 
Dependent variable SWC Bench terrace Slow-forming terrace 
Infiltration 
ditch 
Observations y=1 112 28 63 43 
Variable β 
Robust 
St.err. β 
Robust 
St.err. β 
Robust 
St.err. β 
Robust 
St.err.
Constant -0.291 0.519 0.573* 0.293 0.078 0.449 -0.682 2.479 
Programme 1.014** 0.404 -0.164 0.224 0.507 0.337 0.876** 0.383 
Farm area 0.041 0.039 -0.003 0.020 0.079** 0.033 -0.038 0.026 
Rainfed 0.276** 0.100 -0.143** 0.069 0.152 0.098 0.324** 0.092 
Flat slope 0.019 0.102 -0.086 0.078 0.035 0.101 0.075 0.077 
Distance 0.004 0.047 -0.010 0.026 -0.005 0.041 0.094* 0.049 
No stones -0.104 0.110 -0.094 0.087 0.012 0.106 -0.078 0.091 
Family size 0.007 0.018 -0.012 0.012 0.022 0.020 -0.024 0.017 
Gender 0.040 0.186 0.189** 0.069 -0.255 0.194 0.032 0.131 
Age -0.006* 0.003 -0.006** 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Education -0.017 0.033 -0.032 0.021 -0.035 0.027 0.016 0.025 
Risk taker 0.158* 0.093 0.033 0.065 0.031 0.093 0.160** 0.078 
Long term 0.032 0.091 0.175** 0.063 -0.057 0.092 0.000 0.071 
Market -0.100 0.173 0.088 0.124 0.018 0.162 -0.089 0.136 
IMR(Programme =0) -0.281 0.274 0.193 0.124 -0.091 0.202 -0.429 0.265 
IMR(Programme =1) -0.371 0.320 -0.145 0.194 0.031 0.289 -0.398 0.271 
R2 0.164 0.135 0.135 0.189 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0509 0.0000 0.0030 
F-test IMRs = 0 
(Prob.> F) 
1.21 
(0.3016) 
1.47 
(0.2323) 
0.11 
(0.8985) 
2.23 
(0.1108) 
* significant at 0.1 level      ** significant at 0.05 level 
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Chapter 8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of terraces on factor productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A revised version of this chapter is in preparation as: 
H. Posthumus and R. Ruben (in preparation). Effects of terraces on factor productivity in the 
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8 The effect of terraces on factor productivity 
 
The implementation of soil and water conservation (SWC) practices, especially terraces, requires a 
huge investment of labour and capital. In Chapter 7 it was concluded that farm households who 
participate in an SWC-promoting programme, and who have sloping farmland, adopt SWC 
practices. Hence, external persuasion is important in the decision-making of farmers to invest in 
SWC. However, whether the investment in SWC pays off on long-term, depends on the impact of 
SWC practices on the productivity of the production factors. Productivity change is an important 
potential aspect of technological change (Jayasuriya, 2003). Production efficiency is improved 
when the productivity of the scarcest production factor is increased. Increased productivity or 
output stability contribute to the willingness of poor farmers to adopt resource-conserving practices 
that are economically viable in the farmers’ context of risk and resource constraints (Scherr, 2000). 
In this chapter it will be explored how terraces (that is, bench terraces and slow-forming terraces) 
affect the efficiency of agricultural production. The effect of terraces on the productivity of land, 
labour and fertilisers at farm household level is determined by estimating production functions.  
 
Most research on the effect of SWC practices considers only land or soil productivity (e.g.: 
Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996; Hellin and Haigh, 2002; Shiferaw et al., 2003), and a few also take 
the effect of SWC on fertiliser productivity into account (e.g.: Zougmoré et al., 2004). In Chapter 5 
it was concluded that yield increase at field level due to terraces is negligible if it is not 
accompanied with a change in crop management. It is also shown that SWC practices increase the 
efficiency of fertilisers and that due to the complementary effect of these two technologies a 
significant higher yield can be obtained. Due to the reduced runoff (and thus retention of fertilisers) 
and the improved soil-moisture content, the effect of fertilisers on crop production is increased. 
Often, the application of fertilisers is limited due to a lack of capital to buy these fertilisers. In many 
cases, the purchase of chemical fertilisers is a risky investment for the farm household. If the returns 
or productivity of fertilisers can be increased by SWC, this investment becomes more rewarding. 
 
Less research is done on the effect of SWC on labour productivity. However, in rural areas in 
developing countries (LDCs), labour productivity is important for a farm household. As market 
prices for agricultural products are low, many farm households in the Andes rely (partly) on non-
farm activities for cash income (see Chapters 3 and 4). The ability of farm households to respond to 
prices in order to receive the highest returns for their resources and products, is constrained by 
market failures (Janvry et al., 1991). Labour availability and its allocation between different 
activities including leisure, are important for the household’s income and welfare. Though labour is 
to spend on the farm to assure the household’s food consumption, a household cannot afford to use 
all its labour resources for farm activities. Off-farm income is also indispensable for the livelihood 
of farm households, and increases their food security (Reardon et al., 2001; Ruben and Berg, 2001). 
Farm households in the Andes therefore allocate their resources (land, labour, capital) to different 
types of income activities, like food crops, cash crops, off-farm employment. Off-farm labour 
productivity is relatively fixed by means of market wages, but the farm labour productivity is 
flexible. Farm labour productivity can be increased either by producing more with the existing 
labour input or by producing the same output while saving labour. If the latter is the case, more 
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labour can be allocated to other activities (Reardon et al., 1996). Household labour is also allocated 
to leisure12 activities, besides income generating on- and off-farm activities.  
  
Though it seems that technology adoption in agriculture is impeded by limited labour availability, 
this is rather caused by a lack of cash (Cramb et al., 1999; Moser and Barrett, 2003). In case a farm 
household faces scarcity of cash due to a failing capital market, labour becomes the scarcest input 
of all, as selling labour is the only means by which poor households can earn cash immediately. As 
a result, the opportunity cost of labour is high, causing a bottleneck for the adoption of labour-
intensive technologies in agriculture, as household labour is allocated to off-farm activities (Janvry 
et al., 1991; Cramb et al., 1999). Thus, if terraces can increase farm labour productivity by saving 
labour input for cropping activities, farmers might be more willing to implement these practices.  
 
8.1 Methodology 
8.1.1 Theoretical background of production function 
Econometric estimation of the production technology can be done through either the production 
function (primal or direct approach), or a profit or cost function (dual or indirect approach) 
(Mundlak, 2000; Zepeda, 2001). The production function describes the technological relation 
between combinations of inputs and outputs. The profit or cost function describes the producer’s 
behaviour in choice of inputs, given the market prices (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995). 
 
Production function – a primal estimation 
A production function is a purely physical concept, describing a relationship between inputs and 
output, in this case the agricultural production (Bairam, 1994; Upton, 1996): ( )XfQ =  [8.1] 
where Q is the output, and X is the vector of inputs. ƒ(·) is the functional form of the production 
function defining the technical relationship between the inputs and output. It is assumed that the 
vector X consists of exogenous variables. If so, the function can be estimated with OLS regression 
techniques. However, under the assumption of profit maximisation, the explanatory variables might 
be endogenous, as the producer chooses the input quantities in order to obtain maximum profit. This 
implies that the error term is unknown to the observer but known to the producer himself (Mundlak, 
2000; Coelli and Cuesta, 2001). This results in a simultaneous equations bias, as the error terms are 
correlated with the explanatory (endogenous) variables. However, in agriculture one can assume 
that the error term is partly known (management skills) and partly unknown (climate, pests) to the 
producer (Mundlak, 1996). Coelli and Cuesta (2001) show that if this is the case, OLS estimators 
are still the best choice despite the bias, especially if firms show a systematic non-profit maximising 
behaviour. 
 
                                                 
12 In this case study, the term leisure comprises activities like religious duties, childcare, house repair, time 
spent on social relationships, etc. It thus includes all activities except the non-farm activities to earn cash 
income and the on-farm activities required to gain agricultural and animal products. These activities (or 
goods and services) are produced for direct use rather than for market exchange, and are referred to, as Z-
goods in neoclassical literature (Ellis, 1988). 
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Profit function – a dual estimation 
The dual approach is used as a solution for the possible endogeneity problem. The appearance of 
prices in the empirical equation distinguishes the dual approach from the primal. The basic idea of 
duality is that any point on the production function corresponds uniquely to a vector of price ratios 
and vice versa. As a result, variations in prices cause variations in quantities. Under duality, the 
technology is summarised by profit, cost, or revenue functions, referred to as dual functions. For 
competitive firms, prices, unlike quantities, are exogenous. Therefore, when prices are used as 
explanatory variables, these do not cause a simultaneous equations bias. Duality between 
technology and prices hold under well-defined conditions that can be tested empirically. In most 
studies these underlying conditions are not fully met; in particular, the concavity of the cost 
function or the convexity of the profit function is frequently violated (Mundlak, 2000). Moreover, 
problems might arise when some prices might be non-exogenous, when there is a lack of sufficient 
price variation, or when firms deviate from optimal (i.e. profit-maximising) behaviour (Coelli and 
Cuesta, 2001). These problems are very likely in case of subsistence farming, as the subsistence 
farm is not fully competitive and market prices cannot be applied for all inputs (e.g. labour). 
 
As the farmers in the Peruvian Andes are only partly integrated into the markets, and agricultural 
production is mainly for subsistence purposes, it is expected that farmers do not show profit-
maximising behaviour when it comes to agricultural production. Considering the arguments as 
briefly stated above, and the fact that the purpose of these analyses is to determine the impact of 
SWC practices on agricultural production – a technical relationship –, it was decided to use the 
primal approach by estimating production functions.  
 
Selecting a functional form for the production function  
There are different forms of production functions. Which one to choose depends on the nature of 
the producing unit that is estimated (Heady and Dillon, 1961). Determination of the true functional 
form of a given relationship is impossible, so the problem is to choose the best form for a given 
task, based on choice criteria (Griffin et al., 1987). These criteria can be hypotheses, data 
availability and properties, data-specific considerations and application-specific characteristics.  
 
For the selection of the appropriate functional form for this case study, the following assumptions 
were made: 
− When a farmer operates in uncertainty marginal productivities can be negative (Chambers, 
1988; Hall, 1998). If the assumption of nonnegative marginal productivities is imposed by 
allowing only functions that never decrease, but in reality output decreases as input increases, 
the parameter estimates will be biased (Hall, 1998). However, in this case study the farming 
systems of subsistence farmers with limited access to inputs are analysed. It is thus assumed 
that these farmers did not yet reach the third stage of agricultural production, i.e. decreasing 
output when inputs are increased. Therefore, it can be assumed that the marginal productivities 
of the variable inputs are nonnegative. 
− It is assumed that if all input variables are zero, the output is zero as well. However, if at least 
one of the input variable is positive, the output is also expected to be positive. 
− The function is assumed to be concave. 
− In order to simplify the computation (curvi-)linear functions are preferred, as these can easily 
be estimated with OLS regression techniques. 
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− The amount of parameters should be restricted in order to prevent multi-collinearity.  
 
Based on Griffin et al. (1987), and considering the choice criteria as mentioned above, the Cobb-
Douglas function was selected as being appropriate for this case study. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function is given by: 
n
nxxAxQ
ααα L21 21=  [8.2] 
where Q is the output, xi is the input factor i, A is a constant, and αi is the partial elasticity of 
production of y in relation to xi. If ∑ iα  is equal to 1 then there is a constant return to scale. The 
advantage of a Cobb-Douglas is the easy estimation by linear least squares. 
 
Properties of the production function 
The inputs used for production can be distinguished between fixed and variables inputs. Fixed 
inputs are resources that are constant in the short run. Variable inputs may increase or decrease, as 
production increases or decreases. On the long run all factors are variable, none is fixed.  
 
Average and marginal product 
Average product (AP) is the production per unit input factor and is often referred to as productivity 
(Katz and Rosen, 1998). The average product of the variable input is defined as (Colman and 
Young, 1989): 
i
x X
QAP
i
=  [8.3] 
The marginal product (MP) is the partial derivative of the production function over a production 
factor. In other words, it is the change in output resulting from a small change in the variable input 
expressed per unit of the input (Colman and Young, 1989): 
i
x X
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i ∂
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The marginal product of a Cobb-Douglas function is given by (Upton, 1996): 
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The marginal product is thus equal to the coefficient multiplied with the average product. In 
general, the average product of a variable input diminishes along with the marginal product when 
inputs are increased.  
 
Homogeneity and elasticity 
The neo-classical production function is assumed to be homogeneous in order to meet the law of 
diminishing returns. This law implies that the additional amount of output gets smaller when the 
amount of input increases. This proportion is called the scale elasticity or scale of return. A 
homogeneous production function always yields a total scale elasticity ε, which is constant and 
equal to the degree of homogeneity υ. Total scale elasticity is the sum of the output elasticities εi, 
namely (Bairam, 1994): 
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where Xi is input i, and Q is the output. εi is the input elasticity or partial elasticity of production; 
i.e. the percentage change of output resulting from a percentage change in the variable input i. In a 
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Cobb-Douglas function, the estimated coefficient is the input elasticity. If the input elasticity is 
between 0 and 1, the law of diminishing marginal returns applies. If the elasticity is greater than 1 
or smaller than 0, it would not be economically logic for the farmer to operate. The first because 
output grows more than proportionately with any increase in input which means the farmer could 
always gain more by using more of the input. And the second because output decreases as a 
consequence of using more of the input and the farmer clearly does better by reducing input use 
(Ellis, 1988). Similar, a function that is homogeneous of a degree greater than 1 has increasing 
returns to scale or economies of scale, and that is smaller than 1 has decreasing returns to scale or 
diseconomies of scale (Debertin, 1986).  
 
Efficiency 
When a farmer successfully maximises the output from given levels of input, he is technically 
efficient. A farmer is allocatively efficient when the production is efficient considering the relative 
prices of inputs and outputs. A factor of the production function is thus allocatively efficient if the 
slope of the production function, the marginal product (MP), is equal to the inverse ratio of input 
price (e.g. of labour) to output price (of the product) at the profit maximising point, that is when for 
example (Ellis, 1988): 
p
wMPL =    [8.7] 
where MPL is the marginal product of labour, w is the wage rate and p is the price of the product. 
 
However, in reality this widely accepted economic condition of profit maximisation is rarely 
observed. An empirical explanation is that the marginal cost of resource use includes the observed 
market cost plus some additional costs faced by producers. These additional or “shadow” costs have 
to be estimated (Lee and Zepeda, 2001). Mundlak (2000) subscribes the large spread of output and 
input compositions, or allocation errors, to incomplete information available to the econometrician 
about the behaviour of the firm. Dillon and Hardaker (1993) state that information from production 
function analysis can never be perfect because of uncertainty (climate, disease), imperfect data, 
unknown prices and opportunity costs, and differing observations, as each observation (farm) is 
unique, especially in resource qualities, preferences and management skills.  
 
Important production factors 
The following four factors are often mentioned as the main production factors in agricultural 
economics. These factors can substitute one and each other to a certain extent.  
 
Land 
Without land there is no agricultural production. Especially in subsistence farming the land area and 
the quality of the land that a farm household has at its disposal is critical since it determines the 
production potential (Beets, 1990). Land degradation is a serious threat to agriculture, as it 
deteriorates the soil quality and hence reduces land productivity (Semgalawe and Folmer, 2000). 
Land degradation results from intensification of agricultural land use without compensating 
investments in the maintenance of the soil (Coxhead and Shively, 1995). On mountain slopes, the 
main cause of land degradation is soil erosion. SWC practices are used to limit or prevent soil 
degradation due to erosion. The major benefits of SWC are: conserving water, retaining soil 
nutrients and organic matter, maintaining soil depth and soil structure (see Chapter 2 for further 
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discussion). Hence, SWC technologies can maintain or improve the soil quality and thus land 
productivity or production potential. 
 
Labour 
Small-scale farming systems in LDCs are mainly based on family labour. Though family labour is 
normally unpaid, it has a subjective cost in terms of the leisure foregone. An individual will only 
work as long as the marginal product of the extra effort is valued higher than the foregone leisure. If 
opportunities for off-farm paid employment exist, labour employed on the farm has a direct 
opportunity costs measured by the off-farm wage which is foregone (Upton, 1996). Small-scale 
agriculture is often labour-intensive, as family labour is cheaper than machinery. When labour 
becomes scarce, it can be replaced by capital through mechanisation.  
 
Capital 
Capital not only includes money but everything used in production, which is not a gift of nature but 
has been produced in the past. Each item of capital controlled is known as an asset (Upton, 1996). If 
a farm household has access to capital (e.g. through credit), investments can be made in order to 
improve the other production factors and intensify the agricultural production. However, one of the 
characteristics of small-scale agriculture in LDCs is the limited access to capital. 
 
Management skills 
Empirical studies show a significant influence of management capacity on farm output. 
Management skills determine the quality of labour, and are thus another important production factor 
that should be incorporated into the production function. However, it is difficult to quantify the 
management capacity. It is most common to use personal aspects like education level, experience 
and/or age of the farmer as proxies for management capacity. Many studies found that these aspects 
have a positive influence on the farm results (Rougoor et al., 1998). 
 
8.1.2 Material and methods 
 
Sampling and data collection 
In January and February 2002 a survey was carried out among 180 farm households in Pacucha and 
192 farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca. After testing the survey, local students with knowledge 
of agriculture and of the local language Quechua were attracted in order to carry out the survey. The 
survey forms were checked on a daily basis during the data collection period, in order to correct any 
mistakes or vagueness made by the interviewer. In the survey, cross-sectional data was collected on 
farm household characteristics, the farming system, characteristics of farmland, agricultural 
production of the year 2001, programme involvement, use of SWC practices, and the perceptions 
and opinions of the farm household. A few observations are left out of the analysis because of 
unreliable or incomplete data. 
 
Variables used in production function 
The production functions are estimated with OLS regression techniques. The agricultural 
production is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function, relating farm output to farm inputs and other 
factors affecting productivity. Cobb-Douglas functions were estimated for the gross output of 
agricultural production at household level, and for the main staple food crops. 
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The following formula is used: 
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where α0, αi, βi and γi are the coefficients, Q is the output, Xi are the inputs land, labour and 
fertilisers; Fj are the land characteristics of the farm;  Zk are the characteristics of the farm 
household k; and ui is the error term with the expected value of zero and a normal distribution. 
Separate analyses are done for each watershed, since altitude, climate and market opportunities are 
different.  
 
Independent variables that are not significant are omitted one by one after testing the null 
hypothesis that their coefficients equal zero with the F-test and likelihood ratio test. When this 
hypothesis is rejected, the variables are not omitted. In order to be able to compare the production 
functions, the same reduced set of variables is used for the different functions. 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the production function is represented by Y. Cases with zero values for 
agricultural output were removed from the sample. The following variables are used as dependent 
variables (Table 8.1): 
 
Table 8.1 Description of dependent variables used in production functions 
Dependent variables 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
Variable Description Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Agricultural 
production 
Monetary value (S/.) of farm household’s agricultural 
production of the year 2001 1234 1512 1578 2753
Maize Total maize production (kg) of household in year 2001 639 800  
Potato Total potato production (kg) of household in year 2001  3215 5674
 
Table 8.2 Description of independent variables of vector X used in production functions 
Independent variable 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
 
Variable Description Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.  
Crop area Amount of hectares farmland cultivated in 2001 0.81 1.11 0.65 1.17  
Crop labour 
Total amount of mandays applied to cropping 
activities (ploughing, sowing, weeding and 
harvesting) in year 2001 
55.7 54.6 113 204 ***
Dummy 
fertilisers =1 if fertilisers are applied, 0 if not 0.87 0.34 0.98 0.13 ***
Fertilisers Total amount of fertilisers (kg) applied during year 2001 703 1005 2710 5044 **
% organic 
fertiliser 
Percentage of fertilisers is organic fertilisers 
(kg/kg) 52 48 4 19 ***
% chemical 
fertiliser 
Percentage of fertilisers is chemical fertilisers 
(kg/kg) 2 11 15 23  
Dummy 
pesticides =1 if pesticides are applied, 0 if not 0.091 0.288 0.170 0.377 ***
Means of both watersheds are significant different at (*) 0.1 level, (**) 0.05 level, (***) 0.01 level 
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Farm inputs 
The set of independent variables used in the production functions, are split up in three main factors: 
X, F and Z. The factor X represents the inputs for agricultural production (Table 8.2). Cases with 
zero values for land or labour input (i.e. missing values) were removed from the sample. For cases 
with zero values for fertiliser inputs, the natural log of fertiliser input was set at 0 (implying that the 
normal value was assumed to be 1). The dummies for fertiliser application were added to 
distinguish between cases with and without fertiliser input in order to avoid biased estimators 
(Battese, 1997).  
 
Table 8.3 Description of independent variables of vector F used in production functions 
Independent variable 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
 
Variable Description Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.  
Valley  % of total farmland located in valley 0.361 0.357 0.574 0.373 ***
Rainfed % of total farmland without access to irrigation 0.422 0.348 0.394 0.401  
Slope Average class value (ranging from 1 -flat- till 3 -steep-) of soil depth for farmland  1.847 0.603 1.526 0.513 ***
Soil fertility  Average class value (ranging from 1 -poor- till 3 -rich-) of soil fertility for farmland 1.830 0.727 1.846 0.621  
No stones % of total farmland without stones  0.374 0.361 0.698 0.351 ***
SWC = 1 if farm household has implemented any SWC practices, 0 if not 0.591 0.493 0.596 0.492  
Bench terrace = 1 if farm household has implemented bench terraces, 0 if not 0.545 0.499 0.160 0.367 ***
Slow-forming 
terrace 
= 1 if farm household has implemented slow-
forming terraces, 0 if not 0.142 0.350 0.335 0.473 ***
SWC years Amount of years that farm households implements SWC practices 1.30 1.43 3.39 3.85 ***
Tenure % of total farmland with permanent user right 0.970 0.126 0.985 0.072  
Means of both watershed are significant different at (*) 0.1 level, (**) 0.05 level, (***) 0.01 level 
 
Farmland characteristics 
The vector F contains variables describing the quality of land (Table 8.3). The variables slope, soil 
depth and soil fertility have ordinal categories which are combined to one average value 
representing the farmland. The percentage of farmland belonging to a category is multiplied with 
the value of that category (with 3 is best, 1 is worst), and then the recalculated values for the three 
categories are summed up to one value, as is explained below: 
− Slope: calculated value for the slope of farmland, which is the total sum of class values (3: 
steep, 2: gentle, 1: flat) multiplied with the percentage of farmland with corresponding class. 
Farm households are subdivided according to the steepness of their land: If the average value 
for slope of the farmland is equal or higher than 2, it is considered as gentle till steep; if it the 
value is lower than 2, it is considered as flat till gentle. 
− Soil depth: calculated value for the soil depth of farmland, which is the total sum of class values 
(1: shallow, 2: regular, 3: deep) multiplied with percentage of farmland with corresponding 
class. 
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− Soil fertility: calculated value for the soil fertility of farmland, which is the total sum of class 
values (1: poor, 2: regular, 3: rich) multiplied with percentage of farmland with corresponding 
class. 
 
Farm household characteristics 
The vector Z represents the variables describing the farm household (Table 8.4). A few variables 
mentioned in the table are further explained below: 
− Education: Education level of head of farm household. Education = 1 if no education; = 2 if 
primary school unfinished; = 3 if primary school finished; = 4 if secondary school unfinished; = 
5 if secondary school finished; = 6 if higher education; = 7 if professional training. 
− Risk taker: Head of farm household is risk taker; the head was asked to give his preference 
between two different deals: a risky deal with a chance of high profit or loss, or a deal with 
moderate profit for sure. Expected profit of the two deals was the same. Risk taker = 1 if head of 
household choose risky deal; 0 otherwise. 
− Long-term: Head of farm household has long-term perspective; head of household was asked to 
give his preference between two deals: more money on long-term, or less money on short-term. 
Long-term = 1 if head of household choose for long-term deal; 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 8.4 Description of independent variables of vector Z used in production functions 
Independent variables 
Pacucha 
(N=176) 
Piuray-
Ccorimarca 
(N=188) 
 
Variable Description Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Family size Total amount of farm household members 5.108 1.987 4.745 1.890 * 
Gender = 1 if gender of head of household is male, 0 if female 0.835 0.372 0.957 0.202 ***
Age Age of head of household 39.8 13.0 40.0 12.6  
Education Ranking of education level of head of household 2.66 1.26 3.24 1.33 ***
Dependency 
ratio 
Number of household members younger than 16, 
divided by total number of household members 0.459 0.223 0.454 0.217  
Risk taker = 1 if head of household is risk taker, 0 otherwise 0.489 0.501 0.596 0.492 **
Long-term = 1 if head of household chooses for long-term case, 0 otherwise 0.494 0.501 0.638 0.482 ***
Livestock Monetary value (S/.) of livestock owned by farm household 2523 1901 2417 1585  
Off-farm 
income 
Total amount of off-farm income (S/.) that farm 
household earned during year 2001 1943 2084 3969 5426 ***
Presence  Number of months that head of household is present on farm during year 2001 11.7 1.098 11.7 1.064  
Incentives 
money 
Total amount of money (S/.) farm household 
received for implementation of SWC practices 51.6 108.6 10.2 40.8 ***
Incentives 
tools 
Total value of tools (S/.) farm household 
received for implementation of SWC practices 14.3 45.5 42.6 71.1 ***
Ayni = 1 if farm household makes use of reciprocal labour exchange for agricultural activities 0.94 0.25 0.97 0.18  
Contract 
labour 
= 1 if farm households makes use of contracted 
labour for agricultural activities 0.61 0.49 0.45 0.50 ***
Means of both watershed are significant different at (*) 0.1 level, (**) 0.05 level, (***) 0.01 level 
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Selectivity bias correction 
Introducing the dummy for SWC adoption might cause a selectivity bias in the production function, 
as the farm households who decided to adopt SWC practices might be significantly different from 
the farm households who did not adopt SWC practices. These significant differences among the two 
groups might cause difference in the farm output. Therefore, to prevent biased results, a correction 
term has to be introduced in the production function. Inverse Mill’s Ratios are used to correct for 
any selectivity bias in the production function, as was done in the adoption analyses (see Chapter 7 
for further explanation). This results in the following correction terms (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 
2000): 
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where Yi is the output of farm i, β is the vector of all explanatory variables, and di is a dummy 
representing SWC adoption. In case the correction terms are not significant, they are tested with the 
F-statistic and likelihood ratio statistic whether they can be omitted (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
 
8.2 The effect of terraces on agricultural production in the Andes 
 
8.2.1 Agricultural production at household level in Pacucha 
 
Production functions  
The main determinants of the agricultural production are labour, land and fertilisers (Table 8.5).  
 
Table 8.5 Production functions agricultural production Pacucha 
Sub-sample All No terraces Terraces 
N 176 79 97 
Independent variables β β β 
Constant 2.447*** 1.581 3.524*** 
LN(crop area) 0.289*** 0.350** 0.169 
LN(crop labour) 0.415*** 0.512** 0.369*** 
LN(fertiliser) 0.220*** 0.266** 0.205** 
Dummy fertiliser -0.937** -1.361** -0.835 
% chemical fertiliser 0.374 0.016 0.542 
Dummy pesticide -0.411* -0.468 -0.352 
Slope -0.474*** -0.536*** -0.384** 
Soil fertility 0.174* 0.208 0.146 
Dummy bench terrace 0.148 (dropped) 0.436* 
Dummy slow-forming terrace 0.105 (dropped) 0.167 
SWC years 0.108* 0.223 0.152** 
Dependency ratio -0.441 -0.012 -0.673* 
Risk taker 0.058 0.077 0.056 
Livestock -3.9E-5 -4.9E-5 -2.7E-5 
Ayni 0.406 0.474 0.093 
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.755 0.506 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* significant at 0.05 level,** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level 
 
Slope is negatively influencing the production. The steep slopes are located at higher altitudes and 
often imply shallow and poor soils, that is, these are the marginal areas for agricultural production. 
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Bench terraces are the only SWC practices that significantly induce a production increase. Bench 
terraces are also the major SWC practice that is implemented in this watershed. The amount of 
years that the household implements SWC practices also positively influences the production. For 
practices like bench terraces, the positive influence on production is noticeable after a few years, as 
soil improvement is not immediate. Household characteristics like education, age and gender of 
head of household, are not significant, indicating that management skills do not have a large 
influence. The dependency ratio negatively influences the agricultural production for the sub-
sample of observations with terraces. This implies that farm households with a larger ratio of 
children under age of 16 produce less. The production functions with the complete list of variables 
can be found in Appendix 8.1. 
 
Maize is the main crop cultivated in Pacucha. Table 8.6 shows the results of the estimated 
production function for maize. Labour is the most important variable factor for maize production. 
Land and fertilisers are less significant. Soil fertility positively influences maize production, but the 
slope is not significant any more. As maize is mainly cultivated in the valley bottoms, the slope is 
flat till gentle in most cases, explaining the insignificance of slope. The dependency ratio is 
negative for maize production. Farm households willing to take risk produce more maize. Bench 
terraces as well as the years of SWC implementation positively influence the maize production.  
 
Table 8.6 Production functions maize production Pacucha 
Sub-sample All No terraces Terraces 
N 149 92 57 
Independent variables β β β 
Constant 1.770** 1.061 2.960** 
LN(crop area) 0.332*** 0.439*** 0.120 
LN(crop labour) 0.411*** 0.336** 0.581** 
LN(fertiliser) 0.134** 0.131 0.134 
Dummy fertiliser -0.617 -0.771 -0.384 
Rainfed -0.277 -0.448 0.143 
Slope -0.164 -0.218 -0.058 
Soil fertility 0.150* 0.221* 0.061 
Bench terrace 0.072 (dropped) 0.033 
Slow-forming terrace -0.261 (dropped) -0.329 
SWC years 0.122** 0.074 0.172** 
Dependency ratio -0.642** -0.450 -0.903** 
Risk taker 0.321** 0.334* 0.289 
Ayni 0.275 0.413 0.101 
Adjusted R2 0.661 0.668 0.584 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* significant at 0.05 level,** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level 
 
Productivity and efficiency 
With the results of the production functions, the productivity and marginal products of land, labour 
and fertiliser are calculated for the total agricultural production (Table 8.7) and for maize 
production (Table 8.8). The values were re-estimated for sub-samples of farms with and without 
terraces and farms with flat till gentle slopes or gentle and steep slopes.  
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The output (agricultural production) was higher on farms with terraces than farms without. Only on 
farms with gentle and steep slopes, this difference in agricultural production was significant. For 
farms with gentle and steep slopes, the output and the inputs of labour, land and fertilisers are 
significantly higher on farms with terraces than on those without. This indicates that terraces 
successfully enable agricultural production on sloping land. On the gentle and steep slopes, terraces 
increase the productivity and marginal products of the three variable inputs land, labour and 
fertilisers. However, this difference was only significant for labour productivity. The number of 
farm households applying fertilisers (ni / N) is significantly more on farms with SWC. MARENASS 
introduced terraces together with compost techniques. Most farmers therefore apply terraces 
together with organic fertilisers. Also the chemical fertilisers are applied more frequently on farms 
with terraces. The results indicate an increased productivity of fertilisers due to terraces on gentle 
and steep slopes, but the increase is not significant.  
 
The marginal product indicates the technical efficiency of a farm: the higher the value (i.e. the 
steeper the slope of the production function), the more technically efficient the farmer operates. 
Only at gentle and steep slopes, terraces result in an increased technical efficiency of land. The MP 
of labour is increased due to terraces, as well as the marginal product of fertilisers. Labour and 
fertilisers are thus more efficiently used on farms with terraces than on farms without terraces.  
 
The labour allocation of a farm household on agricultural production is efficient, if the marginal 
product of labour equals the market wage (that is, S/. 10). On average, the marginal product of 
labour is indeed equal to the market wage. On farms with flat till gentle slopes, the marginal 
product of labour is higher, but on farms with gentle and steep slopes, the marginal product of 
labour is lower except for farms with terraces. 
 
Table 8.7 Variable factor productivity of total agricultural production (S/.), Pacucha 
     Slope: flat till gentle  Slope: gentle and steep  
 All No terraces Terraces  All 
No 
terraces Terraces  All 
No 
terraces Terraces  
N 176 79 97  91 48 43 85 31 54
Output 1234 991 1433  1623 1448 1818 818 282 1126 ***
Land productivity (S/. ha-1) 
Input 0.81 0.59 0.99  0.89 0.69 1.11 0.72 0.43 0.89 *
AP 2156 2001 2282  2630 2586 2679 1649 1095 1966
MP 622 701 385  639 695 258 418 187 371
ε  0.289 0.350 0.169  0.243 (0.269) (0.096) 0.254 (0.171) (0.189)
Labour productivity (S/. manday-1) 
Input 55.7 39.5 69.0 ** 60.8 52.3 70.3 * 50.3 19.7 67.9 **
AP 24.0 22.2 25.5  26.4 26.6 26.3 21.4 15.3 24.9 *
MP 10.0 11.3 9.4  10.8 13.3 15.2 8.5 6.0 9.5
ε  0.415 0.512 0.369  0.410 0.499 (0.580) 0.397 (0.390) 0.383
Fertiliser productivity (S/. kg-1) 
ni / N 0.87 0.76 0.96 *** 0.87 0.81 0.93 0.87 0.68 0.98 **
AP 3.67 3.02 4.08  3.80 3.28 4.31  3.52 2.54 3.91  
MP 0.806 0.804 0.837  1.507 1.497 1.653  0.372 0.435 0.487
ε  0.220 0.266 0.205  0.396 (0.456) 0.383 0.106 (0.171) (0.125)
AP is significant different between farms with and without terraces at (*) 0.05, (**) 0.01 or (***) 0.001 level.
Values for ε between brackets were not significant. In these cases, the ε and the MP can be considered 0. 
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Considering only maize production (Table 8.8), land productivity is higher on farms with terraces, 
but its marginal product is lower. In case of gentle and steep slopes the marginal product is even 
negative. This is due to a negative coefficient for land in the estimated production function. 
However, this coefficient was not significant and can thus be considered zero. Labour productivity 
is higher for farms with terraces on gentle and steep slopes. On flat till gentle slopes the labour 
productivity is slightly less due to terraces. The marginal product and elasticities of labour are 
higher for farms with terraces in all cases. In case of farms with gentle and steep slopes, and with 
terraces, the marginal product of labour is higher than the average product. This implies that, by 
adding one day of labour, the productivity of labour can still be increased. Instead, less labour is 
invested in maize production on farms with terraces on gentle and steep slopes, than on farms 
without terraces on gentle and steep slopes. In this case, farmers with terraces do not operate 
efficiently from a technical point of view. Fertiliser productivity is lower on farms with terraces 
than on farms without terraces. This is in contrast with the increased frequency of fertiliser 
application on farms with terraces. However, as was shown in Chapter 5, the fertilisers used for 
maize production are applied on the less fertile soils, disguising the effect of fertilisers in a with – 
without comparison. 
 
Table 8.8 Variable factor productivity of maize production (kg), Pacucha 
     Slope: flat till gentle Slope: gentle and steep
 All No terraces Terraces  All 
No 
terraces Terraces  All 
No 
terraces Terraces  
N 149 92 57  89 58 31 60 34 26 
Output 751 749 754  915 949 850 509 408 640 
Land productivity (kg ha-1) 
Input 0.48 0.48 0.47  0.50 0.51 0.48  0.46 0.46 0.45 
AP 1890 1801 2035  2066 1995 2198  1630 1470 1840 
MP 627 791 244  885 1151 745  318 507 -419 
ε  0.332 0.439 (0.120)  0.428 0.577 (0.339)  (0.195) 0.345 (-0.228) 
Labour productivity (kg manday-1) 
Input 29.3 29.5 28.8  35.4 35.4 35.3  27.8 32.8 21.2 *
AP 27.1 26.5 28.0  26.3 26.7 25.6  28.3 26.2 30.9 
MP 11 9 16  11 8 12  10 5 37 
ε  0.411 0.336 0.581  0.425 (0.296) (0.463)  0.369 (0.182) 1.189 
Fertiliser productivity (kg kg-1) 
ni / N 0.87 0.83 0.95 * 0.85 0.83 0.90  0.90 0.82 1.00 *
AP 4.82 6.09 3.02  5.76 7.48 2.81  3.49 3.71 3.25 
MP 0.65 0.80 0.40  0.77 0.68 0.40  0.52 0.89 0.33 
ε  0.134 (0.131) (0.134)  0.134 (0.091) (0.141)  0.148 0.240 (0.101) 
AP is significant different between farms with and without SWC at (*) 0.05 level. 
Values for ε between brackets were not significant. In these cases, the ε and the MP can be considered 0. 
 
The production is allocative efficient if the marginal product equals the ratio of the input price to 
the output price. Considering the labour input, the market wage for labour is S/.10 per manday. 
Maize values about S/.1.05 per kg on the market, thus the price ratio is equal to 9.52. Considering 
only maize production (Table 8.8), the marginal product for labour on farms with SWC is higher 
than this ratio, implying that the profit for on-farm labour is higher than the market wage. For farms 
without terraces, the MP of labour is about this ratio or lower in case of gentle and steep slopes. A 
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farm household is only economically efficient if it operates both technically and allocatively 
efficient (Ellis, 1988), which is not the case here. 
 
8.2.2 Agricultural production at household level in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
Production functions 
Table 8.9 contains the results of the estimated production functions for agricultural production in 
Piuray-Ccorimarca. Land, labour and fertilisers are important determinants for agricultural 
production. Slope is negatively influencing the agricultural production, except for farms with 
terraces.  
 
Table 8.9 Production functions agricultural production, Piuray-Ccorimarca 
Sub-sample All No terraces Terraces  
N 188 81 107  
Independent variables β β β  
Constant 1.994** 2.308 1.826*  
LN(crop area) 0.275*** 0.199 0.317***  
LN(crop labour) 0.395*** 0.642*** 0.279**  
LN(fertiliser) 0.213** -0.058 0.321***  
Dummy fertiliser -1.047 0.736 -1.429  
% chemical fertiliser 0.423 -0.311 0.947*  
Dummy pesticide -0.134 -0.021 -0.086  
Slope -0.232* -0.618** -0.049  
Soil fertility 0.131 0.132 0.077  
Bench terrace 0.085 (dropped) 0.053  
Slow-forming terrace 0.167 (dropped) 0.156  
SWC years -0.008 0.029 -0.026  
Dependency ratio -0.069 0.020 -0.203  
Risk taker -0.014 -0.069 -0.032  
Livestock 6.3E-5 1.8E-4** 7.9E-6  
Ayni 0.301 (dropped) 0.296  
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.520 0.647  
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000  
* significant at 0.05 level,** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level 
 
The positive influence of fertilisers on production is more pronounced for farms with terraces. Also 
the percentage of chemical fertilisers applied is significant for these farms. The most common SWC 
practice in Piuray-Ccorimarca is the slow-forming terrace. However, this variable is not significant 
in the production function. The effect of slow-forming terraces on production is assumed to be less 
than bench terraces. The production functions with the complete list of variables can be found in 
Appendix 8.2. 
 
The main food crop in Piuray-Ccorimarca is potato. The results of the estimated production 
function for potato can be found in Table 8.10. The production functions are quite similar to those 
for the total agricultural production (Table 8.9). Permanent tenure rights positively influence the 
potato production. In case of farms without terraces, the slope negatively influences the potato 
production. The amount of years that the farm households implements SWC practices, is negatively 
determining the potato production. This suggests that the SWC practices deteriorate over the years 
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due to bad maintenance. Household characteristics and field characteristics have no significant 
influence on the potato production. 
 
Table 8.10 Production functions potato production, Piuray-Ccorimarca 
Sub-sample All No terraces Terraces  
N 180 95 85  
Independent variables β β β  
Constant 2.717** 2.302 2.561*  
LN(crop area) 0.336*** 0.220* 0.473***  
LN(crop labour) 0.345*** 0.546*** 0.175  
LN(fertiliser) 0.301*** 0.228* 0.288***  
Dummy fertiliser -2.324*** -1.665 -2.430**  
% chemical fertiliser 0.695* 0.472 0.966*  
Dummy pesticide -0.222 -0.194 -0.111  
Permanent 1.208* 1.642 0.958  
Slope -0.162 -0.466* 0.079  
Soil fertility 0.016 0.121 -0.017  
Rainfed  0.145 0.136 0.256  
Bench terrace 0.174 (dropped) 0.282  
Slow-forming terrace 0.117 (dropped) 0.306  
SWC years -0.015 0.010 -0.051*  
Dependency ratio -0.088 0.260 -0.498  
Risk taker -0.053 -0.016 -0.020  
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.588 0.729  
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000  
* significant at 0.05 level,** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level 
 
 
Productivity and efficiency 
Results in Table 8.11 show that the agricultural output is higher on farms with terraces than farms 
without terraces. This difference is more pronounced on gentle and steep slopes. However, the land 
productivity is lower, except on the gentle and steep slopes. The marginal product of land, on the 
other hand, is higher on farms with terraces, indicating that land is used more technically efficient.  
 
Labour productivity is higher for farms with terraces on gentle and steep slopes, but not on flat till 
gentle slopes. The marginal product and elasticities of labour are lower in all cases. Fertiliser 
productivity is slightly lower on farms with terraces. None of the elasticities for fertilisers in the 
production functions were significant. Note that the differences in output and productivity between 
farms with terraces and farms without terraces are insignificant. The marginal product of labour is 
lower than the market wage, suggesting that labour is not efficiently allocated to agricultural 
production. 
 
Considering only the potato production (Table 8.12), the output is higher on farms with terraces 
than on farms without terraces. The land productivity of farms with terraces is lower, but its 
marginal product higher. The marginal product of labour, on the other hand, is lower on farms with 
terraces than on farms without terraces. The labour productivity is increased by terraces on farms 
with gentle and steep slopes, but decreased on farms with flat till gentle slopes. The differences for 
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fertiliser productivity are not very pronounced. Again, the differences in output and productivity 
between farms with and without terraces are insignificant. 
 
Table 8.11 Variable factor productivity of total agricultural production (S/.), Piuray-Ccorimarca 
     Slope: flat till gentle  Slope: gentle and steep  
 All No terraces Terraces  All 
No 
terraces Terraces  All 
No 
terraces Terraces  
N 188 81 107  134 58 76  54 23 31
Output 1578 1455 1672  1458 1406 1497  1878 1577 2102
Land productivity (S/. ha-1) 
Input 0.65 0.55 0.72  0.57 0.58 0.57  0.83 0.49 1.08
AP 4685 5015 4435  4750 5319 4316  4525 4249 4729
MP 1289 996 1407  1269 1200 1438  1001 35 1277
ε  0.275 (0.199) 0.317  0.267 0.226 0.333  (0.221) (0.008) 0.270
Labour productivity (S/. mandays-1) 
Input 113.2 93.4 128.2  100.7 95.1 105.0  144.1 89.1 184.9
AP 17.0 16.3 17.4  17.3 18.2 16.7  16.1 11.6 19.4
MP 6.7 10.5 4.9  6.3 9.1 3.5  6.3 12.0 5.3
ε  0.395 0.642 0.279  0.361 0.499 0.212  0.394 1.036 (0.274)
Fertiliser productivity 
ni / N 0.98 0.99 0.98  0.99 0.98 0.99  0.98 1.00 0.97
AP 1.47 1.54 1.42  1.70 1.75 1.67  0.88 1.01 0.78
MP 0.31 -0.09 0.45  0.49 0.29 0.63  0.07 -0.49 0.20
ε  (0.213) (-0.058) (0.321)  (0.289) (0.165) (0.378)  (0.083) (-0.481) (0.261)
Values for ε between brackets were not significant. In these cases, the ε and the MP can be considered 0. 
 
Table 8.12 Variable factor productivity of potato production (kg), Piuray-Ccorimarca 
     Slope: flat till gentle  Slope: gentle and steep  
 All no SWC SWC  All no SWC SWC All no SWC SWC
N 180 95 85  125 71 54  55 24 31
Output 3361 2808 3978  3024 2676 3481  4126 3199 4843
Land productivity (kg ha-1) 
Input 0.48 0.41 0.55  0.42 0.42 0.42  0.60 0.37 0.77
AP 11817 13009 10485  12106 13569 10181  11162 11351 11015
MP 3971 2861 4963  3988 3022 5474  2714 850 3933
ε 0.336 0.220 0.473  0.329 0.223 0.538  (0.243) (0.075) 0.357
Labour productivity (kg mandays-1) 
Input 95.1 66.5 105.8  72.4 64.8 82.4  113.9 71.7 146.5
AP 48.7 48.2 49.3  50.2 53.7 45.6  45.4 32.2 55.7
MP 16.8 26.4 8.6  17.7 25.9 14.7  17.8 24.2 6.3
ε  0.345 0.546 0.175  0.352 0.483 0.323  0.391 (0.750) (0.112)
Fertiliser productivity 
ni / N 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.98 0.99 0.98  1.00 1.00 1.00
AP 3.28 3.31 3.24  3.65 3.47 3.89  2.43 2.83 2.12
MP 0.99 0.76 0.93  1.05 0.92 0.93  0.58 1.08 0.52
ε  0.301 0.228 0.288  0.286 0.266 0.240  (0.237) (0.380) 0.243
Values for ε between brackets were not significant. In these cases, the ε and the MP can be considered 0. 
 
The production is allocatively efficient if the marginal product equals the ratio of the input price to 
the output price. Taking the average market prices for labour, a wage is S/.10 per manday and 
potato values S/.0.39 per kg. The price ratio is thus equal to 25.6. The marginal product values of 
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labour for potato production for farms without terraces are about this value. The marginal products 
for farms with terraces are lower than this ratio, implying that the value of farm labour is less than 
the market wage. As the terraces are installed on marginal land, marginal productivity is to be 
expected less. Farms without terraces are located at the fertile valley bottom, and thus produce 
more. Another explanation might be found in the main SWC practice: slow-forming terraces. Its 
effect on production is less than bench terraces.  
 
8.2.3 Factor scarcity and access to markets in Pacucha and Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 
In Table 8.13 an overview is given of the average values of the production factors for the two 
research areas Pacucha and Piuray-Ccorimarca. The value of the output (crop yield) is slightly more 
in Piuray-Ccorimarca than in Pacucha, though this difference is not significant. However, in Piuray-
Ccorimarca farm households sell a significantly larger part of their production on the market than 
the farm households in Pacucha. Farm households in Pacucha own more land than in Piuray-
Ccorimarca. However, the amount of hectares cultivated in the year 2001, was not significantly 
different. Land productivity is significantly higher in Piuray-Ccorimarca than in Pacucha. The 
farmers were asked how much they were willing to pay if they had to hire their own land for one 
year13. The farmers in Piuray-Ccorimarca valued their land much higher than in Pacucha. This 
suggests that land is scarcer in Piuray-Ccorimarca than in Pacucha. 
 
In Pacucha, farmers complained significantly more often about labour shortage during peak periods 
in agriculture, than the farmers in Piuray-Ccorimarca. Farmers in Pacucha also hired more labour 
for agricultural activities. Time spent on farm activities is equal in both areas, but the labour spent 
on cropping activities is lower in Pacucha, resulting in a higher crop labour productivity. 
Cultivation in Piuray-Ccorimarca is more labour intensive than in Pacucha, as potato requires more 
labour than maize. Off-farm labour productivity, however, is twice as much in Piuray-Ccorimarca 
than in Pacucha. Farmers in Piuray-Ccorimarca are better educated than those in Pacucha, but this 
only partly explains the difference in off-farm wage. Farmers in Piuray-Ccorimarca also have a 
better access to the labour market than in Pacucha. That is, in Piuray-Ccorimarca there are more 
opportunities for off-farm labour, as it is situated close to the large city Cusco, and infrastructure is 
better than in Pacucha. Many derive income from relatively lucrative jobs like taxi driver, a porter 
for tourists or making and selling crafts, besides wage labourer. In Pacucha, the opportunities for 
off-farm labour are limited to wage labourer at other farmers’ fields or in construction work. 
Though the head of the farm household spends similar amount of time on farm-, off-farm, and 
leisure14 activities in both areas, the other household members have more time for leisure activities 
                                                 
13 Since the land belongs to the community, farmers cannot sell their land. Many farmers could thus not 
mention an amount for how much they were willing to buy their own land. However, they do have the 
custom to rent their land to others. Therefore, during the survey they were asked how much they were 
willing to pay to hire their own land for one year, in order to have an indication of how much farmers value 
their land. 
14 Leisure is measured, as the amount of days that is left, after distracting the days spent on farm and off-farm 
activities from 365. Children below 6 were assumed not to contribute to the household labour, children 
between 6 and 12 were assumed to contribute the equivalent of a quarter of an adult, children between 12 
and 16 the equivalent of half an adult.  
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in Pacucha than in Piuray-Ccorimarca. These data suggest that, instead of labour being scarcer in 
Pacucha, there are rather more failures in the labour market. 
 
Table 8.13 Availability of production factors in Pacucha and Piuray-Ccorimarca 
 Pacucha Piuray-Ccorimarca  
Output Average St.dev. N Average St.dev. N  
Value agricultural production (S/. y-1) 1234 1512 176 1578 2753 188
Part of production sold on market (%) 13.6 21.0 176 31.5 23.1 188 ***
Production factors    
Land    
Total farm area (ha) 1.066 1.409 176 0.728 1.166 188 * 
Cultivated area (ha) 0.810 1.111 176 0.646 1.168 188  
Population density (person ha-1) 14.6 19.9 176 25.8 32.3 188 ***
Land productivity (S/. ha-1) 2156 2072 176 4685 4999 188 ***
Willingness to hire (S/. ha-1) 538 671 115 2585 3082 120 ***
Labour        
Contracted labour (dummy) 0.608 0.490 176 0.447 0.498 188 ** 
Labour shortage (dummy) 0.898 0.305 176 0.814 0.390 188 * 
Farm labour (mandays y-1) 581 292 176 586 334 188  
Crop labour (mandays y-1) 56 55 176 113 204 188 ***
Crop labour (mandays y-1 ha-1) 108 105 176 488 1172 188 ***
Value crop labour (S/. manday-1) 24.0 19.1 176 17.0 17.5 188 ***
Non-farm labour (mandays y-1) 167 131 176 174 139 188  
Value non-farm labour (S/. manday-1) 10.1 10.0 176 20.7 23.9 188 ***
Leisure household (mandays y-1) 433 359 176 354 267 188 * 
Leisure head of household (mandays y-1) 70.8 68.8 176 80.8 49.9 188  
Fertilisers        
Organic fertilisers (dummy) 0.858 0.350 176 0.931 0.254 188 * 
Organic fertilisers (kg) 809 1037 151 2639 4628 175 ***
Chemical fertilisers (dummy) 0.136 0.344 176 0.878 0.329 188 ***
Chemical fertilisers (kg) 61.7 74.6 24 289 677 165  
Purchased inputs (dummy) 0.619 0.487 176 0.803 0.399 188 ***
Value purchased inputs (S/.) 46.8 67.1 109 136 239 151 ***
Value agric.prod. / value purchased inputs 88.5 159.1 109 34.2 68.2 151 ***
The average values are significant different between households in Pacucha and Piuray-Ccorimarca at 0.05 
(*) level, at 0.01 level (**) or at 0.001 level (***). 
 
In Piuray-Ccorimarca, more fertilisers are applied than in Pacucha. As farmers in Piuray-
Ccorimarca spend more capital on purchased inputs (like chemical fertilisers and pesticides), the 
productivity of these inputs is lower. Potatoes require more fertilisers and pesticides than maize, but 
also more capital is available in Piuray-Ccorimarca than in Pacucha. 
 
Considering the three input factors (land, labour and fertilisers), it seems that agriculture in Piuray-
Ccorimarca is more intensive than in Pacucha. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, land is scarcer, more capital is 
available due to off-farm opportunities, and the crop potato requires more input (labour and 
fertilisers) than maize. In Pacucha, on the other hand, the labour market is more restricted. Though 
the farm labour productivity is high, farmers cannot convert this into cash, as the market for 
agricultural products is also limited. The farming system in Pacucha is characterised by low-
external input agriculture (LEIA), implying that available resources are used and different farm 
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activities are combined to create synergistic effects. The farming system in Piuray-Ccorimarca is 
characterised by high-external input agriculture (HEIA), which means that it is focused on capital 
intensification through improvement of land and labour productivity, and agriculture is 
commercially oriented (Ruben et al., 1996). 
 
8.3 Terraces, productivity and markets 
 
The estimated production functions showed that in both regions the most common determinants of 
agricultural production are land, labour, fertilisers and the slope of the farmland. The production 
functions were re-estimated for farms without and with terraces. In all cases, the coefficient of the 
slope was smaller for farms with terraces than for those without, indicating that terraces help to 
reduce the negative impact of the slope on production. Terraces enable agricultural production on 
sloping land. 
 
Average products and marginal products were calculated in order to define the impact of terraces on 
the three factors land, labour and fertilisers. The effects of terraces on output and productivity are 
more pronounced on farms with gentle and steep sloping land in both areas. In Pacucha, the 
productivity (i.e. average product) of the inputs land and labour are increased due to terracing. In 
Piuray-Ccorimarca, this positive effect of terraces on productivity is only achieved on the gentle 
and steep slopes. The effect of terraces on fertiliser productivity is less clear, though the marginal 
product of fertilisers was higher on farms with terraces indicating an increased efficiency. Fertilisers 
are also more frequently applied on farms with terraces than on farms without terraces. In Piuray-
Ccorimarca, none of the differences in productivity between farms with and without terraces are 
significant. This implies that in Piuray-Ccorimarca the terraces do not affect productivity in 
agriculture. One reason might be that the main SWC practices in Piuray-Ccorimarca are the slow-
forming terraces. The effect of this practice on production is limited, and only noticeable on the 
long-term (Rist and Martin, 1991). Another reason can be that most terraces are installed on 
marginal land with a lower production potential. In Pacucha, terraces significantly increase the 
output and labour productivity on farms with gentle and steep slopes. Here, the main SWC practices 
are bench terraces, which have a more pronounced effect on production. It should be noted that in 
Pacucha mainly manual labour was used. Bench terraces facilitate manual labour in cropping 
activities (e.g.: tillage, weeding, harvest) because of the levelling of the slope. Other examples in 
the Andes have shown that terraces make mechanised tillage (with oxen plough or tractor) more 
difficult if not impossible (e.g.: Winters et al., 2004). In these cases, labour productivity decreases, 
and for that reason terraces are sometimes removed. 
 
In Pacucha, the marginal product of land is lower on farms with terraces (except for gentle and 
steep slopes) and the marginal product of labour is higher. The use of land is thus less technically 
efficient, and the use of labour more technically efficient for agricultural production on terraces. In 
Piuray-Ccorimarca, it is exactly the opposite: the marginal product of land is higher on farms with 
terraces, whereas the marginal product of labour is lower than on farms without terraces. To be able 
to explain these opposite effects of terraces on labour and land in the two regions, one has to 
consider factor scarcity and factor markets. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, land is scarcer but more capital is 
available than in Pacucha, resulting in a more intensive (i.e. HEIA) farming system. Terraces have 
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potential to contribute to this intensification of agriculture. LEIA farming systems, like in Pacucha, 
are restriced to environments with low market development (Ruben et al., 1996). 
 
At first hand, labour seems to be scarcer in Pacucha than in Piuray-Ccorimarca. However, a closer 
look at the data on off-farm labour indicates that in Pacucha there is a more restricted labour market 
than in Piuray-Ccorimarca. Though the labour allocation between farm, off-farm and leisure 
activities of the heads of the farm households are equal in the two regions, the other household 
members spend more time on leisure activities in Pacucha. Off-farm labour productivity is lower in 
Pacucha than in Piuray-Ccorimarca, but the crop labour productivity is larger as the crop labour 
input is lower. In Pacucha, the labour productivity increases as well as the marginal product of 
labour due to terracing. Also the labour input in agricultural production increases, but this is not 
allocated to the production of the main food crop: maize. It appears that farmers with terraces invest 
less labour in maize production. With an imperfect off-farm labour market, one would expect that 
farmers allocate more labour to food crops. However, there is also a missing output market in 
Pacucha. As farmers explained themselves, there is no use in producing more maize if you cannot 
eat it nor sell it. Instead, they decide to produce the same output, while saving labour allocated to 
maize production. This also explains the remarkable result of the marginal product of labour that 
was larger than the average product. A farmer would be more efficient by adding more labour. 
Though the labour productivity would then still increase, this is of no use to the farmer as he cannot 
eat the extra maize produced. One should note that the maize variety (morocho) cultivated on the 
slopes is mainly used for home consumption, whereas the maize variety (almidon) in the valley is 
more often sold on the market. Thus, as long as farmers cannot utilise the increased crop labour 
productivity due to terraces for their livelihood, there is no incentive to invest more in terracing. 
 
If access to the off-farm labour market in Pacucha would be improved, farmers can convert their 
labour into cash. Off-farm labour productivity will rise, and as a consequence, crop labour 
productivity is expected to rise as well. Terraces significantly increase crop labour productivity on 
sloping land. However, instead of investing in terracing, farmers will probably move to the valley 
for crop production, as the crop labour productivity is the highest at flat till gentle slopes. If the 
access to the output market is improved, and there is no change in the existing labour market, 
farmers will be more willing to invest in terraces, as they will be able to convert their crop labour 
productivity into cash. The decision of a farm household to invest in terracing thus relates both to 
the assets available (labour, cash) and the attractiveness of agricultural intensification as a 
livelihood strategy. It is shown in several studies that if households depend on crop production for 
their livelihoods, they invest more in terraces. However, when off-farm income becomes more 
important for a farm household’s livelihood, the incentive to invest in natural resources (e.g. 
terracing) declines as the dependence on agriculture decreases (Zimmerer, 1993; Boyd et al., 2000; 
Hoogeveen and Oostendorp, 2003; Shiferaw et al., 2003). Programme staff in Peru confirmed that 
the SWC interventions were more successful in the more remote areas where there were no off-farm 
labour markets. The high labour input needed for terraces is only feasible when labour opportunity 
costs are low (Chapter 6).  
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8.4 Conclusions 
 
Our results show that terraces have the potential to increase factor productivity, but whether this is 
of interest to a farm household depends on factor scarcity and the existing factor markets. Shallow 
food and labour markets trap farm households within the range of self-sufficiency (Janvry et al., 
1991). When the market for agricultural products is imperfect and prices are low, farmers cannot 
sell their products. Low yields and lack of access to markets mean little incentive for investment in 
terraces, as yields will not cover the costs unless combined with other improvements that link 
agricultural production with markets (Rodríguez and Nickalls, 2002; Kuyvenhoven et al., 2004). 
Equal experiences have been obtained worldwide with costly interventions that had limited impact 
because of their isolated focus on problems and lack of consideration of marketing aspects. Farmers 
were reluctant to adopt labour-intensive conservation practices in absence of market incentives that 
would allow them to offset increased costs (Castaño, 2001).  
 
In order to take advantage of the positive effect of terraces on factor productivity, access to markets 
has to be improved. When the factor productivity in food production is improved due to technology 
change, resources can be freed for other cash-generating activities. More labour can be used for off-
farm employment, or land and capital can be used for cash crops (Janvry et al., 1991). The first 
option will lead to extensive agriculture, and thus less willingness among farm households to invest 
in SWC, the latter option will lead to intensification of agriculture. However, complementary 
interventions, like public investments in infrastructure or effective market performance, are needed 
to improve the market access of farm households in order to increase the returns on their resources 
and products (Ruben et al., 1996; Kuyvenhoven et al., 2004). Also, the credit markets have to be 
improved to enhance a positive conservation response to increased prices for agricultural products 
(Hoogeveen and Oostendorp, 2003). Interventions that combat market failures are important for a 
sustainable rural development and soil management. If SWC practices are promoted without giving 
attention to the enabling environment, farm households are less motivated to implement these 
practices, as it is difficult to convert the benefits into increased income or more secure livelihood. 
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 APPENDIX 8.1  
 
Production functions for Pacucha 
  
Dependent variable LN (agricultural production 
LN (maize 
production)
Independent variables β β 
Constant 1.483 1.284 
LN (area) 0.326** 0.271** 
LN (labour) 0.429*** 0.524***
LN (fertiliser) 0.238*** -0.002 
Dummy fertiliser -1.152** -0.045 
% organic fertiliser 0.109 -0.106 
% chemical fertiliser 0.342 -0.395 
Dummy pesticide -0.413* -0.261 
Permanent tenure 0.530 0.867 
Rainfed -0.003 -0.225 
Slope -0.431*** -0.165 
Soil fertility 0.153 0.107 
No stones 0.061 0.097 
Bench terrace -0.058 0.033 
IMR (bench terrace= 0) 0.127 0.065 
IMR (bench terrace =1) 0.311 0.036 
Slow-forming terrace -0.113 -0.492 
IMR (slow-forming terrace=0) -0.106 -0.234 
IMR (slow-forming terrace=1) 0.179 0.285 
SWC years 0.084 0.117* 
Family size 0.011 0.002 
Gender -0.034 0.085 
Age -0.001 0.003 
Education -0.046 -0.011 
Dependency ratio -0.331 -0.477 
Presence  0.015 0.024 
Risk taker 0.040 0.325* 
Long-term  -0.029 0.111 
Off-farm income -7.4E-6 -2.4E-6 
Livestock -4.6E-5 -8.5E-6 
Total farm area -0.049 -0.040 
Incentives: money 4.0E-4 -0.001 
Incentives: tools 0.001 0.001 
Ayni 0.460 -0.187 
Contract labour 0.086 -0.003 
Adjusted R2 0.697 0.580 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
* significant at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level, *** at 0.001 level 
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APPENDIX 8.2  
 
Production functions for Piuray-Ccorimarca 
  
Dependent variable 
LN 
(agricultural 
production 
LN (potato 
production)
Independent variables β β 
Constant 3.051 1.786 
LN (area) 0.191* 0.387***
LN (labour) 0.367*** 0.247** 
LN (fertilisers) 0.176* 0.299***
Dummy fertilisers -0.877 -2.504***
% organic fertiliser -0.123 0.300 
% chemical fertiliser 0.295 0.724* 
Dummy pesticide -0.094 -0.240 
Permanent tenure 0.530 1.073 
Rainfed 0.102 0.169 
Slope -0.246 -0.022 
Soil fertility 0.101 -0.012 
No stones -0.047 0.068 
Bench terrace 0.059 0.112 
IMR (bench terrace= 0) 0.153 -0.009 
IMR (bench terrace =1) -0.057 0.087 
Slow-forming terrace -0.048 0.118 
IMR (slow-forming terrace=0) -0.242 -0.171 
IMR (slow-forming terrace=1) 0.432 0.273 
SWC years -0.014 -0.021 
Family size 0.017 0.019 
Gender -0.010 0.040 
Age -0.007 -0.001 
Education -0.003 0.024 
Dependency ratio -0.074 -0.137 
Presence  -0.049 0.018 
Risk taker 0.028 0.001 
Long-term  0.026 -0.075 
Off-farm income 7.4E-6 -1.8E-6 
Livestock 7.8E-5 2.1E-5 
Total farm area 0.153 -0.050 
Incentives: money 0.002 0.003* 
Incentives: tools -0.001 -0.001 
Ayni 0.210 0.661 
Contract labour -0.085 -0.213 
Adjusted R2 0.553 0.633 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
* significant at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level, *** at 0.001 level 
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9 Conclusions and outlook 
 
Scientists and practitioners are concerned about the threat of soil erosion for agricultural production 
in developing countries (LDCs). However, it is an often heard complaint that farmers abandon soil 
and water conservation (SWC) practices once external assistance for implementation is removed. 
Some argue that one of the reasons that farmers initially adopt and then abandon SWC practices is 
due to the direct incentives they receive from SWC-oriented programmes (e.g.: Rist and Martin, 
1991; Bunch, 1999; Giger, 1999; Winters et al., 2004). In this chapter, the results of previous 
chapters are put together in order to address the research questions of this thesis. It will be recalled 
that there were four research questions: 
1. What are the physical and subsequent socio-economic effects brought about by on-farm 
SWC activities and how do the farmers perceive these effects? 
2. Which factors are important in the adoption process and what is the influence of the SWC 
programme incentives? 
3. Which socio-economic factors restrain the adoption of SWC practices? 
4. What are the implications of these research findings for the use of incentives in SWC 
interventions?  
 
For this research, an interdisciplinary approach was used, combining agricultural development 
economics with soil and water conservation, in order to understand the complexity of the processes 
of adopting SWC practices in the Peruvian Andes. One innovative aspect in this thesis is the 
analysis of programme impact on adoption behaviour. To our surprise, this aspect has often been 
neglected in adoption studies. However, the decision about participation in a programme defines the 
decision made about adoption. Analysing the decision on programme participation first, allows 
correction of the selectivity bias in the adoption decision due to programme participation. It appears 
that the adoption pattern for SWC is partly determined by the targeting criteria of programmes 
promoting SWC. Another innovative aspect of this research is that the effect of SWC was 
considered not only on agricultural production, but also on factor productivity. This was done 
because an apparent lack of increase in agricultural production can mask important factor savings: 
for example an increased labour productivity, or improvement in the fertility of poorly fertile fields. 
 
9.1 The physical and economic effects of bench terraces 
 
Physical effects of bench terraces 
As bench terraces modify the slope, water is conserved on the terrace platform and runoff is 
prevented (Chapter 5). Though bench terraces are very effective in combating soil erosion at field 
level, one might question the effect of terraces on erosion at watershed level in the research areas, 
especially in Pacucha. Most of the newly constructed terraces are small and scattered through the 
watershed (Chapter 4). Furthermore, other researchers have shown that the main factor causing 
erosion in the Andes is land use, not slope (Harden, 1993; Philip and Reichard, 2002). Hotspots for 
runoff generation are roads and bare fields. It might thus be more effective to invest in practices like 
roadside drainage and to promote the planting of hedges on field boundaries to prevent runoff.  
 
Nevertheless, terraces do create benefits for farmers, as they improve cropping conditions and 
reduce the risk of crop failure (Shively, 1999). The main short-term physical benefit of bench 
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terraces is water conservation. However, at the time of the fieldwork the terraces were still new (2 
to 4 years old), and it is possible that their effects on soil fertility had not yet become noticeable 
(Chapter 5). Production functions (Chapter 8) showed that terraces reduce the negative impact of 
sloping land on agricultural production. According to farmers surveyed, less labour is needed to 
grow crops on bench terraces: manual tillage, in particular, becomes easier. However, the bench 
terraces are too small to use oxen or tractors for tillage. Farmers who till by these means are 
therefore less interested in bench terraces. Examples are even known of farmers demolishing bench 
terraces because they wanted to use oxen or tractors for tilling (Wiener et al., 2003; Winters et al., 
2004). 
 
Yield measurements (Chapter 5) showed that maize production (grain yield, kg m-2) was significant 
higher on bench terraces than on steep slopes (> 25%). The combination of bench terraces and 
organic fertilisers also resulted in a significant increase of grain production, which underlines the 
importance of complementary technologies. However, with the current crop management, the 
increased crop density and accompanying yield increase caused by bench terraces were nullified by 
the area lost due to the terracing. This means that if the improved cropping conditions are not fully 
exploited, bench terraces may ultimately result in lower yields. Bench terraces should thus be 
accompanied by intensified crop management, for example through irrigation or the introduction of 
high-value (cash) crops (Rodríguez and Nickalls, 2002). Unfortunately, the promotion of bench 
terraces is not usually combined with training on sustainable intensive agronomic technologies.  
 
Profitability of bench terraces 
The suggestion in Chapter 5 that bench terraces should be combined with improved agronomic 
practices and high-value crops was confirmed by the cost-benefit analyses (Chapter 6). When 
farmers do not take advantage of the improved cropping conditions, bench terraces are unprofitable. 
Bench terraces create potential for an increase of land value. However, the real land value only 
increases if the value of agricultural production increases. Whether bench terraces are financially 
attractive to a farmer depends on that farmer’s opportunity cost of labour. The opportunity cost of 
labour at break-even point for terracing as an indicator proved to be a useful tool for understanding 
farmers’ rationale. It was found that farmers depending on steep and degraded fields for their food 
production and income, and with a low opportunity cost of labour (due to few off-farm activities), 
are willing to invest in terracing, as such an investment improves their livelihood. Farmers who 
have access to fertile fields in the valley bottom and depend more on their off-farm income (i.e. 
higher opportunity cost of labour), however, are less interested in terracing, as it is not financially 
attractive to them. Direct incentives provided by programmes have little effect on the profitability 
of the terraces. The widespread belief that farmers construct terraces solely in order to receive direct 
incentives seems to be unfounded, as the investment costs are many times higher than the value of 
these incentives. So, instead of installing terraces solely to receive the programme incentives, a 
farmer would do better to generate income by undertaking off-farm activities. The more bench 
terraces contribute to the improvement of their livelihoods, the more interested farm households are 
to invest in them. 
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9.2 Stages, factors and incentives influencing the adoption process 
 
Even though terraces are profitable, this does not guarantee their adoption, as other factors may 
discourage farm households from implementing them. Initially two stages were defined for the 
analysis of the adoption process (Chapter 7): programme participation and the adoption decision. 
The first stage appeared to be crucial for the adoption process, as the main adopters of SWC 
practices were programme participants that had sloping farmland. Who the participants in the 
programmes are, and thus who are the adopters, depends on the programmes’ targeting criteria 
(organisation of activities, use of incentives). 
 
In Pacucha, SWC interventions are more recent, which is reflected in the results on programme 
participation: here, farm households with more land (i.e. more assets) and with a social standing in 
the community, participate in SWC-oriented programmes. Due to their more extensive network, 
they are the first to hear about new interventions in their community. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, SWC 
interventions have been taking place for 20 years, and the diffusion process of SWC practices has 
spread further. By now, all the farm households are well aware of the different programme 
activities. Programme participation is determined by personal characteristics, such as level of 
education and risk aversion, and thus is more demand-driven. The significant negative sign for the 
education level suggests that farm households with a lower opportunity cost of labour are more 
interested in participating in an SWC-oriented programme. The programmes help the participating 
farm households to diversify their income and reduce the risk of crop failure. Risk-averse farm 
households are therefore also interested in participating in these programmes, and so they too adopt 
SWC practices. This finding is in contrast with previous studies, which have found that risk-averse 
farm households are reluctant to adopt SWC practices (Feder et al., 1982; Sinden and King, 1990; 
Marra et al., 2003).  
 
Another finding that was contrary to the results reported for other studies (Feder et al., 1982; Marsh, 
1998; Asfaw and Admassie, 2004) was that farm households characteristics like education or age 
did not significantly influence the adoption decision. The lack of significance of household 
characteristics suggests that the programmes decide on the implementation and location of SWC 
practices. Only when a sub-sample of MARENASS participants was taken, were household 
characteristics like family size, age, education, risk attitude and time horizon found to be significant 
for the adoption decision. It seems that the decision to adopt SWC practices is made individually by 
MARENASS participants, whereas for other programme participants this decision is influenced by 
technical staff. MARENASS uses a participatory approach whereas the other programmes 
(PRONAMACHCS and Arariwa) use a more top-down approach, with the SWC practices being 
installed under the supervision of the technical staff, on marginal land such as steeply sloping 
rainfed fields. MARENASS participants, however, prefer to install terraces on the less sloping fields 
near their houses, where vegetables or fodder crops are grown. From a conservation perspective the 
first approach is preferable, but from an economic point of view it is more interesting for the farm 
household to implement these practices on the better fields near their houses. As these fields are 
cultivated more intensively, more benefit can be acquired (Rist and Martin, 1991; Winters et al., 
2004). Furthermore, users’ rights to these fields are more secure, whereas the degraded fields in the 
upper parts of a watershed are often on communal land (Chapter 3). During the obligatory fallow 
period of these fields, the SWC practices are often abandoned and destroyed by the animals herded 
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on this fallow land. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, technical staff of the programmes has great influence on 
the adoption behaviour of farmers, but the influence of programme incentives is negligible. In 
Pacucha, programme incentives (i.e. farmer competitions) positively influence the extent of land 
under SWC practices, but this is not accompanied by an increase of labour investment in the 
construction. Thus the quality and appropriateness of these SWC practices is questionable. One of 
the weaknesses of the competitions is that the participating farmers are judged according to the area 
of terraces, and not according to the quality of the work. 
 
Many NGOs and programmes in the Andes promote SWC practices, and they use different 
approaches to motivate the farmers. The direct incentives used include food for work, tools for 
work or cash payment. Farmers themselves confirm that incentives are important in their decision to 
participate in SWC activities, though it seems that it does not really matter whether these incentives 
are provided through faenas (PRONAMACHCS) or competitions (MARENASS). Farmer competitions 
are becoming more popular throughout the Andes (IIDA, 2001; Herrera and Valverde, 2003; 
Kessler, submitted). Most farmers enjoy the competition, though it can create jealousy as well as 
unrest if the judgements and rewards are considered unfair. The competition itself creates an 
informal platform for discussion and knowledge exchange, which can be very instructive if this is 
well organized.  
 
9.3 Socio-economic constraints for adoption of terraces 
 
Why is it that the Incas were so successful in terracing, whereas results of many SWC programmes 
nowadays are disappointing? During the Inca Empire, agriculture was the main activity, and was 
even considered as an art that was being constantly refined. Terracing was imposed by the State in 
order to intensify agriculture and enlarge the area suitable for growing maize – the most important 
crop, as it was used for religious purposes. There was a guaranteed labour force for the construction 
of terraces, as the people had to pay taxes by providing labour for the construction of public works 
(infrastructure, irrigation systems and terraces). At present, however, agriculture is less important 
for the national economy of Peru (Chapter 3) and the livelihood of an Andean farm household 
(Bebbington, 1999; Zoomers, 2001). At the same time, opportunity cost of labour has increased, as 
off-farm employment has become more important for survival. Less labour is therefore invested in 
agriculture (Cavassa and Bedoya, 2001). Furthermore, there is no longer any permanent state 
intervention that imposes the construction of terraces. Rather, it is expected that temporary 
programmes will encourage farmers to implement terraces voluntarily.  
 
Farm households decide on the use of soil resources under the constraints and incentives of the 
enabling environment (Knowler, 2004). To achieve sustainable adoption of SWC, different 
conditions have to be met and a farmer should go through several stages in his decision-making and 
in the adoption process, from perception and recognition to acceptance and adoption (Graaff et al., 
2005). Programme incentives can create shortcuts in this process, causing important conditions not 
to be fulfilled, which results in “unsustainable adoption” or abandonment of SWC (Chapter 2). 
However, it is rare for all conditions for sustainable adoption to be fulfilled in LDCs – which raises 
the question of whether conditions are not fulfilled because of the use of programme incentives, or 
whether the context prevents the conditions from being fulfilled and therefore these incentives are 
necessary.  
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In this thesis it has been shown that terraces have the potential to increase agricultural production, 
land productivity and labour productivity (Chapter 8). However, the desirability of these changes in 
farm production depends on the functioning of factor and output markets (see also: Ruben et al., 
1996). There is no financial benefit from terraces for farm households if there are no markets for the 
increased yield, the improved land, or the saved labour. Why make an investment if the benefits do 
not contribute to the household income? Though farm households in the Andes depend on 
agriculture for their food consumption (Chapters 3 and 4), they rely on off-farm employment 
providing cash to be able to meet other consumption needs. Marketing and policy-related factors are 
thus important reasons for adoption or non-adoption of SWC practices (Castaño, 2001), rather than 
the use of programme incentives. If the functioning of output markets is improved, farmers might 
be more willing to invest in SWC, as the market will allow them to convert the benefits into cash, 
thus offsetting the costs. However, if the labour market is improved, there is a risk that farmers will 
neglect SWC, as they might move away from crop production. 
 
In the current situation, the programmes promoting SWC practices do not have the means, the time 
or the power to change the institutional context. So why blame these programmes for using 
incentives to achieve their short-term goals, as their hands are tied to focus on long-term goals 
(Heredia, 1999)? The influence and potential of many programmes are limited by regional, national 
and international markets, and political interests. Given the current context in which they work, they 
are forced to use direct incentives. Of course this does not justify the use of incentives, but it does 
explain it. Strong institutions are essential for successful SWC interventions. However, attention 
should also be paid to the influence of sectoral and macro-economic policies at the farm level. As 
Knowler (2004) puts it: “there is little use in spending large sums on direct farm-level incentives to 
conserve soils if policies at higher levels inadvertently discriminate against these improvements and 
can be adjusted at less cost”.  
 
9.4 Implications 
 
Research implications 
This research aimed to explain the disappointing results of SWC programmes. Unfortunately, it was 
limited by time and by the nature of the data. As the process of adopting SWC practices was 
analysed with only one cross-sectional data set, the influence of risk behaviour and cash flows of 
farm households was not taken into account. More research should be done with panel data, in order 
to analyse adoption behaviour of farm households over time and the influence of SWC on the 
stabilisation of agricultural production and farm income.  
 
Another limitation of the research presented in this thesis is the comparison between a “with” and 
“without” situation; it would have been better to analyse the impact of SWC with a “before” and 
“after” comparison, comparing a group of adopters with a group of non-adopters. As the starting 
point of the “with” and “without” situation are different (both physically in terms of soil 
productivity as was concluded in chapter 5, as well as economically in terms of farm households’ 
assets and income strategy), the results may be biased. Intensive data collection during several years 
is thus needed, to better explain adoption and non-adoption of SWC practices and their impact on 
rural livelihoods. 
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The results showed that the SWC-oriented programmes studied play an important role in the 
adoption of SWC practices, and determine who actually adopts SWC. This finding asks for further 
research to explain the targeting criteria of these programmes and the decision about programme 
participation. The low scores for goodness of fit for the programme participation models in this 
thesis suggest that many factors that determine programme participation were not accounted for. 
Our understanding of the social processes induced by the programmes has to be improved. 
 
Policy implications 
There is no doubt that external interventions stimulate the initial adoption of SWC practices, but 
whether farm households continue investing in these practices depends on other incentives too – 
especially market incentives. The intervention of SWC-promoting programmes as well as the 
market incentives and the agro-ecological conditions (which determine the farming system) differ 
per community, even per farm household. Therefore, it is not possible to recommend one successful 
formula for the promotion of SWC. The more farm households depend on agricultural production 
for their livelihood, the more likely it is that they maintain SWC practices or even continue 
investing in further implementation. The less they depend on agricultural production, the less they 
are willing to invest in soil management, as is the case in areas with failing product markets, or in 
areas with good functioning labour markets. The scarcity of labour and land, which is related to the 
functioning of the factor markets, also plays a role in the adoption process. New technologies are 
adopted only if they increase the productivity of the scarcest factor. However, this factor scarcity 
also differs per region, per community and per farm household. Many factors thus influence the 
adoption process of SWC practices, and therefore there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the 
dissemination of SWC practices. Programmes should therefore be decentralised, so the intervention 
strategies can be adapted to fit the local circumstances. Furthermore, programmes have to realise 
that providing technical assistance, extension and incentives is not enough to promote SWC; the 
economic and institutional context has to change as well. Though a change is not always within the 
capability of a programme, the staff should be aware that this context determines the sustainability 
of the adoption process, and they should therefore look for market opportunities. For example, if 
there is no market for food crops, there might be a market for dairy products, and farm households 
can improve their livestock and animal production by cultivating fodder year-round on terraces. 
 
Programmes and governments that promote SWC, have to be clear about its objective. When the 
main goal is the conservation of natural resources (i.e. the benefits are for society), permanent 
governmental intervention might be needed. Local authorities can play an important role in the 
promotion of SWC, and farm households can be supported by being paid for their environmental 
services. If the main goal of SWC is to improve rural livelihoods through improved agricultural 
production, a good understanding of the performance of markets is crucial. Various technologies 
have to be considered, as not all practices will fit in the existing farming systems. Some incentives 
may be used to give a boost to the initial adoption (e.g. competitions), but over time they should be 
reduced. It is necessary to critically evaluate programmes and their staff, as they play an important 
role in the adoption process. Their targeting criteria have to be well defined, to ensure that they 
reach the right target group, in line with their objectives. What will most determine whether SWC is 
successfully adopted is whether favourable macro-economic conditions are created. 
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Epilogue 
 
September 2003 
Santos gets up and stretches his back. He is standing behind his small ramshackle house made of loam, 
watching his field. He is daydreaming. His land lies on a steep slope; it’s a shallow, dry soil full of 
stones. But one day, this field will be full with terraces. In 1998, MARENASS took him on an excursion to 
Cusco. He was impressed by the terraces built by his ancestors, the Incas. It was explained to him, 
how he could build such terraces himself. He started to construct terraces, together with his son and 
grandson. First a small one, to try. But as they progressed, the terraces got bigger and better. He’s 
proud. Sometimes MARENASS brings visitors, and even tourists come to see his work. He is amazed that 
so many people are interested in his terraces, but it also stimulates him. He will continue until he 
terraced the entire slope. What a beautiful sight that will be! And then, one day, when he has money to 
install an irrigation canal, his terraces will be full with maize, potatoes and beans.  
 
I want to say goodbye to Santos and his wife. I often visited them during my fieldwork, for surveys, 
questions and measurements. They should be tired of me by now, since they offered me so much and I 
repaid so little. Santos’ wife invites me in the dark kitchen for breakfast. As I sit down on a dirty 
sheepskin on a wooden bench, she gets me some food: boiled maize with fresh cheese and fried guinea 
pig. Other guinea pigs – probably brothers and sisters of the fried guinea pig on my plate - , run around 
my shoes, squeaking, without knowing that soon they will be fried too… Santos’ wife talks Quechua to 
me. She knows I hardly understand any word of it, but she loves making fun of me. Sometimes she 
repeats her own words in Spanish, so that I can reply. When it’s time for me to go, we hug. She starts 
to cry softly. “Now that you are going, who will visit this old lady?” she asks. “Don’t cry, please”, I 
answer her. “One day, I will be back.” “Maybe”, she says. “But when you come, we will build a house for 
you so that you can stay and cultivate your potatoes and maize here”. 
 
November 2004 
Returning to Pacucha feels like coming home. I am anxious to see Santos, the successful farmer of the 
MARENASS programme. I remember how proud he was with his terraces, and how ambitious he was to 
terrace his land. Did he continue constructing terraces? I approach his farm. From a distance one can 
clearly see the well built terraces on the slope. But I cannot discover any new terraces… Santos’ wife 
greets me shyly. “Did you really come back, my daughter?”, she asks me. We talk about her health and 
the grandchildren who live with her. I ask about Santos and his terraces. She shakes her head. “Santos 
is busy nowadays constructing houses so he can earn some money. He does not have time anymore for 
the terraces, not even for our garden. We now cultivate in the valley bottom.” Indeed, the once 
beautiful terraced garden now seems abandoned. 
 
Near to the road I find Santos, working hard with some men to construct a house. We chitchat a few 
minutes. Then I ask Santos whether he is still thinking about constructing new terraces on his field. 
He looks at me as if I asked him whether the sky is blue. “You know”, he says, “ MARENASS was a good 
programme but now we are working with a new one, CARE, on things like health, sanitary facilities and 
so one. There are other things to do now.”  
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 Summary 
 
As soil erosion is considered to be a major constraint to agriculture and thus to rural development, 
many efforts are being made to promote soil and water conservation (SWC) practices. However, 
despite these efforts, the adoption of SWC practices by farmers is often disappointing. This thesis 
therefore focuses on the reasons for the adoption of SWC practices. The Andes region of Peru was 
chosen as the fieldwork area because of the importance of SWC in most of its agro-ecological 
zones, and the extensive experience with SWC practices, interventions and use of incentives. The 
following research questions were formulated: 
1. What are the physical and subsequent socio-economic effects brought about by on-farm 
SWC activities and how do the farmers perceive these effects? 
2. Which factors are important in the adoption process and what is the influence of SWC 
programme incentives? 
3. Which socio-economic constraints restrain the adoption of SWC practices? 
4. What are the implications of these research findings for the use of incentives in SWC 
interventions?  
 
Scientists and agricultural extension officers are often concerned about soil erosion and subsequent 
declining soil fertility, which are caused by runoff and in the long-term affect productivity. Farmers, 
however, are often concerned about the short-term effects of runoff on productivity. These concerns 
are reconciled in the concept of soil productivity, as scientists are interested in how soil erosion 
affects soil productivity, and farmers in how soil productivity affects crop production. For the 
biophysical analysis, the research described in this thesis focuses on the impact of SWC practices 
on soil productivity in terms of crop production. For the economic analysis of SWC practices, two 
different schools are applied: the evaluation school and the adoption school. The evaluation school 
tries to quantify the economic impact of different SWC scenarios, making use of cost-benefit 
analysis. However, profitability is not the only condition resulting in adoption of SWC practices. 
The adoption school therefore tries to explain the divergences in adoption behaviour between 
economic agents. There are three main paradigms within adoption theory: the economic constraints 
paradigm, the innovation-diffusion paradigm, and the adopter perception paradigm. Often, 
econometric methods are used in empirical research to determine the significant factors influencing 
the adoption process. As many factors hinder spontaneous adoption, SWC-oriented programmes 
often provide incentives to promote SWC practices. However, the use of incentives is controversial. 
Proponents justify the use of incentives in terms of the social benefits of SWC, the market failures, 
and the fact that farmers are investment-poor. Opponents of incentives argue that they create 
paternalistic dependency: farmers do not feel responsible and do not develop a conservation 
attitude. This debate is complicated by the diversity of definitions, as different types of incentives 
can be distinguished. Many arguments against incentives are against direct incentives, which are 
designed to have an immediate impact on behaviour and have a discriminating effect, as only 
adopters receive these incentives. Other indirect incentives can be regulatory measures (fines, 
taxes), enabling incentives (land security, market development, credit facilities), sectoral incentives 
(price policy, subsidies) or macro-economic incentives (exchange rate, interest rates). 
 
Rural development in the Andes is affected by the region’s inaccessibility, fragility of natural 
resources and economic structures, marginality of productive activities, and its diversity of agro-
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ecological zones and biodiversity. This heterogeneity creates both opportunities and limitations to 
development. Contemporary agriculture in the Andes typically follows a risk-spreading strategy, 
rather than being profit-maximising, and is mainly intended to meet farm households’ food 
requirements. The peasant economy has been marginalised by demographic and economic changes. 
In recent decades, Peru has evolved into a semi-industrial country exporting primary products. The 
share of agriculture in the Gross National Product has decreased, and since the 1980s Peru has been 
a net importer of agricultural products. Small-scale farmers in the Andes are excluded from the 
market due to the low productivity, high transportation costs and high risks of agriculture. 
Therefore, to assure the cash income they need for expenditure on clothes, food, health and 
eduction, the farm households also undertake other activities (commercial activities, wage labour, 
craft, carpentry, production of food products). 
 
The research presented in this thesis was done in two sub-watersheds in the southern part of the 
Peruvian Andes: Pacucha (Apurímac) and Piuray-Ccorimarca (Cusco). Though both research areas 
are considered to be poor, there are some important differences between them. The programme 
interventions in Pacucha are more recent, as this area suffered from extreme guerrilla violence in 
the 1980s. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, the programme interventions are more intensive and diffuse. 
Another difference is that farm households in Piuray-Ccorimarca are relatively well-off. They sell a 
larger percentage of their agricultural produce on the market, and they have a higher off-farm 
income than farm households in Pacucha.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture launched two programmes promoting SWC practices: PRONAMACHCS 
and the recent MARENASS pilot scheme. The former is characterised by knowledge transfer, 
technical assistance and a top-down approach, the latter by a participatory bottom-up approach, 
farmer-to-farmer extension and farmers’ competitions. A third organisation promoting SWC 
practices is the NGO Arariwa, which used to pay farmers in the past for implementing SWC 
practices. PRONAMACHCS has activities in both research areas, MARENASS is active in Pacucha and 
Arariwa is active in Piuray-Ccorimarca. 
 
During fieldwork for this thesis, the impact of terraces on soil productivity and crop yield was 
evaluated by soil analyses and yield measurements in farmers’ fields in Pacucha. The main (short-
term) benefit of terraces was found to be the increased water availability in the soils, which allows 
an increased crop density and subsequent higher yields. As organic fertilisers are mainly applied on 
less fertile fields, it is difficult to see any positive effect of fertilisation. Crop yields on terraces are 
about 20% higher than on the adjacent sloping fields. However, the area lost due to terracing is also 
about 20%, nullifying the positive effect on yield. Terraces improve cropping conditions, but if no 
advantage is taken of this, there will be no effect. Therefore, terracing has to be combined with 
changes in crop management, such as irrigation or the growing of crops with a high market value. 
 
The results of the yield measurements were used for a cost-benefit analysis of the same terraces. It 
was found that terraces are not profitable if the farmer does not take advantage of the improved 
cropping conditions. Whether terraces are financially attractive for farmers depends on the farmer’s 
personal characteristics, especially the opportunity cost of labour. The value of labour at break-even 
point was calculated. In most cases the value of labour invested in terracing was positive, but below 
the market wage. It was also found that the direct incentives the farmers received affected the 
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profitability of the terraces only slightly, as the value of the labour investment of farmers is many 
times higher than the value of the direct incentives received. Though direct incentives may initially 
encourage farmers to implement terraces, they do not make terraces more financially attractive to 
them. 
 
Even though terraces are profitable, this is no guarantee that they will be adopted, as other factors 
may discourage farm households from implementing them. Surveys were done in the two research 
areas and the data were analysed with econometric methods, in order to elucidate the adoption 
process. The analysis was initially split up into two stages, representing two decisions: (1) 
programme participation – whether to participate in a programme that promotes SWC, and (2) 
adoption decision – whether to implement SWC practices on the farmland. Also the adoption effort 
– the investment made (labour or land) in the implementation of SWC practices – was estimated. 
The decision to participate in a programme is considered to be the first stage, as this participation 
will increase farmers’ knowledge of SWC and influence their attitude towards SWC. In Piuray-
Ccorimarca, programmes have promoted SWC practices for more than 20 years and by now all 
farm households are well aware of their activities. Programme participation in this area depends on 
personal characteristics (a low education level and risk aversion) and thus is demand-driven. The 
programmes help farm households with low opportunity costs of labour to diversify their income 
and reduce risk. In Pacucha, the SWC interventions are more recent. Farm households with more 
land and a higher social standing participate. Due to their social standing they have a more 
extensive network and are the first to hear about new interventions in their community. In general, 
the adopters of SWC practices are programme participants with sloping farmland. The great 
significance of programme participation reveals the strong influence of programmes on the adoption 
decision. Farm households participating in MARENASS decide individually on the implementation of 
SWC practices, and they install bench terraces on the gently sloping fields near their houses. The 
adoption decision of farm households participating in other programmes is influenced greatly by 
programme staff, and results in the installation of slow-forming terraces and infiltration ditches on 
the extensively cultivated degraded and steeply sloping land. Direct incentives have not resulted in 
a change in adoption effort, except for the farmer competitions in the MARENASS programme that 
have led to farm households constructing terraces on much of their land, as it is the area under 
terraces that counts in the competition. However, the quality of these terraces is dubious, as they 
have not led to an increase in labour investment. 
 
It is generally assumed that an increased productivity or output stability contributes to the 
willingness of farm households to adopt resource-conserving practices. Therefore, the impact of 
terraces on factor productivity (land, labour and fertilisers) was analysed by estimating production 
functions at household level. It was found that the main determinants of the agricultural production 
in both research areas are labour, land, fertilisers and slope. Production is influenced positively by 
the production inputs, but negatively by the slope. Household characteristics like education and age 
are less important, indicating that management skills do not have a large influence on the total 
output. Though terraces do not significantly increase the agricultural output, they do reduce the 
negative effect of the slope. The effects of terraces on output and productivity are more pronounced 
for farm households with mainly gently and steeply sloping farmland. The effects are more positive 
in Pacucha, where bench terraces are the main SWC practices, than in Piuray-Ccorimarca, where 
SWC practices mainly consist of slow-forming terraces on steep, poorly productive land. The 
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terraces also result in a significant increase of labour productivity in Pacucha. The marginal product 
of land was found to be lower on farms with terraces, but the marginal product of labour was higher 
in Pacucha. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, the exact opposite was found: the marginal product of land was 
higher on farms with terraces, but the marginal product of labour was lower than on farms without 
terraces. This opposite effect was caused by the differences in factor scarcity and factor markets 
between the two areas. In Piuray-Ccorimarca, land is scarcer but more capital is available. 
Agriculture is more intensive, which is expressed by a larger labour input in cropping activities, and 
heavier application of chemical fertilisers. This high external input farming system is defined by the 
crop potato, the scarcity of land and the better-developed markets in the area of Piuray-Ccorimarca. 
Pacucha has to cope with failing labour and output markets because of its bad accessibility. Despite 
the potential of terraces to increase maize production in Pacucha, the farmers decided to keep the 
production at the same level, while using less labour. This resulted in the increased crop labour 
productivity. These findings show that terraces have the potential to increase agricultural production 
and factor productivity, but whether this is of interest to a farm household depends on the existing 
factor markets. When SWC practices are promoted, attention has to be given to the enabling 
institutional environment. 
 
The research demonstrates that the attractiveness of SWC practices for a farm household in the 
Peruvian Andes is very site- and household-specific. The more households depend on agriculture 
for their livelihood and the lower their opportunity cost of labour, the more they can benefit from 
SWC. Though external intervention by SWC-oriented programmes is the key driver of adoption, 
programme incentives were shown to be less important than expected. Market incentives, on the 
other hand, seem to be an important determinant of sustainable adoption. Disparagers of the use of 
programme incentives argue that they accelerate the decision-making process, resulting in adoption 
being unsustainable because important conditions for sustainable adoption are not considered. 
However, it may also be the case that as these conditions for sustainable adoption cannot be created, 
programme incentives are important to achieve any adoption, as without them, nothing will happen. 
Nevertheless, for SWC practices to be adopted, it is essential to pay attention to the institutional 
context and market constraints. As the situation differs per region, SWC interventions should be 
decentralised. If the main goal of SWC intervention is the conservation of natural resources, 
permanent intervention by local authorities can be considered. However, if the objective of SWC 
intervention is to improve rural livelihoods through increased agricultural production, a good 
understanding of the existing markets is crucial.  
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Samenvatting 
 
In ontwikkelingslanden wordt veel moeite gedaan om bodem- en waterconservering (BWC) te 
bevorderen, aangezien bodemerosie als een belangrijke beperking voor landbouw wordt gezien, en 
als gevolg daarvan ook voor de rurale ontwikkeling. Ondanks deze inspanningen is de adoptie van 
BWC maatregelen door boeren vaak teleurstellend. Dit proefschrift behandelt de redenen voor 
adoptie of verwerping van BWC maatregelen. De Andes regio in Peru is als onderzoeksgebied 
gekozen, aangezien BWC aldaar in de meeste agro-ecologische zones belangrijk is, en men hier 
veel ervaring heeft met BWC maatregelen, interventies en het gebruik van incentives. De 
onderzoeksvragen zijn als volgt geformuleerd: 
1. Wat zijn de fysische en vervolgens sociaal-economische effecten van BWC activiteiten op 
een boerenbedrijf, en hoe waarderen boeren deze effecten? 
2. Welke fasen en factoren zijn belangrijk in het adoptie proces en wat is de invloed van 
incentives hierop? 
3. Welke sociaal-economische beperkingen houden adoptie van BWC maatregelen tegen? 
4. Wat zijn de implicaties van dit onderzoek voor het gebruik van incentives in BWC-
interventies? 
 
Wetenschappers en voorlichters bekommeren zich vaak over bodemerosie, veroorzaakt door 
afstromend water, en de daaraan gerelateerde dalende bodemvruchtbaarheid, wat op lange termijn 
de productiviteit aantast. Boeren zijn echter vaak bezorgd over de korte termijn effecten van 
afstromend water op de productiviteit. Deze twee aspecten worden verenigd in het concept 
bodemproductiviteit, aangezien wetenschappers geïnteresseerd zijn in hoe bodemerosie 
bodemproductiviteit beïnvloedt, en boeren hoe bodemproductiviteit de gewasopbrengst beïnvloedt. 
De bio-fysische analyse van het onderzoek zoals beschreven in dit proefschrift behandelt het effect 
van BWC maatregelen op bodemproductiviteit in de vorm van de gewasopbrengst. Twee 
verschillende benaderingen zijn gebruikt voor de economische analyse van de BWC maatregelen: 
de evaluatie school en de adoptie school. De evaluatie school kwantificeert de economische impact 
van verschillende BWC scenario’s met behulp van kosten-baten analyses. Maar rendabiliteit leidt 
niet automatisch tot adoptie van BWC maatregelen. De adoptie school probeert afwijkingen in 
adoptie gedrag tussen individuen te verklaren. Er bestaan drie paradigma’s binnen de adoptie 
theorie: het paradigma van economische restricties, het paradigma van innovatie-diffusie en het 
paradigma van de perceptie van de gebruiker. In empirisch onderzoek worden vaak econometrische 
methodes gebruikt om de significante factoren te bepalen die het adoptie proces beïnvloeden. 
Aangezien veel factoren spontane adoptie verhinderen, worden incentives vaak gebruikt door 
programma’s die BWC bevorderen. Dit gebruik van incentives is echter omstreden. Voorstanders 
rechtvaardigen het gebruik van incentives vanwege de sociale baten van BWC, markt-imperfecties, 
en het feit dat boeren vaak te arm zijn om te kunnen investeren. Tegenstanders van incentives 
vinden dat deze een paternalistische afhankelijkheid creëert: boeren voelen zich niet 
verantwoordelijk en ontwikkelen geen positieve houding ten opzichte van milieubeheer. De 
verscheidenheid aan definities bemoeilijkt dit debat, aangezien verschillende typen incentives 
onderscheiden kunnen worden. Veel argumenten tegen incentives zijn eigenlijk tegen directe 
incentives, die worden ontworpen om een direct effect op gedrag te veroorzaken; deze hebben een 
discriminerend effect aangezien alleen de nieuwe gebruikers deze incentives ontvangen. Andere 
indirecte incentives kunnen regulerende maatregelen zijn (boetes, belasting), incentives die gunstige 
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omstandigheden voor adoptie scheppen (landrechten, marktontwikkeling, krediet verlening), 
sectorale incentives (prijsbeleid, subsidies) of macro-economische incentives (wisselkoers, 
rentekoers). 
 
De ontoegankelijkheid, de fragiliteit van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en economische structuur, de 
marginaliteit van productie activiteiten, en de diversiteit van agro-ecologische zones en 
biodiversiteit in de Andes houden de rurale ontwikkeling van deze regio tegen. De heterogeniteit 
creëert zowel mogelijkheden als beperkingen voor ontwikkeling. Hedendaagse landbouw in de 
Andes wordt eerder getypeerd door een strategie van risico-spreiding dan door winst-maximalisatie, 
en de landbouw is voornamelijk bedoeld om de voedselvoorziening van het boerenhuishouden 
veilig te stellen. Door demografische en economische veranderingen is de landbouweconomie 
gemarginaliseerd. Peru is in de afgelopen decennia veranderd in een semi-industriëel land dat 
primaire producten exporteert. Het aandeel van landbouw in het Bruto Nationaal Product is gedaald, 
en sinds de jaren ’80 is Peru een netto importeerder van agrarische producten. Kleinschalige boeren 
in de Andes zijn buitengesloten van de markt vanwege de lage productiviteit, hoge transportkosten 
en hoge risico’s binnen de landbouw. Daarom ontplooien veel boerenhuishoudens activiteiten 
buiten de landbouw (commerciële activiteiten, loonarbeider, handwerk, houtbewerking, bereiding 
van voedselproducten) om hun inkomsten veilig te stellen, die nodig zijn om de uitgaven aan 
kleding, voedsel, gezondheidszorg en onderwijs te kunnen bekostigen. 
 
Het onderzoek zoals in dit proefschrift beschreven, is uitgevoerd in twee stroomgebieden in het 
zuidelijk deel van de Peruaanse Andes: in Pacucha (Apurímac) en Piuray-Ccorimarca (Cusco). 
Hoewel beide gebieden als arm worden beschouwd, zijn er een aantal belangrijke verschillen. In 
Pacucha zijn de interventies van programma’s recenter, aangezien deze regio geteisterd werd door 
extreem geweld tijdens de guerilla in de jaren ’80. De interventies van programma’s in Piuray-
Ccorimarca zijn intenser en wijder verspreid. Bovendien zijn de boerenhuishoudens in Piuray-
Ccorimarca relatief rijker. Zij verkopen een groter percentage van hun agrarische productie op de 
markt en hebben een hoger inkomen buiten de landbouw dan de boerenhuishoudens in Pacucha. 
 
Het ministerie van landbouw heeft twee programma’s gelanceerd die BWC maatregelen promoten: 
PRONAMACHCS en het recentere MARENASS. Het eerste programma wordt gekenmerkt door 
kennisoverdracht, technische assistentie en een hiërarchische ‘top-down’ benadering. Het tweede 
programma wordt gekenmerkt door een participatieve ‘bottom-up’ benadering, voorlichting door 
boeren zelf gegeven, en competities onder boeren. Een derde organisatie die ook BWC maatregelen 
promoot is de NGO Arariwa, welke in het verleden boeren heeft betaald voor het aanleggen van 
BWC maatregelen. PRONAMACHCS heeft activiteiten in beide gebieden, MARENASS in Pacucha en 
Arariwa in Piuray-Ccorimarca. 
 
Het effect van terrassen op de bodemproductiviteit en gewasopbrengst is tijdens het veldwerk in 
Pacucha geëvalueerd aan de hand van bodemanalyses en oogstmetingen in velden van boeren. De 
toegenomen beschikbaarheid van water in de bodem is het voornaamste voordeel van terrassen (op 
korte termijn), wat een hogere plantdichtheid mogelijk maakt en als gevolg hiervan ook een hogere 
opbrengst. Enig positief effect van organische mest was moeilijker vast te stellen omdat organische 
mest voornamelijk op de minder vruchtbare velden wordt toegediend. De gewasopbrengsten op de 
terrassen zijn ongeveer 20% hoger dan op de aangrenzende velden op een helling. Maar het 
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oppervlak wat door het aanleggen van terrassen verloren is gegaan, is ook ongeveer 20%, wat het 
positieve effect van terrassen op de gewasopbrengst ongedaan maakt. Terrassen verbeteren de 
teeltomstandigheden voor een gewas, maar als hier geen gebruik van gemaakt wordt, zullen 
terrassen geen effect op de opbrengst hebben. Terrassen moeten dus gecombineerd worden met 
veranderingen in het teeltsysteem, zoals irrigatie of het verbouwen van gewassen met een hogere 
marktwaarde. 
 
De resultaten van de oogstmetingen zijn voor de kosten-baten analyse van dezelfde terrassen 
gebruikt. De resultaten tonen aan dat terrassen niet rendabel zijn wanneer de boer geen voordeel 
haalt uit de verbeterde teeltomstandigheden. Het hangt van de persoonlijke omstandigheden van de 
boer af, in het bijzonder van de kosten van alternatieve aanwending van zijn arbeid, of de terrassen 
ook financieel aantrekkelijk zijn. De waarde van zijn arbeid is berekend voor het punt dat de kosten 
en baten gelijk zijn (break-even point). De waarde van de arbeid geïnvesteerd in de aanleg van de 
terrassen was in de meeste gevallen positief, maar wel onder de marktwaarde van arbeid. Het bleek 
ook dat de directe incentives die boeren ontvingen de rendabiliteit nauwelijks beïnvloedden, 
aangezien de waarde van de arbeid geïnvesteerd in de aanleg veel hoger is dan de waarde van deze 
incentives. Hoewel incentives boeren in het begin kunnen aanmoedigen om terrassen aan te leggen, 
maken deze incentives de terrassen nauwelijks financieel aantrekkelijker voor hen. 
 
Ook al zijn de terrassen rendabel, dit is geen garantie dat ze ook worden geaccepteerd, aangezien 
andere factoren boerenhuishoudens kunnen ontmoedigen om terrassen aan te leggen. In beide 
onderzoeksgebieden werden enquêtes uitgevoerd en de gegevens werden met econometrische 
methodes geanalyseerd om het adoptie proces te doorgronden. De analyse werd in eerste instantie in 
twee fasen opgesplitst, die verschillende beslissingen representeren: (1) programma participatie - of 
het huishouden mee doet aan een programma dat BWC promoot, en (2) adoptie beslissing – of het 
huishouden BWC maatregelen op eigen land aanlegt. Ook de adoptie inspanning – de investering 
(arbeid of land) die het huishouden maakt in het aanleggen van BWC maatregelen – werd geschat. 
De beslissing om aan een programma mee te doen wordt als eerste fase beschouwd, aangezien 
deelname de kennis van boeren over BWC doet toenemen en hun houding ten opzichte van BWC 
zal beïnvloeden. Programma’s in Piuray-Ccorimarca promoten BWC al meer dan 20 jaar en 
ondertussen zijn alle boerenhuishoudens goed op de hoogte van de activiteiten. In dit gebied hangt 
programma participatie van persoonlijke kenmerken af (een laag opleidingsniveau en risico aversie) 
en deelname wordt dus bepaald door de vraag. De programma’s helpen boerenhuishoudens met lage 
opportuniteitskosten voor hun arbeid om hun bronnen van inkomsten te variëren en om hun risico te 
verlagen. De BWC interventies in Pacucha zijn recenter. Boerenhuishoudens met meer land en een 
hogere sociale positie nemen deel aan de programma’s. Dankzij hun sociale positie hebben zij een 
wijder netwerk en zijn dus de eersten die over nieuwe interventies in hun gemeenschap horen. Over 
het algemeen zijn de gebruikers van BWC de huishoudens die aan een programma deelnemen en 
hellend akkerland hebben. De sterke significantie van programma deelname onthult de sterke 
invloed van programma’s op de adoptie beslissing. Boerenhuishoudens die in MARENASS 
deelnemen, beslissen individueel over de aanleg van BWC maatregelen wat resulteert in de aanleg 
van bank terrassen op de minder steile akkers dichtbij hun huizen. De adoptie beslissing van 
boerenhuishoudens die aan andere programma’s deelnemen wordt sterk beïnvloed door het 
personeel van de programma’s, resulterend in de aanleg van langzaam-vormende terrassen en 
infiltratie greppels op gedegradeerde en steile akkers met extensieve teelt. Directe incentives hebben 
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de adoptie inspanning, of investering, niet veranderd, behalve de competities onder boeren van 
MARENASS, wat in een groter areaal met nieuw aangelegde terrassen resulteerde aangezien de 
hoeveelheid land met terrassen voor de jurering telde. De kwaliteit van de terrassen is echter 
dubieus, aangezien de competities niet in een hogere investering van arbeid resulteerde. 
 
Over het algemeen wordt aangenomen dat toenemende productiviteit van productie factoren of 
hogere productie stabiliteit bijdraagt aan de bereidheid van boerenhuishoudens om maatregelen 
voor het behoud van hulpbronnen te adopteren. De invloed van terrassen op factor productiviteit 
(van land, arbeid en kunstmest) is daarom geanalyseerd door productie functies op huishoudniveau 
te schatten. Het bleek dat in beide gebieden arbeid, land, kunstmest en de helling de belangrijkste 
factoren van agrarische productie waren. Kenmerken van huishoudens zoals opleiding en leeftijd 
zijn minder belangrijk, wat aangeeft dat vaardigheden in management minder belangrijk zijn voor 
de totale opbrengst. Het positieve effect van terrassen op de agrarische opbrengst is niet significant, 
maar ze verminderen wel de negatieve invloed van de helling. De effecten van terrassen op 
opbrengst en productiviteit zijn duidelijker voor boerenhuishoudens met hellend akkerland. De 
effecten zijn positiever in Pacucha, waar bankterrassen de meeste voorkomende BWC maatregelen 
zijn, dan in Piuray-Ccorimarca, waar BWC maatregelen vooral uit langzaam-vormende terrassen op 
steil en marginaal land bestaan. De terrassen resulteerden in een significante toename van de 
arbeidsproductiviteit in Pacucha. Het marginale product van land bleek lager te zijn op boerderijen 
met terrassen in Pacucha, maar het marginale product van arbeid was hoger. In Piuray-Ccorimarca 
werd exact het tegenovergestelde gevonden: het marginale product van land was hoger op 
boerderijen met terrassen, maar het marginale product van arbeid was lager dan op boerderijen 
zonder terrassen. Dit tegenovergestelde effect werd veroorzaakt door verschillen in factor schaarste 
en factor markten tussen de twee gebieden. Land is schaarser maar kapitaal is meer beschikbaar in 
Piuray-Ccorimarca. Landbouw is intensiever, hetgeen wordt uitgedrukt in een hogere arbeidsinput 
in teeltactiviteiten en een hogere toediening van kunstmest. Dit boerenbedrijfssysteem met een hoge 
externe input wordt bepaald door de teelt van aardappel, de schaarste van land en beter ontwikkelde 
markten in de regio rondom Piuray-Ccorimarca. Vanwege de slechte bereikbaarheid heeft Pacucha 
te kampen met een falende arbeidsmarkt en een falende markt voor agrarische producten. Ondanks 
de potentie van terrassen om de maïs productie in Pacucha te verhogen, besluiten de boeren om de 
productie op hetzelfde niveau te houden, maar met een lagere input van arbeid. Dit resulteerde in 
een verhoogde productiviteit van arbeid in de akkerbouw. Deze resultaten geven aan dat terrassen 
wel de potentie hebben om de agrarische productie en factor productiviteit te verhogen, maar het 
hangt van de bestaande factor markten af of dit voor de boerenhuishoudens interessant is. Het is 
belangrijk dat aandacht gegeven wordt aan deze institutionele context, wanneer BWC maatregelen 
bevorderd worden. 
 
Dit onderzoek toont aan dat de aantrekkelijkheid van BWC maatregelen voor een boerenhuishouden 
in de Peruaanse Andes erg afhankelijk is van de plaats en het huishouden. Hoe meer de huishoudens 
afhankelijk zijn van landbouw voor hun levensonderhoud en hoe lager hun kosten van alternatieve 
aanwending van arbeid, hoe meer zij van BWC kunnen profiteren. Hoewel externe interventie door 
programma’s die BWC promoten de belangrijkste drijfkracht van adoptie is, zijn de incentives van 
deze programma’s minder belangrijk dan gedacht. Incentives van markten blijken veel belangrijker 
te zijn voor duurzame adoptie. Tegenstanders van het gebruik van incentives beargumenteren dat 
deze het beslissingsproces versnellen, wat in een onduurzame adoptie resulteert omdat belangrijke 
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voorwaarden voor duurzame adoptie worden genegeerd. Maar het kan ook zo zijn dat deze 
voorwaarden voor duurzame adoptie niet gecreëerd kunnen worden, en incentives daarom 
belangrijk zijn om adoptie te bereiken, aangezien zonder deze incentives niks zou gebeuren. 
Niettemin is het essentieel om aandacht aan de institutionele context en beperkingen van de markt 
te geven om de adoptie van BWC maatregelen te bevorderen. Aangezien de situatie per regio 
verschilt, moeten BWC interventies gedecentraliseerd worden. Wanneer het behoud van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen het belangrijkste doel van BWC interventie is, kan een permanente interventie door de 
lokale autoriteiten overwogen worden. Maar als het doel van BWC interventie het verbeteren van 
het levensonderhoud in rurale gebieden door middel van verhoogde agrarische productie is, is een 
goed begrip van de bestaande markten cruciaal. 
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Resumen 
   
La erosión del suelo es considerada como una restricción mayor a la agricultura y así al desarrollo 
rural. Por eso, están haciéndose muchos esfuerzos promoviendo las prácticas de conservación de 
suelos y aguas (CSA). Sin embargo, la adopción de las prácticas de CSA por agricultores está 
deceptionante muchas veces, a pesar de estos esfuerzos. Por consiguiente esta tesis enfoca en las 
razones de la adopción de prácticas de CSA. La región de Andes de Perú era escogida como el área 
de investigación debido a la importancia de CSA en la mayoría de sus zonas agro-ecológicas, y la 
experiencia extensa con las prácticas de CSA, con las intervenciones y con el uso de incentivos. Las 
preguntas de la investigación fueron formuladas como siguiente: 
1. ¿Cuales son los efectos físicos y socio-económicos que se traen por las actividades de CSA 
acerca a la finca, y cómo perciben los agricultores estos efectos?   
2. ¿Qué factores son importantes en el proceso de adopción y cual es la influencia de los incentivos 
de las programas de CSA?  
3. ¿Qué restricciones socio-económicos refrenan la adopción de prácticas de CSA?   
4. ¿Cuales son las implicaciones de los resultados de ésta investigación para el uso de incentivos en 
las intervenciones de CSA?    
   
Científicos y personal de la extensión agrícola se preocupan muchas veces por la erosión del suelo 
y, por consequencia, el descenso de la fertilidad del suelo, que son causados por el escorrentía, y 
afectan la productividad en el término largo. Agricultores, sin embargo, se preocupan generalmente 
por los efectos de escorrentía en la productividad a corto plazo. Estas preocupaciones diferentes se 
reconcilian en el concepto de productividad del suelo, cuando los científicos están interesados en 
cómo la erosión afecta la productividad del suelo, y los agricultores en cómo la productividad del 
suelo afecta la cosecha. Para el análisis biofísico, la investigación en esta tesis enfoca en el impacto 
de prácticas de CSA en la productividad del suelo, lo que es la cosecha. Para el análisis económico 
de prácticas de CSA, dos escuelas diferentes son aplicadas: la escuela de la evaluación y la escuela 
de adopción. La escuela de la evaluación intenta cuantificar el impacto económico de 
intervenciones de CSA diferentes, usando el análisis del costo-beneficio. Sin embargo, la 
rentabilidad no es la única condición que causa adopción de prácticas de CSA. La escuela de 
adopción intenta explicar las divergencias en el comportamiento de adopción entre los agentes 
económicos. Hay tres paradigmas principales dentro de la teoría de adopción: el paradigma de 
restricciones económicos, el paradigma de innovación-difusión, y el paradigma de percepción del 
usuario. A menudo, se usan los métodos econometricos en la investigación empírica para 
determinar los factores significantes que influyen el proceso de adopción. Ya que tantos factores 
impiden la adopción espontánea, los programas orientados al CSA muchas veces proporcionan los 
incentivos para promover las prácticas de CSA. Sin embargo, el uso de incentivos es discutido. Los 
defensores justifican el uso de incentivos por lo que se refiere a los beneficios sociales de CSA, los 
fracasos del mercado, y el hecho que agricultores son inversión-pobres. Los oponentes de 
incentivos defienden que ellos crean una dependencia paternalista: agricultores no se sienten 
responsables y no desarrollan una actitud de conservación. Este debate es complicado por la 
diversidad de definiciones, como se puede distinguir diferentes tipos de incentivos. Muchos 
argumentos contra los incentivos están contra incentivos directos que se diseñan para tener un 
impacto inmediato en el comportamiento de agricultores y que tienen un efecto diferenciado como 
sólo los usuarios reciban estos incentivos. Otros incentivos indirectos pueden ser las medidas 
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reguladores (las multas, impuestos), incentivos facilitadores (la seguridad de la tierra, el desarrollo 
del mercado, los medios del crédito), los incentivos sectoriales (la política del precio, subsidios) o 
los incentivos macroeconómicos (el tipo de cambio, proporciones de interés).   
   
El desarrollo rural en los Andes es afectado por la inaccesibilidad de la región, la fragilidad de los 
recursos naturales y de las estructuras económicas, la marginalidad de actividades productivas, y su 
diversidad de zonas agro-ecológicas y biodiversidad. Esta heterogeneidad crea tanto oportunidades 
como limitaciones al desarrollo. La agricultura contemporánea en el Andes sigue una estrategia 
extendiendo el riesgo, en lugar de maximizar ganancia, y intenta principalmente de cubrir los 
necesidades de consumo de la familia agricultora. La economía campesina se ha marginado por los 
cambios demográficos y económicos. En las recientes décadas, Perú ha evolucionado en un país 
semi-industrial que exporta los productos primarios. La porción de agricultura en el Producto 
Nacional Grueso ha disminuido, y Perú ha sido un importador neto de productos agrícolas desde 
que los años 1980s. En los Andes las familias campesinas de pequeña escala son excluidos del 
mercado debido a la productividad baja, los costos altos del transporte y riesgos altos en la 
agricultura. Por consiguiente, para asegurar el ingreso las familias campesinas necesitan para los 
gastos en ropas, comida, salud y educación, la familia agricultora también emprende otras 
actividades (actividades comerciales, mano de obra, artensanía, carpintería, producción de 
productos alimentarios). 
 
La investigación presentada en esta tesis se hizo en dos micro-cuencas en la parte sur del los Andes 
peruanos: Pacucha (Apurímac) y Piuray-Ccorimarca (Cusco). Aunque los dos áreas se considera 
como pobres, hay algunas diferencias importantes entre ellos. Las intervenciones de programas son 
más recientes en Pacucha, como este área sufría violencia extrema del guerrilla en los años 1980s. 
En Piuray-Ccorimarca, las intervenciones de programas son más intensivas y difusas. Otra 
diferencia es que las familias campesinos en Piuray-Ccorimarca son relativamente bien situadas. 
Ellos venden un porcentaje más grande de sus productos agrícolas en el mercado, y ellos tienen un 
ingreso de actividades non-agricultores más alto que las familias agricultores en Pacucha.    
 
El Ministerio de Agricultura lanzó dos programas que promueven las prácticas de CSA: 
PRONAMACHCS y más reciente el programa piloto MARENASS. El anterior se caracteriza por el 
traspaso de conocimiento, asistencia técnica y un enfoque arriba-abajo, el último por un enfoque 
participativo de abajo-arriba, extensión de campesino-a-campesino y concursos campesinos. Un 
tercer organización promoviendo prácticas de CSA es el ONG Arariwa que pagaba al agricultores 
para ejecutar las prácticas de CSA en el pasado. PRONAMACHCS tiene actividades en los dos áreas de 
la investigación, MARENASS en Pacucha y Arariwa en Piuray-Ccorimarca. 
 
Para este tesis, se evaluó el impacto de terrazas en la productividad del suelo y en la cosecha por los 
análisis del suelo y medidas de cosecha en los terrenos de agricultores en Pacucha. El beneficio 
principal (a corto plazo) de las terrazas fue la aumentada disponibilidad de agua en el suelo 
permitiendo una aumentada densidad de plantas y por consiguiente los rendimientos más altos. 
Puesto que los fertilizantes orgánicos son aplicados principalmente en los terrenos de menos 
fertilidad, es difícil de notar cualquier efecto positivo de fertilisantes. El rendimiento en las terrazas 
es aproximadamente 20% superior que el rendimiento en los terrenos vecinos en pendiente. Sin 
embargo, el área perdida debido a la construcción de terrazas es aproximadamente 20% también, 
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anulando el efecto positivo en el rendimiento. Las terrazas mejoran las condiciones para el cultivo, 
pero si no se las aprovecha, no habrá ningún efecto. Por consiguiente, las terrazas tienen que ser 
combinado con cambios en la gestión de cultivo, como la aplicación de riego o cultivos con un 
valor mejor del mercado.   
 
Los resultados de las medidas de cosecha fueron utilisados para un análisis del costo-beneficio de 
las mismas terrazas. Se afirmó que las terrazas no son aprovechables si el agricultor no se 
aprovecha de las condiciones mejoradas para el cultivo. Depende de las características personales 
de la familia campesina, sobre todo los costos de oportunidad del mano de obra, si las terrazas son 
atractivas financialamente para las familias campesinas. El valor del mano de obra al punto de 
equilibrio era calculado. En la mayoría de los casos el valor del mano de obra invertido en las 
terrazas era positivo, pero debajo del salario mercantil. También resultó que los incentivos directos 
que los agricultores recibieron para las terrazas afectaron solamente ligeramente su rentabilidad, 
como el valor del mano de obra de agricultores es superior al valor de los incentivos directos 
recibidos. Aunque los incentivos directos pueden estimular los agricultores de construir terrazas 
inicialmente, los mismos no mejoran la attracción financiera de las terrazas.   
 
Aunque las terrazas son rentables, ésta es ninguna garantía que los agricultores las adoptarán, ya 
que otros factores pueden impedir las familias campesinas de efectuarlas. Se ejecutó encuestas en 
las dos áreas de la investigación y se analizó los datos con los métodos econometricos para elucidar 
el proceso de adopción. Al inicio, se dividió el análisis en dos fases, representando dos decisiones: 
(1) la participación en un programa – si la familia campesina participa en un programa que 
promueve CSA, (2) la decisión de adopción – si ejecuta las prácticas de CSA en su terreno. 
Tambien se estimó el esfuerzo de adopcion – la inversión hecho (mano de obra o tierra) en la 
aplicación de prácticas de CSA. Se considera la decisión para participar en un programa como 
primero etapa, ya que esta participación aumentará el conocimiento de las familias campesinas 
sobre CSA e influirá su actitud hacia CSA. En Piuray-Ccorimarca, los programas han promovido 
las prácticas de CSA durante más de 20 años y ahora todos las familias campesinas son bien 
conscientes de sus actividades. En este área, la participación en programas depende de las 
características personales (bajo nivel de educación y aversión de riesgo) y así es estimulado por la 
demanda. Los programas ayudan las familias campesinas con costos de oportunidad bajos de mano 
de obra para diversificar su ingreso y reducir el riesgo. En Pacucha, las intervenciones de CSA son 
más recientes. Las familias campesinas con más terreno y una posición social más alta participen. 
Debido a su posición social ellos tienen una red más extensa y son el primero en oír hablar de las 
nuevas intervenciones en su comunidad. En general, los usuarios de prácticas de CSA son los 
participantes de los programas con terreno en pendiente. La gran importancia de participación en un 
programa revela la influencia fuerte de programas en la decisión de adopción. Familias campesinas 
que participan en MARENASS deciden individualmente en la aplicación de prácticas de CSA, y ellos 
instalan las terrazas de absorción en los terrenos con poco pendiente acerca de sus casas. La 
decisión de adopción de familias campesinas que participan en otros programas se influencia 
grandemente por el personal del programa, y se resulta en la instalación de terrazas de formación 
lenta y zanjas de infiltración en el terreno deteriorado, extensivamente cultivado y con fuerte 
pendiente. Los incentivos directos no resultan en un cambio en el esfuerzo de adopción, con 
excepción de los concursos campesinos del programa MARENASS que resultaron en un área mayor 
con terrazas construidas por las familias campesinas, puesto que se cuenta el área bajo terrazas para 
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los concursos. Sin embargo, la calidad de estas terrazas es dudosa, porque los concursos no han 
llevado a un aumento en la inversión del mano de obra.   
 
Generalmente se supone que una productividad aumentada o un rendimiento estable contribuye a la 
buena voluntad de las familias campesina para adoptar prácticas conservandos los recursos. Por 
consiguiente, se analizó el impacto de terrazas en la productividad de factor (la tierra, mano de obra 
y fertilizantes) estimando las funciones de producción al nivel de la familia campesina. Fue 
encontrado que los determinantes principales de la producción agrícola en las dos áreas de la 
investigación son mano de obra, terreno, fertilizantes y pendiente. Los insumos influyen 
positivamente la producción, pero el pendiente negativamente. Las características de la familia 
campesina como la educación y edad son menos importantes, indicando que ese capacidades de 
administración no tienen una influencia grande en la producción agrícola. Aunque las terrazas no 
aumentan la producción agrícola significativamente, ellos reducen el efecto negativo del pendiente. 
Los efectos de terrazas en el rendimiento y productividad son más pronunciados para las familias 
campesinas con terreno con pendiente. Los efectos son más positivos en Pacucha dónde las terrazas 
de absorción son las prácticas de CSA principales, que en Piuray-Ccorimarca dónde las prácticas de 
CSA consisten principalmente de las terrazas de formación lenta instaladas en terreno de poco 
productividad. En Pacucha, las terrazas también producen un aumento significativo de la 
productividad del mano de obra. Se encontró que el producto marginal del terreno era más bajo en 
las fincas con terrazas, pero el producto marginal del mano de obra era más alto. En Piuray-
Ccorimarca, se encontró el contrario: el producto marginal del terreno era más alto en las fincas con 
terrazas, pero el producto marginal del mano de obra era más bajo que en las fincas sin terrazas. 
Este efecto contrario se causó por las diferencias entre las dos áreas en la escasez de mercados de 
factores de producción. En Piuray-Ccorimarca, la tierra es más escasa pero más capital está 
disponible. La agricultura es más intensiva que se expresa por un input del mano de obra más 
grande en las actividades de cultivo y aplicación mayor de fertilizantes químicos. Esta sistema 
agricultura de alto input externo se define por el cultivo de papa, la escasez del terreno y los 
mercados mejor desarrollados en Piuray-Ccorimarca. Pacucha tiene que poder con faltas en el 
mercado de mano de obra y de productos agrícolas debido a su accesibilidad mala. A pesar del 
potencial de terrazas de aumentar la producción de maíz en Pacucha, los agricultores decidieron 
persistir la producción en el mismo nivel, mientras usando menos mano de obra. Esto resultó en una 
productividad del mano de obra de cultivo aumentada. Estos resultados muestran que las terrazas 
tienen el potencial para aumentar la producción agrícola y la productividad de factores, pero si esto 
es de interés a una familia campesina depende de los mercados de factores existentes. Cuando se 
promueven las prácticas de CSA, tiene que dar la atención al ambiente institucional.   
 
La investigación demuestra que el atractivo de prácticas de CSA para una familia campesina en los 
Andes peruanos depende por sitio y familia. Cuanto más las familias dependen de la agricultura por 
su sustento y cuante más bajo sus costos de oportunidad de mano de obra, más ellos pueden 
beneficiar de CSA. Aunque la intervención externa por los programas orientados al CSA es el 
determinante lo más importante de adopción, se mostraron que los incentivos de los programas son 
menos importante que esperado. Los incentivos del mercado, por otro lado, parecen ser un 
importante determinante de adopción sustentable. Opponentes del uso de incentivos por las 
programas razonan que ellos aceleran el proceso de toma de decisiónes, produciendo una adopción 
inadmisible porque no se consideran condiciones importantes para la adopción sustentable. Sin 
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embargo, también puede ser el caso que como estas condiciones para la adopción sustentable no 
puede crearse, los incentivos de las programas son importantes para lograr alguna adopción, como 
sin ellos, nada pasará. No obstante, para las prácticas de CSA de ser adoptados, es esencial para 
prestar atención al contexto institucional y constreñimientos del mercado. Como la situación difiere 
por región, deben descentralizarse las intervenciones de CSA. Si la meta principal de intervención 
de CSA es la conservación de recursos naturales, una intervención permanente por las autoridades 
locales puede ser considerada. Sin embargo, si el objetivo de intervención de CSA es mejorar los 
sustentos rurales a través de la producción agrícola aumentada, una comprensión buena de los 
mercados existentes es crucial. 
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